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INTRODUCTION
The Great Schism
The Tractatus de materia concilii generalis must be
viewed in the general historical context of the Great Schism
in the Latin Church.

To understand the work requires some

knowledge ox the beginning of the Schism, of the roots and
course of the dissension, of the attempts at solution and
the traditions out of which they came.

Here complex issues

and events are necessarily given brief treatment.

As Brian

Tierney writes:
An adequate account of all the intricate
schemes that were set on foot in the years of
the Schism, the desperate expedients of exas
perated churchmen, the evasions of the rival
pontiffs, the manoeuvrings of the Catholic
princes, could be undertaken only in the context
of a full-scale diplomatic and ecclesiastical
history of Europe at the end of the fourteenth
century.1
As the College or Cardinals met in electoral conclave
on April 8, 1378, the city of Rome was beset by civil dis
turbances.

Since the end of the troubled pontificate of

Boniface VIII in the first decade of the century the popes
had resided in the papal enclave of Avignon in southern
France.

They had all been French, and their cardinals had

been predominantly so.

Though it may be apparent now that

a major reason for deserting Rome was the chronic disorder

1

Tierney, Foundations, p. 238.
1
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of the Italian peninsula and the city, though it may be shown
that these French popes displayed remarkable independence
from the French crown, though it may be shown that the cen
tralizing of policy and finance which characterized the Av
ignon years was not as totally sinister as was once thought,
though the uselessness and decadent luxury of the papal court
may be found to have been exaggerated, it is important to
realize that
areas.
grieved.

contemporaries suspected the worst in all these

Italians, especially Romans, felt particularly ag
The absenteeism of their bishop meant the loss of

revenue, the dissipation of ecclesiastical property, a slump
in tourism, and a general loss in prestige.

The outcry of

many concerned parties, plus the ravaging of France in the
Hundred Years' War, led to a rising impetus toward the re
establishment of residence at Rome.

Following up some ear

lier efforts, Urban V (1362-1370) brought the curia back to
Rome, but after three years vainly attempting to reestablish
order there, he returned the court to Avignon.

His succes

sor, Gregory XI, repeated this action— but died before he
could depart Rome.
The sixteen cardinals who were with Gregory (six oth
ers were at Avignon, and one was on a mission in Tuscany)
immediately met to elect a successor.

There were four Ital

ians and one Spaniard; the rest were French.

With the clamor

of the Roman mob for "a Roman, or at least an Italian!" and
the nervous embassies of civic leaders, the conclave itself
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3
lacked harmony.

There.was a brief stalemate because the
1
French majority was divided! the six Limousin cardinals
were as determined to elect the fifth consecutive pope of
their region as the other Frenchmen were determined to pre
vent it.

Of the two Roman cardinals, one was considered

inexperienced, one too feeble, and anyway the cardinals were
reluctant to show total servility to the populace.

This

opened the way to a compromise candidate favored by the Ital
ian cardinals, Bartholomew Prignano, archbishop of Bari.

A

man of reputed good character and scholarship, his years of
curial service made him agreeable to the cardinals even
though he was not of their number.

He seemed an admirable

choice to at once satisfy the interests of the Church and
2
the cardinals and placate the Roman demands.
But Bartholomew, who took the name Urban VI, soon dis
played a lack of tact in attempting to curb the worldliness
and extravagance of the cardinals.

During May and June all

of the cardinals except the Italians made for Anagni, away
from Urban.
ly with him.

By the end of September they had broken complete
Alleging that the mob had put the conclave un

der duress, they repudiated Urban's election as invalid.

On

^"Limousin" refers to a region of southern central
France, the center of which is Limoges.
2
For an exhaustive account of the stormy election, with
critical examination of sources, see Ullmann, Origins, pp.

9- ^ 3-
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September 20, they elected a French cardinal, Robert of Gen
eva.
ignon.

He took the name Clement VII and took his court to Av1

King Charles V of France, at first hesitant, threw his
support behind Clement.

The resulting alignment of papal

allegiances reflected the diplomatic array of rival nations
at the time.

France, Scotland, Navarre, Castile, Aragon,

and some German princes adhered to Avignon, while England,
Gascony, Flanders, Portugal, the empire and most of the Ger
man princes, Bohemia, and Hungary aligned themselves with
Rome.

Italy was split as usual.
Who was the true pope?

With Europe evenly divided,

with no clear legal theory to resolve the issue, the con
flict did not often rise above personalities and power pol
itics.

Each side excommunicated the other but expressed

willingness to accept the abdication of the rival on lenient
terms.

Since neither claimant could displace the other, the

new break was graver than any of its predecessors within
the Latin Church.

It was to last until 1417 and was to be

further complicated when the abortive attempt of the Coun-

1Ibid., pp. 44-69* Ullmann*s study of the events fa
vors a definite verdict* the dissident cardinals regarded
Urban's election as valid at the time of the election, and
until their estrangement due to his tactless and abusive
manner, gave no sign that his legitimacy was a question at
all. In fact, they gave every sign that there was nothing
at all amiss. Also, their case against Urban had little
solid basis in canon law. Tierney concurs in this last
judgment, Foundations, pp. 75-76.
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cil of Pisa (1409) to heal the rift led to a third line of
papal claimants.

At the death of Clement VII (139*0» his

curia elected Benedict XIII j Urban VI was succeeded by Bon
iface IX (1389-1404), Innocent VII (1404-1406), and Gregory
XII (1406-1415).
The Church suffered grievously.
was shattered.

Her cherished unity

Rival pontiffs appointed rival bishops and

abbots, maintained rival courts, sent out rival legates,
levied rival taxes.

Public worship was disrupted as dio

ceses were torn apart.

Questions arose as to the legiti

macy of Masses and sacraments.

Scholars, theologians, law

yers, and saints lined up on opposing sides.
People could readily see that the Schism had to be
healed.

To the chorus of cries for unity were added more

strident voices asserting that simple reunion was insuffi
cient.

That was only to treat the effect of the Church's

maladies.

There must be, hand in hand with reunion, a thor

ough reform in head and members, to root out the abuses that
had been plaguing the Church for years.
A variety of schemes were set afoot to heal the Church.
Princes sought to bring down the rival pope by resort to
political pressure.

Many urged the mutual cession of both

contenders to pave the way for a candidate of unity.

For

a time (1398-1403) much of Europe withdrew obedience from
both in a vain attempt to force both to yield.

But grad

ually the cry for the calling of a General Council became
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most insistent, as other avenues were sealed off or proven
unproductive.
Sources of the Conciliar Movement
It has been generally agreed for some time that con
ciliar theories were not unprecedented novelties invented
on the spot to solve the pressing emergency.

Understandably

the earliest modern works tended to concentrate on relating
conciliarism to the immediate situation of the Schism, but
there has been a gradual expansion of investigations into
the roots of conciliar thought and with it a growing reali
zation of the depths of these roots.^

It has been commonly

pointed out that conciliarist ideas were anticipated by cer
tain imperial, papal, curial, and episcopal publicists of
the early fourteenth century, such as John of Paris, William
of Ockham, and Marsilius of Padua.
There are objections to locating the sources of con
ciliarism amid these publicists.

It has become evident that

the publicists relied heavily upon the legal corpus of the
2
Church for their own ideas.
About William of Ockham Brian

1Por a summary of modern scholarship on this topic, see
Tierney, Foundations, pp. 7-13. or Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 198207.
2
Recently, scholars have fruitfully explored hints of
earlier writers about the canonistic sources of Marsilius,
William, and John. See C. C. Bayley, "Pivotal Concepts in
the Political Philosophy of William of Ockham," Journal of
the History of Ideas. X (19^9), 199-218. Tierney, in "A
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Tierney writes that as far as conciliar theory is concerned,
he "was most influential precisely when he was least origi
nal."*

Elsewhere he writes:

It may be doubted whether even the circum
stances of the Schism could have induced so
many devout and distinguished churchmen from
so many countries to subscribe to doctrines
invented by known heretics a couple of generations
earlier.
This is an especially cogent argument when applied against
any alleged influence of Marsilius, a champion of the secu
lar state.

The conciliarists wished to reform the papacy

but in general did not deny its divine origin.

Nor were

they enemies of ecclesiastical prerogatives. As Oakley has
3
pointed out, although the conciliarists, in common with
Marsilius, stressed such ideas as the residence of ultimate
authority in the community, so did John of Paris and William
of Ockham.

And these two deduced from them conclusions less

Conciliar Theory of the Thirteenth Century," Catholic His
torical Review. XXXVI (1951 )* *+15-*+0, and "Ockham, the Conciiiar Theory and the Canonists," Journal of the History
of Ideas. XV (195*0» *+0-70, argues that in his methods of
manipulating canonistic texts nothing greatly distinguishes
Ockham's technique from that of the canonists, and that he
and John of Paris were repeating arguments of the canonists
Huguccio (d. 1210) and Hostiensis (d.1271) in explaining
several of their key doctrines of ecclesiastical authority.
In the former article, Tierney also deals with Marsilius.
See Tierney, Foundations, pp. 157-78, for a full discussion
of the canonistic roots of John of Paris.
*Tierney, "Ockham," 70.
2
Tierney, Foundations, p. 10.
^Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 206.
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radical, and at least in John's case, more germane than Marsilius'.

Significant anticipations of publicist positions

are to be found among the early canonists, and if the main
lines of indebtedness for the conciliarists are said to run
to men like John and William, it must be understood that
they also run on crucial issues through and beyond them,
sometimes even independently of them, to the medieval canon
ists.
Another interpretation of the origin of conciliarism
has been advanced by J. N. Figgis.

He holds that while the

contribution of the publicists and the pressure of emergency
were important, the real source of conciliarism was the con
stitutional example of the secular states, that the concil
iarists discovered the applicability of secular constitution
alism to the Church, and that conciliarism failed because
academic ideas were unable to stand up to political reality
or the deep tradition of papal monarchy.1
It is true that in late medieval times Church and State
shared constitutional issues and problems.

Both were learning

from the experience of corporate organization and the recep1
Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 31-55. Figgis found
support in the writings of Otto von Gierke, for example*
"More and more distinctly and sharply men were conceiving
of the Church as a Polity, and it was natural therefore that
in the construction of this Polity they should employ the
scheme of categories which had in the first instance been
applied to the temporal State." Political Theories of the
Middle Age (trans. F. W. Maitlandj Cambridge* Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 1922), p. ^9.
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tion of Roman law.

Centralization stimulated local protest;

representative assemblies, first summoned to enhance the
sovereign, could learn to give collective expression to such
protest and perhaps take advantage of a crisis to assert
themselves.

The rise of a central bureaucracy, which could

also acquire corporate identity, was an added threat to the
ruler's exercise of power.

Naturally, the rise of papal

monarchy involved these problems, and their existence was
reflected in the Church's growing legal literature.

Tierney

points out what Figgis overlooked: when churchmen, including
conciliarists, surveyed their difficulties, they would nat
urally turn for guidance not to secular law and constitu
tionalism but to ecclesiastical jurisprudence.1

Indeed, it

may even be argued that the resemblance between conciliar
theories and secular constitutional experiments is due par2
tially to canonist influence upon the secular sphere.
Tierney, building upon the suggestions of Gierke, H.
-X. Arquilliere, V. Martin, Walter Ullmann, and others, has

Tierney, Foundations. p. 11. For further criticism
of this and other aspects of Figgis' argument, see E. F.
Jacob, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch (South Bend: Univer
sity of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 1-7; T. M. Parker, "The
Conciliar Movement," in Trends in Medieval Political Thought
(ed. Beryl Smalley; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), pp.
127-39.
2
The growth of representative institutions and organs
of restraint is a vast topic, in which the me_dieval canon
ists played a large role. Tierney, "Some Recent Works on
the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists," Traditio,
X (195*01 59*^-625, discusses the literature on canonist ecclesiology and political theory, 19**5“195*M for later years
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set out to account for the origins and early development of
conciliar theory.

He has concluded that while we must not

overlook the impact of other factors, the essential roots
of conciliarism are not found in the spontaneous reaction
to the emergency of schism, nor in the fourteenth-century
publicists, nor in the example of secular states, but in
canon law and the canonistic commentaries.

Indeed, it is

curious that this influence on the conciliarists has been
so long overlooked or played down, replete with canonistic
citations as some of their works are.
It has been widely held that canonistic doctrines were
solely directed toward and useful for the extension of papal
absolutism, that this was the canonist theory of sovereignty.
It is true that the canonists maintained the superiority of
the spiritual power over the secular? they were pro-papal
in the sense that they were anti-imperial.

But though they

did not question the hierarchical conception of the Church,
they found room within it for a variety of theories on the

see the annual bibliography of the Institute of Canon Law
in Traditio. For more on the influence of canon law on secular law and constitutionalism, see Gaines Post, "The Theory
of Public Law and the State in the Thirteenth Century," Sem
inar, VI (1948), ^2-59? "Roman Law and Early Representation
IrTspain and Italy," Speculum. XVIII (1943), 211-32? "Plena
Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies," Traditio.,1
(1943), 355-408? "A Romano-Canonical Maxim *Quod Omnes Tangit* in Bracton," Traditio. IV (19^6), 197-251? Tierney, "The
Canonists and the Medieval State," Review of Politics. XV
(1953). 378-88; "Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitution
alism," Catholic Historical Review. LII (1966), 1-17. See
also Oakley. D'AiTIy. pp. 99-102. 133-39.
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nature of the power implied in the welter of individuals
and corporations which formed the Universal Church.

Con

sequently, canon law became the common armory of the most
bitter antagonists on a variety of issues.

Far from being

a reaction against canonistic views, conciliarism was a log
ical culmination of certain canonistic strands, part of the
outcome of attempts by generations of canonists, the great
est of whom were practical men of affairs as well as schol
ars, to rationalize the everyday life and organization of
the Church while maintaining contact with ancient doctrine.
Apart from this misunderstanding of the nature of can
on law, the neglect of canonist origins of conciliarism has
been fostered, Tierney suggests, by the sort of interpreta
tions of conciliarism mentioned above, in which it is seen
as accidental, thrust upon the Church from outside, "rather
than as a logical culmination of ideas that were embedded
1
in the law and doctrine of the Church itself."
One cannot
understand the nature of the ecclesiastical polity nor the
constitutional crisis of the Schism without examining the
legal background from which all the protagonists drew their
claims, upon which any ecclesiastical constitution had to
be erected, and in which the late Church formed and disci
plined her young clerics.
From the vantage point of the late fourteenth century,

1Ibid., p. 13.
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one might discern two doctrines of Church unity in the can
onistic literature of the previous centuries.

The most con

spicuous onet the one which has often been regarded as the
canonist doctrine, held that the unity of the Church could
only be secured by the strict subordination of all to the
pope.

"But side by side with this there existed another the

ory, applied at first to the single churches and then at the
beginning of the fourteenth century, in a fragmentary fash
ion, to the Roman Church and the Church as a whole, a theory
which stressed the corporate association of the members of
a church as the true principle of ecclesiastical unity, and
which envisaged an exercise of corporate authority by the
members of a church even in the absence of an effective head.^
There was an ambivalence already apparent among the
Decretists— an ambivalence produced to some degree by the
2
nature of the Decretum — over the nature and concept of the
Church itself.

The Decretists maintained a balance between

the doctrines of papal supremacy and the concept of the
Church as the whole congregation of the faithful (congregatio fidelium) having its own inherent and indestructible

1Ibid., p. 2*K).
2
The Decretum (c. 11*4-0) was the work of the Camaldolese monk Gratian. Epic-making in its scientific approach
and universal applicability, it was a running argument in
which the legal accretions from a millenium of Christian
life were cited, with an attempt at clarification and har
monization. The Decretists were the legal scholars involved
in studying, teaching, and further elucidating the texts of
the Decretum and the dicta of Gratian.
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authority, both found in the Decretum, by taking advantage
of the Decretum's ambiguous use of the term "Roman Church"
(Romana ecclesia).

In some contexts it designated the Uni

versal Church; in others, the local church of Rome, superior
to the other local cnurches in dignity and power.

An even

deeper ambiguity existed: ecclesia itself sometimes desig
nated the prelate who headed a church corporation or com
munity, sometimes all the members of that group, sometimes
an intermediate group of clergy.

In the late twelfth cen

tury the Decretist Huguccio was instrumental in formulat
ing a tradition that was to have great impact in the four
teenth century.

He held that any theory of church govern

ment must be founded on a distinction between the inherent
authority of the Romana ecclesia, understood as the congregatio fidelium, and the power that could be exercised by the
local Romana ecclesia. and that in matters of faith, the
only Romana ecclesia wnich bore the divine promise of in
errancy and indefectibility was the Universal Church, the
congregatio fidelium.

nut in line with the general move

toward papal monarchy and centralization in the first half
of the thirteenth century, especially among the Decretal
ists,1 the canonists of that era clarified the status of

*The Decretum was followed by an accelerated issuance
of papal decretals and their collection. The Decretalists
were the scholars of this material. At the risk of over
simplification, some comparison and contrast between Decre
tist and Decretalists may be made. The former were general
ly prior in time, exhibiting more boldness, vitality, syncre

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14
Romana ecclesia, defining it as the local church of Rome,
which had by divine gift the exercise of all the powers and
privileges which Christ had bestowed upon the Church forever.
To this Roman Church the other local churches were subor
dinate, dependent on it for their authority, united to it
1
as body and members to the head.
But simultaneously, the thirteenth-century Decretal
ists had to define ecclesia from a different point of view,
due to the pressure of intricate problems of the structure
of local churches and other ecclesiastical corporations.
Their resolution here pointed in a direction different from
that of their larger scale development of the term Romana
ecclesia.

Combining the Scriptural insistence that ecclesi

astical authority is conferred for the good of the Church,
not for the prelate's glory, and that cleric's should be
servants, not masters, with existing doctrine on counsel,
consent, and distribution of ecclesiastical property, and
with elements of Roman private law, they worked out the idea
that the prelate is proctor of his corporation, that in some
way the consent of the corporation is required for affairs
pertaining to the general well-being, and that in case of
grave default or vacancy in the headship, the governmental

tism, and ambiguity than the later Decretalists, who were
more given to dry and labored erudition, systematic analysis,
and high papalism.
^Tierneyc Foundations, no. 36-37. 242; "Ockham."
63-69.
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power (potestas iurisdictionis) devolves to the corporation
itself.

The Decretists had become aware of the problems

of Matt. 16*17-19 for the relationship of Peter to the other
apostles.

They had avoided the implication that all the

apostles received power equal to Peter's by an influential
distinction between the sacramental power of orders which
all received equally and the governmental powers of juris
diction bestowed in a superior fashion on Peter.
general agreement that the former power was

There was

handed down

through the agency of an ecclesiastical superior, the latter
(the governmental powers), through the agency and election
of the Christian community.

It was to this potestas iuris

dictionis that the Decretalists were directing their atten

1

Tierney has suggested that in the thirteenth-century
refinement of proctorial prelacy we may find the line be
tween the earlier medieval concept of representation as per
sonification and the modern one, growing increasingly ex
plicit in the fourteenth century, that representation re
quires an actual delegation of authority from the community.
Tierney, Foundations, p. 126. For a full discussion of the
canonist theorizations on the structure of the ecclesiasti
cal corporation, see pp. IO6-I3I in the same work.
2
A problem of medieval political philosophy was the
reconciliation of conflicting legacies concerning the font
of political power. On the one hand was the Scriptural and
patristic tradition of authority descending from God* on
the other were the influence of Roman law that political
associations are voluntary in origin, of German tribalism
that the leader in some way holds authority by popular elec
tion, and of feudalism that political associations arise from
human contract. The solution adopted by the canonists is
expressed philosophically by Aquinas in his Commentary on
the Sentences. Book II, Dist. kk, Quest. 2, Art. 2: G o d T s
the formal cause of authority* but this ultimate source does
not exclude a material cause— a human act— in erecting a
particular form of government. As can be seen, Aristotle

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
tion, and their analysis made more explicit the idea that
this power in some way resided in the community.*

did not provide a substantive solution to the duality of
tradition but lent his modes of thought to a solution. In
this regard Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas -(London:
Routledge and Paul, 2 vols., 195*0» I* 157, writes: "Phil
osophical publicists of the later Middle Ages commonly rec
onciled these two views through the principle . . .suggested
by Aquinas, that God worked through the mediation of human
reason; and this principle was increasingly associated with
the further idea that human reason issued in the popular
consent which was the immediate basis of valid authority."
See Oakley, D*Ailly, pp. 133-3^»
*Tierney, Foundations, pp. 117-27* It is well to keep
in mind that in this discussion the canonists and later the
conciliarists of the era of the Councils of Pisa and Con
stance were not concerned with the sacramental power (potes
tas ordinis), conferred from above and equal in all apostolic
successors, but rather with the power of regulating subjects
and governing them to salvation, the governmental power (potestas iurisdictionis). This latter power was not possessed
to an equal extent by all of the apostles but was conferred
in its fullness (plenitudo potestatis) upon Peter alone. A
basic problem confronting conciliarists was that of deciding
just what was entailed in the government of the Church by
this plenitude of power. The constitutional implications
of d'Ailly*s brand of conciliarism are often misunderstood
due to a failure to see the distinction between orders and
jurisdiction. For d'Ailly, conciliarism had to do, not with
the power of orders, nor with an unerring magisterium, but
with the location within the Church of final responsibility
for the potestas iurisdictionis which was normally exercised
in fullness by the pope. Still» there seems to have been
some confusion and blurring of distinctions. The fact that
the issue of the locus of inerrancy is so often raised in
discussions of these governmental powers seems to be an indi
cation of how closely these thinkers linked the preservation
of pure belief with the indefectibility of the institution
and government machinery of the Church. While the main can
onist tradition turned the doctrine of papal jurisdictional
primacy into a doctrine of an infallible papal teaching au
thority, the conciliarists used the doctrine of the doctrinal
inerrancy of the Universal Church as an argument for the
jurisdictional primacy of the General Council. In this paper
the attribute of "inerrancy" as I have employed it has over
tones of both "indefectibility" and "infallibility."
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Tierney has pointed out the irony of this development;
at the very time when the Decretalists were most uncompro
misingly proclaiming Rome as mother and teacher and the pope
as lord of the world, they were evolving a corporate theory
built upon the assumption that a prelate is not a lord but
a procurator.

Future critics found in the corporative ideas

surrounding the proctorial principle "an instrument peculiar
ly well adapted to sap the foundations of the doctrine of
papal sovereignty that the canonists themselves had helped
to build up."

This Decretalist analysis of corporative

theory lay in an area seemingly remote from large issues of
ecclesiology and was devoid of intent to damage papal sov
ereignty,
. . .but in fact a more detailed analysis of
the structure of corporate groups was precisely
what was necessary to provide a sounder juristic
basis for the rather vague "constitutional" ideas
that occur in the Decretist works. At every point
where the Decretist arguments ended in ambiguity
a coherent theory of corporate law could help to
clarify their implications.2
The Decretist suggestion of a diffused power to main
tain the faith was clarified by Decretalist discussion of
agency and delegation.

The status of the cardinals in the

local Roman Church could only be understood with an adequate
structural theory of the cathedral chapter at hand.

Decre

talist emphasis on election as the source of episcopal juris

1Ibid.. p. 243.
2Ibid., p. 96.

See also pp. 96-131, 242, 243.
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diction made it possible for a bishop to assert that Christ’s
delegation of jurisdiction through the apostles came to him
via local election or consent, not via the fullness of power
exercised by the pope.

The persistent dichotomy in thir

teenth-century Decretalist literature between the analysis
of the structure of the whole Church and that which was ap
plied to the lesser corporations influenced later ecclesiology and made difficult the juristic formulation of the
comprehensive, consistent theory of papal monarchy sought
after by many.

"The conciliar theories of the fourteenth

century were nearly all . . .dependent upon the canonistic
corporation doctrines of the preceding century."*
An important phase of conciliar development was the
gradual transfer by the canonists of their corporative the
ories developed in the analysis of the lesser churches to
the Church as a whole.

There was then the possibility of

viewing the Universal Church as a corporation with the pope
as its head.

But first it was necessary to establish that

that ecclesia. in the widest sense, Christ’s Mystical Body
(corpus mysticum). was indeed a corporation in the legal
sense.

One can trace in certain thirteenth-century glosses

the assimilation of the Scriptural-patristic doctrine of the
corpus mysticum. the fusing of this theological concept of
unity in Christ with the juristic idea of legal incorpora

1Ibid., p. 105.
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tion.

A significant contribution to a juristic conception

of the whole Church had been made by Huguccio when he sug
gested that the structure of the whole Church was comparable
to that of its lesser corporations.

The Decretalist analy

sis, which stressed the authority of the head of the corpor
ation, was important for the legalization of corpus mysticum,
in its emphasis on the Roman Church as head of the Body of
Christ and the other local churches as members.

The trans

fer was further encouraged by the c ire tunstances of the four
teenth century, with a more explicit doctrine of representa
tion and the subtle analysis of the prelate's authority and
of the relationship between the individual churches and the
i
Universal Church.

Ibid., pp. 132-41. Many objections to understanding
the Mystical Body in anything but a mystical sense have been
laid to rest by recent scholarship. By the late fourteenth
century the doctrine had been almost emptied of mystical
and sacramental connotations and had acquired political and
corporational associations. ' Incidentally, this information
provides some answer to the charge that those conciliarists
who were nominalists, including d'Ailly, were being incon
sistent in using a term like corpus mysticum. From the thir
teenth century on, the idea is commonly found that political
organization is an instrument for the pursuit of joint action
toward the citizens* common interests. This idea of a set
of common interests as the goal of community action is not
only a logical offspring of the corporate experience of med
ieval times; its conception of interests in a collective
fashion is most compatible with late medieval nominalism,
with its suspicion of universals. While Aquinas could as
cribe to the state or the Church a formal unity and a common
good formally distinct from the goods of individuals, the
nominalists had to conceive of political bodies and common
goods in collective terms. For more on corpus mysticum,
see Ernst Kantorowicz, The King*s Two Bodies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 193-273; see Oakley,
D'Ailly. pp. 55-61, for a good discussion and references
to the important work of Henri de Lubac.
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With the application of corporate theory to the whole
Body of Christ the weakness of the Decretalist case for pa
pal monarchy becomes more obvious.

The Decretalists pur

sued a doctrine of the corporate unity of all of the churches
under the local Roman Church with a view toward presenting
the pope, with his plenitudo potestatis, as the embodiment
of this vast corporation's authority.

But there was always

the possibility of emphasizing the participatory facet of
corporate unity, a view surely in keeping with the canonist
theories on the corporate structure of the lesser ecclesiastical corporations.

Once these theories had been applied

to explain the structure of the whole Church, they invited
analysis of the papacy as an elective office analogous to
the headship of any ecclesiastical corporation.

This was

a sensitive issue, because it was just that power in which
the pope was held to be superior to other prelates, the potestas iurisdictionis that the pope held in fullness, which
was the power derived from the community's authority by elec
tion in the normal ecclesiastical corporation.

The high pa-

palist vision of plenitudo potestatis was thus vulnerable
at its apparently strongest point, for later radicals could
trace the concept to Decretist origins, where the term it
self was more fluid.

In examining their analog, the lesser

ecclesiastical corporation, they could see that the concept

*The constitutional ambiguity characteristic of corpor
ate experience has been pointed out by many writers.
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could be used to signify an authority conferred by the com
munity on its elective head, a form of proctorial mandate.
"The whole concept of plenitudo potestatis. regarded as a
basis for the more extreme claims put forward on behalf of
the Papacy, was peculiarly ill-adapted to withstand any de
tailed canonistic analysis . . . ."

In this it typified

the general weakness of the thirteenth-century theories of
papal sovereignty.

"The Decretalists built a great edifice

of papal claims, but their underlying theories concerning
the corporate structure of the Church and the origins of
ecclesiastical authority provided an inadequate foundation
1
for such an ambitious superstructure."
There were great implications in this transfer of cor
porate doctrine to the whole Church for the position of the
pope or Roman Church in relation to the Universal Church or
General Council, as well as for the relationship of the pope
to the local Roman Church, especially to the cardinals with
in it.

One could pass from episcopalism to conciliarism;

the idea that the corporation must be consulted in decisions
touching the general welfare could be developed to favor a
General Council representing the entire Church as a perma
nent organ of ecclesiastical government.

The idea of the

corporation as the source of its head*s authority made pos
sible an interpretation of plenitudo potestatis from a rep
resentative angle.

A parallel process was applicable to the

■^Tierney. Foundations, pp. 14-1-491 quoted material, p.
148.
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local Roman Church.

In the fourteenth century, the cardi

nals would claim to be a divinely ordained element of ec
clesiastical government and would assert the right to parti
cipate in shaping policy for the Roman Church.

They would

even present themselves as the source of papal authority.
A crucial figure in the development was Hostiensis, who
was not only important in shaping corporate theory but also
in applying it and its corollaries to the Roman Church and
the Universal Church.

In assuming that the Roman Church was

subject like any bishopric to normal corporate law, he was
led to form an oligarchic idea of the local Roman diocese,
and he saw the implications of corporate theory for the pope's
headship of the whole Universal Church.

In applying corpor

ate theory to the whole Church he arrived at a doctrine of
the Church as one corporation, in whose authority all mem
bers participated in the last resort.

In certain emergen

cies, he foresaw the devolution of power from the pope, to
the cardinals, to the people and clergy of Rome, and to the
Universal Church represented in a General Council.

While

his doctrine differed from the prevailing theory, it was to
have enormous consequences in the fourteenth century.

In

Hostiensis, the Decretist idea of the inherent authority of
the community was transformed from a negative incapacity to
err and a passive dominion over goods to a positive power
to act in the common interest in emergencies.

As Tierney

points out, it was only a small step from saying that the
power of the cardinals could devolve to the whole Church,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
•to saying that in their normal exercise of authority the
cardinals represented the Church,1
In the fourteenth century the most respected canonists
held that in the corporate whole of the Universal Church all
power was concentrated in the head, the pope, by a direct
act of divine will.

But the same men also held to the prin

ciples of corporate structure developed in the analysis of
the lesser corporation and carried further the application
of these principles to the whole congregatio fidelium and
the local Romana ecclesia.

Thus, the dichotomy mentioned

above persisted into the troubled fourteenth century, with
its attendant difficulties for the theorists of high papalism.

"The fourteenth-century canonists, the defenders of

papal authority, were operating with just the same concept
of the Church that . . .was to form the very foundation of
p
the conciliar theories."
1

Ibid.. p. 153* For discussion of Hostiensis* doctrines
see Ibid.. pp. l48-53» 24-4, and Tierney, "A Conciliar The
ory of the Thirteenth Century," Catholic Historical Review.
XXXVI (1951), ^15-^0.
2
Tierney, Foundations, p. 205. Tierney suggests that
the material with which these Decretalists worked had much
to do with their difficulties. Not only was their theory
of unitary absolutism faced with the reality of church life,
the diverse corporate entities which actually made up the
Church, but early in the century the Rosarium of Guido de
Baysio resurrected many old Decretist texts, whose more "con
stitutional" ideas the Decretalists felt compelled to deal
with (p. 207). See Ibid.. pp. 215-16 for the possible in
fluence of the political situation on the way noted four
teenth-century Decretalists conceived of dealing with an
heretical pope, and pp. 199-219 for a general discussion
of the fourteenth-century canonists.
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The lack of an integrated theory might have been of no
consequence in another time, but it was a great embarrass
ment to the fourteenth-century popes, who stirred powerful
and resourceful opposition.

The disputes between them and

secular rulers, the problems of Celestine V's abdication
and of the Spiritual Franciscans with their radical ideas
of apostolic poverty, the outcry against the Avignon Papacy
and the centralization of ecclesiastical government and fi
nance, and the conflicts within the curia activated analyses
of the limits to papal authority and led to renewed emphasis
on the claims of other elements of church government.

Canon

ist arguments found their way into imperial, curial, episco
pal, and papal treatises of various publicists.

The four

teenth century was a time for the drawing out of implica
tions, the rehearsal of the adversaries-

The great crisis

of the Schism, brought on by the ambition of a curial faction,
took to momentary ascendancy a program for ensuring the
Church's continued authority over its ruler and its power,
through its representati.

General Council, to wield this
i
authority for the common good.
1
A point stressed throughout Waiter Ullmann's Origins
of the Great Schism is that the Schism was primarily a legal and constitutional battle, foreshadowed by the mounting
constitutional and legal crises of the fourteenth-century
Church, brought on by the dissatisfaction of the cardinals
with their theoretical position and their determination to
retain the de facto position they had attained. In seeing
the Schism and conciliarism as legal and constitutional is
sues within the Church, Ullmann denigrates the hypothesis
of nationalism as the primary cause and dominant influence.
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Then the inconsistent principles of the fourteenthcentury canonists became critical, for it was to the canon
ists that perplexed Christians turned for solutions to the
Schism.

Men found, for instance, that the pope was superior

to the laws of the General Council; yet, in certain special
cases the Council could exercise jurisdiction over the pope.
The pope was endowed with plenitudo potestatis— yet an au
thority inherent in the whole Church could be superior or
equal to his.
It has often been pointed out that the pre
vailing doctrine of papal sovereignty formed a
serious hindrance to all the various attempts at
healing the Great Schism, but it should also be
emphasized that the Schism could hardly have
broken out at all if that doctrine had been ex
pressed with unswerving consistency and clarity
in the laws of the Church and the teachings of
the canonists. The original claim of the dis
sident cardinals that Urban's election was in
valid was flimsy enough; the subsequent confusion
and controversy . . .could hardly have arisen
except in an age when the whole problem of the
right relationship between Pope, cardinals, and
General Council was enmeshed in ambiguities and
in legal intricacies that the lawyers themselves
could not unravel.
To those investigating ways out of the legal impasse
between the rival popes, it became obvious that the prevail
ing doctrine of papal absolutism made a reconciliation of
the contenders impossible; any disposition to arbitration
could be interpreted as abandonment of the claim to be true
pope, who was above human judgment.

But the conception of

the Church as a corporation lent itself to the restatement

^Tierney, Foundations, p. 219.
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of some early Decretist positions implying a different con
cept of papal authority, that only the whole Church was uner
ring in faith, that no pope could act contrary to the Churchfe
general welfare, that as a last resort the pope could be de
posed by the Church.
The elaboration of conciliar systems of Church
government . . .was made possible by the assimila
tion of the rather inchoate ideas of the Decretists
into the framework of later corporation theory;
the principle source of conciliar thought is to
be found in the mingling of these two streams of
canonistic ideas. . . .The Conciliar Theory, one
might say, sprang from the impregnation of Decre
tist ecclesiology by Decretalist corporation con
cepts.
The Conciliar Theory
Given the grave legal and constitutional nature of the
crisis of schism and the anxious feeling that the ailing
Church had to be not only patched up but reformed and in
sured against future catastrophes, the great profusion of
speculation on ecclesiastical government which occasioned
the Schism soon went far beyond the immediate problem of
the Schism to probe the basic questions of the nature and
location of ecclesiastical authority and the machinery by
which that authority should be manifested.

The most rad

ical came to question whether the pope should continue to
govern at all.

With the wide spread of ideological posi

tions, vocations, and national backgrounds of the major con-

1Ibid., p. 245.
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ciliarists, it is an oversimplification to talk about the
conciliar theory.^- But it is a necessary oversimplifica
tion and, additionally, one justified by a basic unity of
thought among the conciliarists.
"The appeal to the underlying authority of the Church,
understood as the congregatio fidelium, was the very essence
2
of the conciliary position."
The conciliarists insisted
that the final authority of the Church and the principle of
unity lay not with the pope but with the whole Church.

The

various conciliar systems were based on this distinction be
tween the Universal Church and the pope or local Roman Church,
and they wrapped around this a group of theories concerning
the relationship of the Church to the pope and curia.

Christ

is the primary head of the Universal Church, his Mystical
Body.

From Christ the Church receives and holds directly

the truth, inerrancy, and fullness of power which are exer
cised and held in some way by the Church's secondary head,
the pope.

The pope's authority is not absolute but minis

terial, delegated to him for the good of the Church.

It was

commonly held that the pope represented the Church, but in
the sense that he personified it and so embodied in himself
the whole of its authority.

But to the conciliarist the idea

^It is also an oversimplification to pass over the other
programs advanced for the solution of the Schism, such as
compromise settlement, mutual cession, or political pressure.
2
Tierney, Foundations, p. 4.

/
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of* representation went beyond this common medieval notion
of mere personification to imply an actual bestowal of au
thority upon the representative by those whom he represented,
with the corollary that this authority could be withdrawn if
abused.

Thus even the pope was held to possess only a lim-

ited.and derivative right to govern, conferred by the Church.
Ke could exercise only such authority as was necessary for
the edification of the Church, and if his rule tended to its
destruction he could be corrected, even deposed.

The organ

of ecclesiastical government which was to embody the insti
tutional safeguard was the General Council.

The Universal

Church might bestow its underlying authority on a General
Council, and this Council was regarded as the most reliable
representative of the Universal Church's superior and inerrant authority.

In addition, as Francis Oakley has pointed

out, pure conciliarism was momentarily entwined with the ris
ing demand for ecclesiastical reform (a demand sometimes ac
companied over the course of the fourteenth century by the
assertion that reform could best be effected by the regular
assembling of a General Council) and with the oligarchical
theories of the cardinals which had their origin in the in
creasing de facto governmental role exercised by the cardin-

^For a discussion of medieval notions of representation
and their constitutional ambiguity, see Tierney, Foundations,
pp. 4-5, 35-36, 125-57, and Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. I35-3&. See
also above, pp. 14-15, 15 n. 1, 20.
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als.1
The beliefs were supported by various theological ar
guments, analogies drawn from ancient councils, Pauline ecclesiology and other Scriptural elements, the Aristotelian
>
/
concept of •£T7cccKeco<k(in the sense of equity or necessity),
with the general impress of the canonist tradition.

No doubt

the ecclesiastical crises of the fourteenth century, in which
anti-papal or pro-reform elements had from time to time touted
the General Council as a panacea, contributed.

Conciliarism

made possible an appeal from the stubborn rivals.

The possi

bilities of the approach were realized at Pisa (1409), where
a council convoked without any papal authorization elected
a third contender, and more fully at Constance (1414-1417),
where two contenders were effectively deposed, one constrained
2
to abdicate, and a new pope of unity elected.
1
Francis Oakley, "Pierre d'Ailly," in Reformers in Pro
file (ed. B. A. Gerrishj Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967),
pp. 48=5^* Oakley notes that the writings of d'Ailly neatly
combine these three strands of historical conciliarism. He
has also stressed that curialism and conciliarism were only
momentary allies. Before and after the time of the Schism,
they stood at opposite poles on the important issue of cen
tralization. Tierney has looked at these viewpoints from
a different angle. To him their momentary union reveals a
common thread: advocates of curial rights or of local rights
in the lesser churches all relied upon the application of
corporative concepts of the Church, to bolster their own
rights and interests. This, Tierney feels, helps to explain
the leading position of cardinals such as Pierre d'Ailly and
Francisco Zabarella in the historical conciliar movement.
Before and after the era of the councils, immediate conflicts
of interest tended to keep out of the picture the potential
alliance of local and curial opposition to the pope. See
Tierney, Foundations, pp. 55» 238-39J Oakley, D'Ailly. pp.
182-98, 207-212.
2
For modern introductory information on conciliarism,
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D'Ailly* A Sketch of His Life and Works
Pierre d'Ailly was born of bourgeois parents in 1350
at Compiegne in the lie de France.
obscure.

His childhood remains

In 1364, he entered the University of Paris as a

bursar of the College of Navarre and began his academic ca
reer as a member of the French nation in the Faculty of
Arts.

He became a Bachelor of Arts in 1367 and taught for

a year in that Faculty.

Then he moved on to the Faculty of

Theology, where like his fellows, he was obliged to spend
four years studying the Bible and two years studying the
Sentences of Peter Lombard.

During those years— in 1372 to

see E. F. Jacob, especially pp. 1-24j and T. M. Parker, pp.
127-39. Despite the fact that his treatment is weighted by
an in many ways outmoded emphasis on the role of nationalism
in causing and influencing the Schism and conciliarism, John
Hine Mundy's essay in The Council of Constance (ed. Mundy and
Kennerley M. Woody; Records of Civilization Studies and Sour
ces; trans. Louise Ropes Loomis; New York: Columbia Univ
ersity Press, 1961), pp. 3-51* is still good, especially for
tracing the undoubted influence of nationalism on the fif
teenth-century course of conciliarism. Similarly, although
often, criticized by later writers, J. N. Figgis, Gerson to
Grotius, pp. 31-55, is still a good introduction.
*The colleges were endowed halls to secure board and
lodging for poor scholars and to insure a supply of educated
clergy. They were generally presided over by masters who
supplemented public lectures by private instruction, general
supervision, and aid to their scholars, some of whom held
bursarships, or scholarships. The University of Paris was
divided into four Faculties: Arts, Theology, Law, and Medi
cine. The Faculty of Arts was composed of four nations*
French, English, Picard, and Norman— none of which coincide
with modern national affiliations. See Hastings Rashdall,
The Universities of the Middle Ages (ed. F. M. Powicke and
A. B. Emden; revised edition; Oxford * Oxford University Press,
3 vols., 1936), I, 299-321, 500, 510-12, 516.
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be exact— he was chosen proctor of the French nation.

After

his six years of study, he was admitted upon examination to
the rank of baccalaurius cursor and assumed the concomitant
responsibility of lecturing on the Bible to the junior mem
bers of the Faculty.

The duty of lecturing on the Sentences

was assumed upon attainment of the rank of baccalaurius sententiarius.

Having finished this course (1378), he became

a baccalaurius formatus. and in 1381, after completing his
formal disputations, he was granted the authority to teach,
i
thus becoming a Doctor of Theology.
In the same year he
was granted a canonry of Noyen.
Thus, d'Ailly was emerging into public life as the
Schism broke out and spread.

The University had recognized

Avignon under pressure from King Charles V, although the
English and Picard nations of the Faculty of Arts had de
clared neutrality, and the Parisian scholars Henry of Langenstein and Conrad of Gelnhausen had called for a conciliar
solution as early as 1379*

The death of Charles (1380) and

the succession of a minor gave the University, to which many
throughout Europe were looking for leadership, an opportunity
to shift its position.
conciliarism.

In 1381, it openly moved to support

That year d'Ailly may have defended this po

sition before the royal court.

If so, he was rather indis

1

See Rashdall, I, ^-7^-82, for details on the career of
the student of theology at Paris. Significantly, in his for
mal disputations d'Ailly discoursed on some matters concern
ing the ecclesiastical polity; Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 10 n. 3*
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creet, because the regent, Louis of Anjou, was banking on
Avignonese assistance in his Italian ambitions.1

The inci

dent may explain d'Ailly*s temporary retirement to Noyen.
Still, that same year he again advocated the conciliar solu2
tion, in his Epistola diaboli Leviathon.
Oakley has writ
ten!
Despite later shifts and hesitations this
seems to have been the solution closest to his
heart. He never seems to have wavered in his
conviction of the superiority of the whole Church
to the Pope, and in the years after 1403, when
other solutions had failed and when the obduracy
of the rival claimants was becoming increasingly
apparent, he recurred once again to_his earlier
advocacy of the Conciliar position.-5
In the intervening years, d'Ailly continued his aca% ■
demic career and became a leading prelate. During his rise
to fame his attitude toward Avignon seems to have fluctu
ated.
Between 1383 and 1394 he was at Paris and preoccupied
with academic affairs.
lege of Navarre.

In 1383* he became rector of the Col

Two years later he was chosen proctor of

the Faculty of Theology in a dispute with the chancellor, who

D'Ailly claimed in later life to have done so. In his
history of France during the Great Schism, Noel Valois has
cast doubt upon the story. See Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 11 n. 4
for a reference.
2
The polemic appeared anonymously. A translation has
been published by I. W. Raymond, "D'Ailly's 'Epistola Di
aboli Leviathon, '" Church History, XXII (1953)* 181-91. His
Invectiva Ezekielis contra pseudo-pastores appeared about
that same year.
-^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 11.
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had begun to arbitrarily levy fees for the authority to
teach (licentia docendi).

In 1388 he headed a University '

delegation to Avignon and successfully persuaded Clement VII
to uphold the censure of some propositions of the Dominican
2
John of Monzon, who had denied the Immaculate Conception.
In the following year he became chancellor of Paris and royal
chaplain.^

D'Ailly seems to have been involved during these

years in further University discussions of the Schism despite
a royal ban on such activities.
In 1394, a University referendum revealed that its mem
bers overwhelmingly supported the way of cession as the most
practicable way to end the Schism.

D'Ailly responded with

Some relevant source material for this controversy may
be found in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (ed. Henry
Deniflet Paris: Delalain, 9 vols., 1889-1897), H I , 340, 48586.
(The chartulary is useful for investigating details of d'Ailly's academic career.) Significantly, d'Ailly's argu
ments against the chancellor involved discussions of the
source of political authority and the issue of public utility.
2
For material on the Monzon affair, Chartularium, III,
Nos. 1559-65 i 1582 .
■^The chancellor was originally an official of the ca
thedral church of Paris and actually never attained an of
ficial status within the University.
In his status as chief
theology instructor of the cathedral school, he acquired some
measure of control over the schools of Paris, especially in
the conferring of the licentia decendi. By the time of d'Ail
ly's tenure the office retained great prestige but little
actual power, having been on the losing side in a series of
disputes between the episcopal administration and the Univ
ersity. See Rashdall, I, 2?8-81, 304-312, 398-402.
^John B. Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism (Manches
ter: University of Manchester Press, 1980), pi 38* The ban
was lifted in January of 1394.
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an open commitment, despite his apparent preference for the
conciliar solution.

The way of cession was adopted as the

French national policy, and it led to the French withdrawal
of obedience from Avignon (1398) in a vain attempt to force
cession from that side.

Much of Europe went along with France

in maintaining neutrality toward both contenders and in de
manding the cession of both.

D ‘Ailly, however, opposed the

withdrawal.
He acted several times as a royal or University emis
sary, and on his missions to Avignon he was supposed to urge
acceptance of cession.

In Oakley*s words, he "seems to have

been somewhat less than enthusiastic in his advocacy of the
cause— possibly because of a succession of favors heaped upon
i
him by the Avignonese popes."
In 1389» royal disapproval
had blocked Clement VII*s plan to make d'Ailly bishop of Laon.

But he did acquire a string of minor benefices, and,

in 1395* he relinguished his chancellorship to assume from
Benedict XIII the bishopric of Puy.

In 1397» he relinquished

that for Cambrai, which he held until 14-11.

Many at court

and at the University seem to have felt that he was being
bought.

When he became bishop of Puy, one of the nations of

the Faculty of Arts voted to exclude him from its meetings.
The truth is hard to find.

First of all, it is known that

d'Ailly preferred the conciliar solution to the way of cession.
And it may have been that the appointment to Puy was part of

1Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 12.
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a program of Pope Benedict to open his reign on a concilia
tory note.

On the other hand, d'Ailly staunchly defended

Benedict during these years.

". . .It is certain that d'Ail

ly opposed the withdrawal of obedience in 1398, was active
in bringing about a partial restoration in 1403, tried to ab
sent himself in 1406 from the clerical assembly at Paris
which sought to institute proceedings against Benedict XIII,
and, when coerced into attending, insisted against opposition
on speaking in defense of that pontiff."^
From 1399 to 1402, d'Ailly retreated from church pol
itics and concentrated on his diocesan duties.

He had never

visited Puy, and his successor criticized his administration.
In Cambrai, however, he seems to have been a model bishop.
It was a large diocese, divided by language and papal obe
dience.

It was a microcosm illustrating the ravages of

schism.

D'Ailly held three diocesan synods and devoted atten

tion to reforms which anticipated ideas to be found in some
of his later treatises.
In late 1402, d ’Ailly began moving back into wider af2
fairs.
Though, as has been pointed out, he was still will
ing to defend Benedict against his most radical enemies at
the Paris Council of 1406, his apparent conviction of the
Avignonese sincerity about seeking solutions seems

to have

Oakley,in Gerrish, p. 44.
2

It was in the winter of 1402-1403 that he wrote
Tractatus de materia concilii generalis.
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the

been undergoing gradual erosion.

No doubt his personal in

volvement in the fruitless negotiations of these years con
tributed to his attitude.

In January 1408, he broke with

Benedict and returned to Cambrai.

At the Council of Aix a

year later, he was back to advocating a General Council.
The collapse of negotiations had by this time led a
t

group of cardinals from both camps to drop their separate
allegiances and summon a General Council to Pisa.

D*Ailly

aligned himself with the dissidents, accusing the rivals of
blind ambition and foreswearing his allegiance to the Avig
non line.

En route to the assembly, he sent ahead letters

and suggestions.1

Absent on diplomatic missions for the

Council during the sessions-that witnessed the attempted de
positions of the two rivals and the election of the Pisan
Alexander V, d'Ailly did not play an active role.
But he continued to rise in prominence within the ec
clesiastical hierarchy.

In 1411, John XXIII, the second Pi

san, made him cardinal priest of St. Chrysogonus.
ed that pontiff's Council of Rome (1412).

He attend

Although he owed

his cardinalate to John, d'Ailly seems to have forthrightly
recognized that this "reform" pope was uninterested in reform.
The outcry of d'Ailly and others at the vacuity of the Rome

1See Martene and Durand, VII, 916-18, 988, especially
909-912. This last, his Propositiones utiles, is a clear,
comprehensive, yet brief statement of conciliar theory. It
has been published in English translation: Oakley, "The
'Propositiones Utiles' of Pierre D'Ailly? An Epitome of Con
ciliar Theory," Church History, XXIX (i960), 398-403.
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Council was instrumental in amassing support for the gather1
ing at Constance.
D'Ailly's role in the early sessions of that Council
2
"vfas clearly a dominant one."
From his opening sermon on
December 2, 1414, until the election of the new pope of uni
ty, Martin V, in 1417* he was involved in many of the great
events of the Council, notably, the condemnations of John
XXIII, John Hus, and John Petit (the supposed apologist of
tyrannicide).

He presided at the third session, after the

flight of John XXIII; he was deeply involved in the debates
over the status of the Sacred College, the procedure for
voting in council, and the future composition and summoning
3
of the General Council.
At the Council he displayed consummate skill as a polit
ical maneuverer.

In the early stages of the Council he and

William Fillastre were largely the architects of a coalition
of French and English conciliarists and cardinals which pre
vented the Italians from simply confirming John's election
and going home.

Later, when mainly English and German radical

conciliarists seemed to be threatening the hierarchical Church
and the quest for unity, d'Ailly inspired a realignment which
included the Italians and excluded some of his former con-

^John Hine Mundy, in The Council of Constance, p. 11.
20akley, D'Ailly. p. 13.
3
-'Mundy and Woody, in The Council of Constance, pp. 2526 and 5^» respectively.
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ciliarist colleagues.1

In the face of those who proposed

to first reform the Church, then elect a pope, d'Ailly's
party insisted that reunion under one head was the first
priority.

During the sessions which formally asserted the

superiority of the Council to the pope, d'Ailly became "ill”
and did not attend.

In general, d'Ailly retreated, over the

course of the Council, from some of the more innovative mea
sures which he had supported

at its outset.

His motive seems

to have been a dawning realization that such measures were
inimical to his primary goal, Church unity, and to his hier
archical conception of the Church, as well as to his own
interests as a cardinal.

Oakley writes:

In his relations with John XXIII, as in his
work on the reform commission of the council, he
reveals himself to have been more flexible and
conciliatory in practice than his theories might
lead one to expect. Indeed, despite the radical
nature of many of his ideas, the over-all impres
sion given is that of excessive prudence.
At the close of the proceedings, the new pope, Martin V,
sent him as legate to Avignon.

He died there August 9» 1420.

Despite his active involvement in the urgent issues of
his day and in the general affairs of the Church, d'Ailly
composed more than 170 works— commentaries, tracts, letters,
sermons, poems— displaying his competence in theology, phi
losophy, letters, astronomy, and geography, in addition to
conciliar theory.

His works have never been amassed in one

1Jacob, pp. 5-6, 49.
2
Oakley in Gerrish, p. 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
collection; very few have been translated into English.

A

large number of them appeared in print during the late fif
teenth and sixteenth centuries.

Some of his philosophical,

theological, and geographical works appeared in successive
editions down into the eighteenth century.

Of his writings,

a large group concern the Schism and ecclesiastical reform.
There are a large group of apologetic, ascetical, Biblical,
rhetorical, pietistic, and poetic works.

He wrote consider

able numbers of tracts on geography, astronomy, and cosmo
graphy.

Notable is his geography Imago Mundi (1410), in

which he reasoned, with the aid of ancient authors, that the
Indies could be reached-by sailing westward.

Christopher

Columbus possessed a copy in which he made marginal notes.*
Also, in his Exhortatio super kalendarii correctione (1411),
d*Ailly vainly advocated the calendar reform later adopted
by Pope Gregory XIII (1582).^
D'Ailly's philosophical works are few and generally
small.

His theological works are more numerous and larger,

the most authoritative and comprehensive statement of his
views being his Commentary on the Sentences.

John H. Mundy

has called him "the foremost French theologian of his age."^

^For references to material dealing with the question
of his alleged influence on Columbus, see Oakley, D'Ailly.
p. 14 n. 10, and C. A. Dubray, "d'Ailly," The Catholic Ency
clopedia. I, 236.
^See Mansi, XXVIII, 370, for this exhortation.
3
^Mundy, p. 17*
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As a philosopher and theologian d'Ailly was an ardent nom
inalist. 1
The above-mentioned printings of d'Ailly's works dur
ing the early modern era imply some interested audience,
and d'Ailly does seem to have been widely read over the two
or three centuries following his death.

His name surfaced

frequently in theological, philosophical, ecclesiological,
and political literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.

D'Ailly's influence on thought and action con

cerning ecclesiastical and secular political affairs will
2
be dealt with in the conclusion of this paper.

My treatment of d'Ailly is restricted to the ecclesi
ological and political ideas expressed in the Tractatus de
materia; treatment of his broad philosophical-theological”
stance shall be sparse except insofar as that stance impinges
directly upon the matter of the treatise. Such a method
dealing with the material has another justification besides
limitations of time and space: as will be seen, d'Ailly's
ecclesiology and political theory are not necessarily derived
from the Ockhamite philosophical and theological stance which
he embraced but from certain legal traditions. For more on
d'Ailly's basic philosophical and theological stance, see
Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 14-32, 86, 89-90, 189-97, 236-40; "Pi
erre D'Ailly and the Absolute Power of God: Another Note on
the Theology of Nominalism," Harvard Theological Review, LII
(1959), 43-60; William Courtenay, "Covenant and Causality
in Pierre D'Ailly," Speculum, XLVI (1971), 94-119.
2
Again, treatment is restricted to the issues of the
Tractatus de materia. Page 39 n. 1 alludes to his influence
in geography; p. 40 n. 1 provides some introduction to is
sues of philosophical-theological influence.
The sketch of d'Ailly's life and works here is large
ly drawn from Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 9-14, and in Gerrish, pp.
40-57* Dubray, pp. 235-36, was also a source. The most
valuable overall treatments of his life and works remain
Paul Tschackert, Peter von Ailli (Gotha, 1877) and Louis
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The Text and Its Historical Setting
The Tractatus de materia concilii generalis survives
in four manuscripts, three of them from the fifteenth cen
tury.

Until the edition of the tract produced by Oakley

appeared, the treatise had never been edited in full.

Three

fragments had appeared in print, none in original form and
one incorrectly attributed.
Paul Tschackert was unaware of this tract, which Oak
ley calls "one of d'Ailly's two most extensive and important
2
works on matters connected with the Schism," when he wrote
his standard work on d'Ailly (1877).^

It appears that Louis

Salembier was the first modern scholar familiar with this
tract, and, writes Oakley, "ignorance of its very existence
has continued to cause confusion in Conciliar studies."

II

Salembier, Petrus de Alliaco (Lille, 1886). Salembier's
Le Cardinal Pie~rre d'Ailly (Tourcoing, 1931 ) contains the
most up to date list of his writings. A list of his Latin
works may be found in Tschackert, pp. 3^8-66; his French
works are listed in Salembier, Les oeuvres francaises du
Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly (Paris, 1907). A bibliography of
secondary works on him may be found in Oakley, D'Ailly. pp.
350-56; to it should be added Courtenay's article (see p.
40 n. 1) and Oakley's "Pierre D ’Ailly and Papal Infallibil
ity," Medieval Studies. XXVI (1964), 353-58, and "Gerson
and D'Ailly1 An Admonition," Speculum. XL (1965), 74-83.
Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 244-48. See these pages for ful
ler discussion of the fragmentary editions, manuscripts, and
the problems of editing.
2
Oakley, "Gerson and D'Ailly," 77.
^Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 251 n. 26.
^Oakley, "Gerson and D ’Ailly," 77.

On pp. 76-79. the
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There has been some dispute over the composition date.
Louis Ellies Dupin had placed it in 1416, but this position
has been largely abandoned.

Salembier maintained that it

was written around 1403, not before May of that year; he
cited as evidence d'Ailly's reference to the instructions
of a delegation sent by the Sacred College to the French
king.

Salembier said that this particular delegation did

not see the king before May 1403.

But Noel Valois contended

that the tract was composed in late 1402 or early 1403, cit-r
ing two passages in the tract.

The first indicates that

Benedict XIII was still imprisoned in the besieged palace
of Avignon^ when d'Ailly was writing; this would indicate
a composition date before March 11, 1403, when Benedict es
caped.

The second indicates that some of the nations that

had been honoring the current withdrawal from Avignon, and
possibly all but France, had restored obedience.

Provence

and Anjou had done so in May 1401 and August 1402, respec
tively, and Castile had followed in February 1403*

The sug

gestion is that the tract was written between August 1402
and March 1403.
The chronological difficulty, which could force one
to view the tract as a series of fragments composed at dif

author touches upon several problems in conciliar studies
which have arisen from a lack of awareness of this tract.
1De materia, p. 2992Ibid., p. 257.
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ferent times and only later put together, is resolved by
Oakley's discovery that Salembier had confused two distinct
delegations from the Sacred College to the French king.
Indeed, the text of the treatise clearly shows that d'Ailly
was referring to a delegation which spoke against and not
for the pope.1

The delegation therefore could not have been

that of May 1403, but was that of 1398, which in January
1399# in the king's presence, accused Benedict of heresy,
perjury, and other crimes.

Valois, then, appears to have

been correct, and his dating is supported by another pas
sage, which indicates that the tract was written before
the Byzantine emperor embarked for home at Venice, April
1403.2
The setting, of course, is crucial to a proper under
standing of the tract.

Oakley points out: "The unrest caused

throughout Europe by the seemingly endless prolongation of
the Great Schism provides the setting for the treatise, as,
more particularly, does the strengthening of ecclesiastical
disunity . . .by the most important, though abortive, attempt
to bring it to an end— the withdrawal of obedience from
Benedict XIII, sponsored by France and adopted by the coun-

"Ibid., p. 288.

2

Ibid., p. 321. For fuller discussion of this chronological problem and for reference to the other opinions
cited (which have been unavailable to me firsthand), see
Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 24-8-49, fI*om which this discussion
has been drawn.
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tries of the Avignonese obedience."*
In the course of the withdrawal, neither pope proved
cooperative.

And it was soon apparent that the winner in

the withdrawal was the Crown.

The French Church soon found

to its sorrow that the papacy was a less severe taskmaster
than the doctors of the University of Paris and the royal
favorites.

By the time that the Tractatus de materia was

written, dissatisfaction with the withdrawal was widespread
in France.2
In sketching the life of d'Ailly I have dealt with the
events and issues of his life surrounding the withdrawals
the 139^ referendum, Chancellor d'Ailly's decision to co
operate, the national policy of withdrawal to effect ces
sion, d'Ailly's half-hearted ambassadorial role, the sus
picion aroused by this and by his lucrative appointments,
his preoccupation, 1399-1^02, with diocesan affairs, and
the gradual crumbling of his loyalty to Avignon.

As has

been pointed out, although as late as 1^06 he was willing
to defend Benedict against his worst detractors, he himself
seems to have begun losing patience years before.-^
It is these events, these possible motives, and this
mood which we must consider in studying the treatise.

In

*Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 24-9.
2John Holland Smith, The Great Schiom. 1378 (New York:
Weybright and Talley, 1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 160-61; Jacob, p. 5*
■^See above pp. 33-36.
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it d'Ailly, either swallowing his growing hostility or bow
ing to self-interest, held out for a partial restoration of
obedience to Avignon, to root out the schism within the
Schism.

Actually the evidence of the tract would seem to

support Oakley's favorable interpretation of d'Ailly's mo
tives.1

It seems that a solid Avignon partisan would have

favored a full restoration.

Furthermore, d'Ailly does not

just argue for the restoration of necessary spiritual powers.
As if to point out the trend in his thought and to show that
his case for restoration is not a case for papal absolutism,
he goes on to develop and defend his conciliarist ideas.
Thus, the tract expresses both his desire to work with
Avignon toward solving the Schism as well as his readiness
to take more drastic action if necessary.
In discussing the canonist roots of conciliarism, note
was made of the plethora of canonistic citations in concil
iarist treatises.

Concerning this tract alone, Oakley has

remarked that by itself it affords "an impressive demonstra
tion" of d'Ailly's familiarity with many of the great glos
sators and texts; sometimes the tract reads "like a work of
2
canonistic scholarship."
Among texts, he employed the
Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals. Gratian's Becretum (1140), the

10akley, "The 'Propositiones Utiles,'" 399• Here Oak
ley makes the judgment that d'Ailly had not bowed to the
favors bestowed upon him.
20akley, D'Ailly. p. 209 and n. 6.
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Decretals of Gregory IX (1234), the Liber Sextus. (1298),
and the Clementines (131?).

He displayed familiarity with

the glosses and commentaries of Huguccio (c. 1210), Joannes
Faventinus (d. c. 1220), Joannes Teutonicus (d. 1246), Laurentius Hispanus (d. 1248), Goffredus Tranensis (d. 1245),
Henricus Boik (d.c. 1250), Innocent IV (d. 1254), Barthol
omew Brixiensis (d. 1258), Bernardus Parmensis (d. 1266),
Hostiensis (d. 1271) Guido de Baysio (d. 1313), Joannes
Andreae (d. 1348), and Bernardus Compostellanus Antiquus
(early thirteenth century).

Oakley, while emphasizing that

d'Ailly himself was not a legal scholar and that at times
his dependence is indirect— through writers such as John
of Paris and William of Ockham— maintains that his know
ledge of canonist literature is indisputable and more than
a secondhand acquaintance.1
This canonist influence seems to belie d'Ailly*s con
demnations of legal studies.

In his Epistola diaboli Levi-

athon (1381), he had depicted the devil urgingthe study of
2
Justinian and Gratian.
And in Part Three of Tractatus
de materia, he castigated the precedence that legal studies
had taken over spirituality among the clergy.-^

Tierney has

1Ibid., pp. 164, B09-210. As the latter.pages show,
evidence of d'Ailly's familiarity with canonist literature
is by no means limited to the Tractatus de materia.

2

See the translation of this polemic by I. W. Raymond
(cited p. 32 n. 3 ) t reference is to p. 188.
3pe materia, p. 330»
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sought to explain the condemnations which d'Ailly and other
conciliarists expressed as directed against contemporary
canonists who were generally pro-papal.1

Perhaps we see

this in Part Two of our tract, where, amid numerous can
onist citations, d'Ailly states that the older texts ought
to be adhered to rather than the contrary theories of the
2
new doctors.
Oakley has suggested that d'Ailly's antago
nism arose from his belief that the jurists forgot the role
of equity in interpreting positive law and thus preferred
the letter to the spirit.

Other works of d'Ailly, in which

he rankles at the alleged attempts of the lawyers to bind
an absolutely free and powerful God by created laws, seem
to suggest a deep hostility, founded upon his nominalist
(or voluntarist) theology.
1
Tierney, Foundations, p. 13 n. 1.
2
De materia, p. 306* " . . .Magis sunt notanda et sequenda quam cuiuscunque novelli doctoris opinio contrarium asserentis."
■^Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 163 and n. 3» 16*J-. A central ten
et of nominalism from a theological view was the absolute
freedom and power of God? hence the voluntarist label, em
phasizing God's absolutely free and powerful will. To the
nominalist, even the natural law was grounded in divine fi
at. Created, or human laws, are products of creatures rad
ically contingent upon this all-powerful being, with no nec
essary bond of participation in his intelligence. Hence
the nominalist might adopt an attitude of hostility toward
the jurist who treated created laws as final and grounded
in the principles of the universe, when to the nominalist
they were more flexible rules of human conduct. See above
p. 4-0 n. 1, and Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 163-97*
This of course raises the question of how much weight
d'Ailly himself gave to his own arguments on the basis of
canon law. Since I have had no access to his strictly phil
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4.8
It would be worthwhile to conclude this introduction
with a warning about the conciliarist use of canonist texts.
As has been pointed out, the conciliarists were able to ex
tract from earlier canonistic works ideas that seemed to
be clear anticipations of their theories.

On the one hand,

the leading canonists of that earlier era were not concil
iarists in the fourteenth-century sense.

They were not in

terested in hampering daily papal governance of the Church
nor in erecting comprehensive ecclesiologies, but in ration
alizing the Church's working structure.

There is danger

and usually futility in attempting to amass a canonists's
scattered glosses, written on various problems, into a con
sistent whole.

It is unlikely that the canonists were very

often aware of the wider implications of many of the doc
trines they formulated.1

osophical and theological works, I have been unable to make
an assessment. See Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 29-32, however,
for a discussion of the possible weight which d'Ailly gave
to his political and publicist thought in the light of his
nominalist ideas on absolute and conditioned evidence and
the probabilities of natural reason. There is evidence that
while d'Ailly entertained academically many ideas on divine
power and the limitations of human reason which might lead
to paralysis for disciplines such as ecclesiology and polit
ical philosophy, in practice he felt that it was the duty
of practical men to examine workable solutions to problems
within the present limits of an absolute God's creation.
i
The Decretists especially assembled valuable raw
material for later thinkers; they advanced many ideas sig
nificant for diverse later developments but maintained them
in patterns often quite different from those in which later
interpreters would arrange them. For an introduction to
medieval canonistic literature and scholarship, see Fernando
Della Rocca, Manual of Canon Law (Milwaukee* Bruce Publish
ing Company, 1959)( pp. 23-40.
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On the other hand, it is not fair to accuse the conciliarists of deliberate distortion.

"They approached the

works of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with minds
formed in a later tradition of canonistic thought, which
led them almost inevitably to see in the early texts shades
of meaning different from those that the original authors
had i n t e n d e d . I n a similar way, the Scriptural and pa
tristic elements of the Decretum, quoted by conciliarist
and high papalist alike, had undergone a transmutation at
the hands of medieval canonists, so that when the protag
onists of the fourteenth century quoted Scripture and the
Fathers (from the Decretum) "the connotations of the terms
they employed were determined less by their original texts
than by the impress they had received from the thirteenth
2
century canonists."
Walter Ullmann's warning should also
be kept in mind: "It was perhaps the most characteristic
feature of the legal and canonistic scholarship of the Mid
dle Ages that the jurists tried to elicit general princi
ples from terms and notions which their originators had
perhaps not used with a generally applicable meaning."^
This attitude, largely due to the casuistic nature of the
raw material, was shared by the late medieval publicists

^Tierney, Foundations, p. 19»
2Ibid.. p. 241.
^Ullmann, Origins, p. 217.
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and conciliarists.

Finally, the methods of medieval jurists

and other nen who went to the legal corpus for support are
not so strange or unique.

Jurists of every era have to one

degree or another engaged in the ransacking of sources for
suitable legal ammunition and have resorted, when confront
ed with a legal impasse or the obvious opposition of the
law, to verbal analysis and appeals to necessity or equity.
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THE TRACT
The First Opinion
The tract itself consists of three parts.

Although

we shall deal only with the Second Part, some explanation
must be made of the others.
In his introduction, d’Ailly dedicates his work to the
Trinity and outlines the three parts.

Part One covers some

general considerations on the matter and form of a proposed
council of the Avignon obedience.

In this section d'Ailly

maintains that such a council should not hear accusations
of perjury and heresy against Benedict XIII and that innova
tive measures to end the Schism should be avoided as poten
tially disastrous, and useless anyway, since the three pro
posed avenues of cession, compromise, or council are adequate
if pursued.

Part Three covers "certain special considera

tions of the necessary reformation of the Universal Church of
Christ."*

Here he proposes a reform program touching every

level from pope to laity.

D'Ailly closes his introduction

with a warning to the reader.

He wishes no one to under

stand his following statements as having been said "assert-

*" . . .De quibusdam specialibus considerationibus cir
ca necessariam reformationem universalis Ecclesiae Christi."
De materia, pp. 252-53*
51
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ively or determinatively, but only recitatively and disputatively," except those things approved by the authority of the
1
Church.
In Part Two, d'Ailly deals with the question vexing
many at the time, whether the obedience withdrawn from the
pope ought to be restored to him before the meeting of the
2
proposed council of the Avignon obedience.
Because there
were so many different opinions on the topic, d'Ailly again
warns that he desires nothing he writes to be understood as
having been said "determinatively,” but only "disputatively."
He wishes to review the various opinions so that more learned
men may point out the most worthy solution.
opinions.

He covers three

Despite his admonition against seeing his expres

sion of approval anywhere, it is hard not to conclude that
the third opinion was the one which he personally preferred.
This can be judged from his general tone and slant through
out the work, the length of his discourse on the third opinion, and his acts and words at other times.
1

" . . .Assertive aut determinative, sed solum reci
tative et disputative. . . . "
Ibid., p. 253* Part One, pp.
253-80; Part Three, pp. 314-42.
2
" . . .Utrum ante huiusmodi concilium subtracta Papae oboedentia eidem restitui debeat?" De materia, p. 280.
The importance of this question arises from the virtual cer
tainty that at such a council Benedict would be faced with
serious charges. At that time, then, his status in relation
ship to the papacy would be an issue.
-^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 250 and n. 24, agrees. D ’Ailly
opposed the withdrawal in the first place and argued at the
synods during the first decade of the fifteenth century

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
The first opinion is that obedience ought to be re
stored.

D'Ailly notes that the opinion seems to have the

support of many sacred canons.
porting texts.

He then presents the sup

This was an opinion supported at the"time

by Pierre Ravat, Nicholas Clamanges (a student of d'Ailly),
Jean Fiot, and the Duke of Orleans.1
appeal to the rule of law.

Essentially it is an

The argument centers around the

canon law on spoliation and restoration* it is a principle
of long establishment in civil and canon law that no one,
despoiled of his possession or office on account of alleged
crime, may be accused and brought to judgment until his
possession or office has been restored to him, until the
proper court has been constituted, and until the proper
legal procedures for trial have been satisfied.

The argu

ment is that Benedict has not been granted tbe necessary
rights of the accused in the withdrawal, which amounted to
a despoliation without trial.
The mass of canonistic citations is largely repeti2
tious, and lenthy quotation is not called for.
D'Ailly

that there should be a partial restoration, in line with
the third opinion. See pp. 34-36.

1Ibid., p. 280 n. 1.
2

Texts cited are from the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals
(pagination from the edition of Hinschius, Leipzig, 1863),
Praefatio. c .6, pp. 18-19* cc.2-6, pp. 131-32* c.12, p. 133*
cc.4-6, p. 184* c.10, p. 201 * c c .3-4 , pp. 214-15* c.8, p.
227* c.12, p. 237i pp. 662-64, 664ff., 076. From the Decre
tum. C.2, q.7» c.41, Item cum Balaam. 10* C.3» q«l» 2| from
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is led by the amassed evidence to comment that all these
considerations deserve great weight.

If they hold regular

ly for minor bishops, how much more grave and solemn is the
responsibility to observe correct procedure in the case of
the pope, who has no superior.

D'Ailly points to the cele

brated case of Pope Symmachus as an example of this principle
at work.
D'Ailly concludes that the first opinion produces con
clusive evidence of the established rule that one despoiled
without the correct process of law, without a judge, must
2
3
be restored.
Nevertheless, he says, as the gloss notes,
the regular rule fails in certain cases.
Intrusio is such a case.

D'Ailly follows through the

discussion of Gratian on this point.

Ll

Gratian charges that

the Decretals of Gregory IX, X, 2, 13, cc.5-7. And from the
glossa ordinaria to the Decretum, D.17, c.6, Hinc etiam, in
v. praecepisset; C.3» q .1, in v. quod restitutio.
1De materia, pp. 283, 287, 28^-85. Hinschius, pp. 6626^; D.17, c.6, in v. praecepisset; C.2, q.7» c.^l, Item cum
Balaam, 10. SymmacEus (4-98-5i^)had been deprived of the
control of Church property due to allegations of notorious
crime. However, a synod summoned by the Ostrogoth Theodorio
to judge him decreed the restoration of this control to Sym
machus (501), since he was still the legitimate pope. At
this point d'Ailly omits mention of the synod's reasoning:
that no true pope is subject to human judgment. Apparently
d'Ailly's only point here is that without a trial there can
be no spoliation.
2
" . . .Quod spoliatus a non iudice vel sine iuris ordine
restituendus est. . . . "
De materia, p. 286.
3
X, 2, 13, c.6, in v. Clam possessione intrasse.
if

C.3» q.l, c.6, Patet ergo.

Without access to the glos-
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when institution is not legitimate in the first place, no
restoration can follow a despoliation, for he is not proven
deprived who was not first instituted.

He cannot demand

restoration.
Those therefore whose election is defective,
or who have not been elected by the clergy, or
sought by the people, or who through simony took
office, must not be held among the bishops. And
therefore, if they have been expelled from the
seats which they seemed to hold, they cannot.seek
restitution before they are called to trial.
2
Gratian then adverts to a text in which Pope Nicholas II
pronounced concerningone who uncanonically acquires the pa
pacy through violence.

Here, d'Ailly notes, it is said that

if someone by popular or military disturbance, without can
onical election, is enthroned in the Apostolic See, it is
permissible for the cardinals^ to anathematize the invader

sa ordinaria to the Decretals of Gregory IX, I have been un
able to determine whether the gloss on X, 2, 13, c.6, in v.
Clam possessione intrasse directs d'Ailly to this text of
the Decretum.
"Illi ergo, quorum electio vitiosa est, vel qui a
clero non sunt electi, vel a populo expetiti, vel qui per
simoniam irresperunt, non sunt habendi inter episcopos. Et
ideo, si a sedibus, quas tenere videbantur, expulsi fuerint,
non possunt restitutionem petere, antequam vocentur ad causam." C.3, q.l, c.6, Patet ergo. If the translations of
canonist writings presented m this paper appear wanting,
I can refer the reader to Brian Tierney (Foundations, p. 20
n. 1) for at least one reason* "It is difficult, and some
times impossible, to translate accurately the technical lan
guage of the canonists . . . ."
2D.79 1 c.6 .
3
^In paraphrasing this text, d'Ailly omits aliis clericis timentibus Deum et laicis, who are associated by the text
with this action by the cardinals.
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and expel him, with human aid.

Gratian immediately points

out that this is a special case— that in which the Apostolic
See is occupied by violence.

For in such a case no judge

can be found superior to the usurper.'1'
Gratian thus blunts the objections to the first opinion
by showing that this exception holds only in the case of
violent occupation of the Apostolic See.

The lesson is that

this emergency provision does not apply to the Avignonese
pope, since he did not gain the See by such an intrusio.

In

the course of the argument, d*Ailly gives his opinion of the
Roman pope*s status.

It is obvious from these considerations,

he says, that those who contend that obedience ought to be
restored to Bartholomew (i.e. Urban VI) or his successor be
fore he comes with us to a General Council hardly have the
law on their side, "since his intrusion into the papacy by
2
popular tumult is a notorious fact."
D*Ailly then points out that the above-mentioned gloss
enumerates other cases in which the established rule on res
toration fails.

But it is pointless to go on enumerating

them because, according to the first opinion, such consider

"Qui casu iudex non invenitur, cuius officio ille apostaticus possit excludi. In aliis autem locum non habet, cum
violenta pcssessio, nisi per iudicis sententiam, violento
detentori detrahi non possit. . . .Si ergo episcopi a sedibus, quas quoquomodo tenere videbantur, non per iudicem, sed
violenter eiecti fuerint, post eiectionem restituendi sunt
ante regularem ad synodum vocationem."
2

" . . .Cum eius intrusio in Papatum per tumultum populi
facta fuerit notoria.” De materia, p. 286.
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ations have no place in the affair of whether or not obedi
ence ought to be restored to the pope, "since in his case
it is not permissible for his underlings to limit or judge
his deeds."

It is written m

the canons:

No one shall judge the first seat, desirous
of testing justice. For not by Augustus ^that
is, the Emperor7, nor by all the clergy, nor by
kings, nor by ihe people shall the judge be
judged.2
Likewise there is found:
God wished the cases of other men to be bound
by men, but He has reserved the bishop of that
see from judgment except for His investigation.
He wished the successors of Blessed Peter the
Apostle to owe innocence only to heaven . . . .
Pope Gelasius wrote:
The most holy Roman Church has to be judged
in all things by divine law, and it is not per
missible for anyone to pass judgment on its
judgment. . . .But we do not pass over those
things, because the Apostolic See, without any
synod preceding, has the faculty both of pardon
ing those whom an unjust synod has damned and of
damning, with no synod in session, those whom
it behoves. Doubtless this is on account of

" . . .Cum de eius causa non liceat subditos definire
vel eius facta iudicare, ut 9, q*3» cap. Nemo, et capitulis
sequentibus." Ibid., p. 28?. Reference is to C.9, q*3#
c.l3ff.
2
Nemo iudicabit primam sedem iustitiam temperare desiderans. Neque enim ab Augusto, neque ab omni clero, neque a regibus, neque a populo iudex iudicabitur." C.9, q.3»
C.13.
3

■'"Aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit per homines terminari, sed sedis istius praesulem suo sine quaestione reservavit arbitrio. Voluit Beati Petri Apostoli successores
caelo tantum debere innocentiam . . . ." C.9» q»3t c.l4;
d*Ailly also cited from cc.15-16.
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the lordship which Blessed Peter the Apostle
held and always shall hold from the Lord's
voice.1
The first opinion concludes that the pope (the Avignon
pope) was not granted the necessary rights of the accused
when he was despoiled by the withdrawal.

A canonical dep

rivation cannot be made of one who is not present at the
proceedings; Benedict was despoiled before and without tri
al.

Before any further action may be taken against him in

a General Council, he must be restored.

2

There is an imbalance in this first opinion, or at least
in the way it is presented.

The opinion is preoccupied with

the necessary rights of the accused to fair judicial pro
ceedings, and it concludes that since Benedict has been de
spoiled before and without trial, he must be restored before
he is again examined.

Yet there is the matter supporting

the point of view that the pope can be judged by no man. This

"Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia fas de omnibus habet iudicandi, neque cuidam de eius lieeat iudicare iudicio. . .
.Sed nec ilia praeterimus, quod Apostolica Sedes sine ulla
synodo praecedenti et solvendi quos iniqua synodus damnaverit, et damnandi, nulla existente synodo, quos oportet
habuit facultatem. Et hoc nimirum pro suo principatu, quern
Beatus Petrus Apostolus Domini voce tenuit et semper tenebit." C.9» q*3t c.17. Here d'Ailly allows his opinion to
intrude in a way which foreshadows the manner in which he
will later in the treatise treat such texts. He notes that
the remarks made here concerning the synod must not be under
stood to apply to the universal synod canonically celebrated,
but to the local synod or to the universal synod uncanonically celebrated. De materia, p. 288.
2
De materia, p. 288.
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is another argument altogether.

It is a point equally well

entrenched in the canons and is certainly a more forceful
stance.

But it is not given preeminence in the argument

and does not seem to figure in the final summation of the
first position.

Moreover, to admit the cogency of such an

argument is to render superfluous the rest of the arguments.
If one believes that the pope has no human judge, then what
is the point of debating the rights of the pope when he is
being accused and judged?1

D ’Ailly depicts the argument

from the judicial supremacy of the pope only being used to
strike down the exceptions to the established rules on res
toration, when logically it is also fatal to the established
rules, at least as they are applied to the pope.
Perhaps we must be on guard here against d ’Ailly's han
dling of a position with which he is known to have disagreed.
He was opposed to full restoration and to the argument that
the pope has no human judge.
tributed.

Other factors may have con

D ’Ailly may have been summing up the opinions of

men who supported the full restoration but for two different
reasons.

Or the first opinion may mean to say that if one

does not admit that the pope cannot be judged by any man,
at least one must admit that he must be granted the regular
rights of the accused when proceedings are made against him.

1There is no hint in the argument of that subtle dis
tinction of Huguccio, by which a pope manifestly guilty of
notorious crime is ipso facto no longer pope. See Appendix.
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Whatever the explanation, it is hard to believe that d'Ailly
was aware of the extent to which the more extreme claim
nullified the exceptions to the laws on restoration and yet
was unaware of the extent to which the same claim made super
fluous the application to the pope of the laws themselves.
The Second Opinion
Now d*Ailly turns to the second opinion, that there
should be no such restoration to Benedict.

He states that

he has drawn the arguments from the points raised against
Benedict in the instructions of the cardinals sent to the
French king by a faction of the Sacred College.

This refers,

apparently, to the mission of the Cardinals de Malesset, de
Thury, and de Saluces sent to Paris in 1398-1399 by the Sa
cred College, bringing charges of heresy, perjury, dissolute
ness, and injustice against Benedict.1

The arguments, d ’Ail-

ly says, are reducible to certain points raised in a gloss
followed by many doctors, in which cases of the failure of
2
the established rule on restoration are laid out.
Of the
points discussed therein, d'Ailly proposes to raise only the
eight which he considers germane and to which the other arguments may be reduced.

Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 288 n. 5* This is one of the pas
sages which have been used to date the tract. See above pp.
te-43.
2
C.3»
in v. restitutio.
^De materia, pp. 288-89.
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The first case is dilapidation (dilapidatio).
authority of Pope Pelagius,

By the

"It is said, let him be removed

from administration who badly administers the affairs of the
2
Church, until the facts of the case are known."
While it
is allowed that the gloss here-' warns that today spoliation
must follow legal proof of guilt, this opinion brushes the
objection aside with the assertion that this is not neces
sary when dilapidation is notorious.
A
cited in proof.

Joannes Andreae is

Hence, these men who support the second opinion con
clude that withdrawal of administration from Benedict was
deservedly done and that there ought not be a restoration,
because it is notorious that Benedict is insufficient and
useless to the papal regime, a delapidator and dissipator
of the Church, that he has most of all exhibited negligence
in the settling of the Schism, being unwilling to or negli
gent in submitting to the cardinals and others working for
a solution.^

C«3» Q.•2, c.9.
2

" . . .Dicitur quod ab administratione submoveatur qui
res Ecclesiae male ministrat, donee de causa cognoscatur.”
De materia, p. 289.
3
C.3» q.2 , c.9» in v. Donee causa.
4
Glossa ad X, 5» 3» c.31« See Oakley, D*Ailly. p. 289
n.2 , for duller reference.
^De materia, p. 289.
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The second case is enormity of crime.

The case cited1

is that of a presbyter, who evidently came under suspicion
concerning the death of his bishop and was removed.

Pope

Alexander II ordered him to be tried and only then restored,
if proven innocent.

The gloss notes that this was done "be2
cause he was gravely disgraced."
Most of all this holds
true in the case of heresy, as is pointed out by The Arch
deacon, Innocent IV, Bernardus Compostellanus, and Henricus
Boik.

And Hostiensis concurs, when, among cases in which
II
restoration is to be denied, he cites heresy.
The third case is "ill-fame and proof of crime."^

1
C.2, q .5, c.ll.
2
" . . .Quia graviter erat infamatus."
in v. Beneficia.

It

C.2, q.5» c.ll,

^References are made to Guido de Baysio (The Archdea
con), Rosarium, glossa ad D.8, c.l; Innocent IV, upon X, 5,
31, c.1i (from which d'Ailly repeats Innocent's warning: "Sed
si aliud crimen sibi obiciatur, ut quod sit adulter, perjurus, vel simoniacus, quia per huiusmodi crimina non amittit ius suum, non credit huiusmodi exceptiones admittendas.");
Bernardus (Antiquus), upon X, 1, 6, c.28; Henricus, upon X,
5, 31t c.ll. For more complete references, see Oakley, D'Ail
ly , p. 290 nn. 2, 3» 8. 9* Guido de Baysio (d. 1313) was
archdeacon of Bologna and a glossator of the Decretum. In
nocent IV (d. 1254) was not only pope but a noted Decretalist. Bernardus, archdeacon of Compostella, was a thir
teenth-century canonist, referred to as Antiquus to distin
guish him from a later namesake. Henricus Boik (13IO-I350?)
was a Decretalist.
4
Upon the rubric De restitutione spoliatorum. See Oak
ley, D'Ailly, p. 290 n. 5 for fuller reference.
. . .Infamia et crimis evidentia, ut 2, q.5, Pres
byter, et q.l, Scelus, et cap. Manifesta." The references
are to C.2, q.5, cc.13, 21, 15.
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is said that if a presbyter is the object of rumors of dis
graceful conduct among the people and if the bishop is un
able to establish the facts with legitimate witnesses, the
presbyter should be suspended until there is a worthy res
olution "lest the people of the faithful suffer scandal in
this."1

On this point the gloss says that this is meant for

cases of notorious, manifest, or infamous crimes which scan2
dalize the faithful.In C.2, q.l, cc.15, 21, it is shown
that even without formal accusatio a manifest crime is to
■5
be judged and punished. The gloss agrees on this point,v
and other doctors have written in the same vein.

So, the

adherents of the second opinion claim that Benedict has com
mitted enormous crime, that he is a partisan of schism, that
he is under suspicion of heresy in his words and deeds con
trary to his oath concerning the peace and union of the Uni
versal Church, and that he labors under ill-fame and evi
dence of crime, with the spreading of notorious scandal among his cardinals and the princes and people of his obe-

1"Presbyter si a plebe sibi commissa mala opinione infamatus fuerit, et episcopus si legitimis testibus approbare non potuerit, suspendatur usque ad dignaro satisfactionem, ne populus fidelium in eo scandalum patiatur." C.2,
q.5» c.13.
2
C.2, q.5» c,13» in v. suspendatur. D'Ailly also cites
from X, 3» 2, cc.7, 8, 10.
3

^C.2, q.l, c .15» in v. manifesta. where it is noted,
says d'Ailly, "quod 'aliud est infama, aliud manifestum,
aliud notorium,' et quod 'notorium triplex est, scilicet
notorium facxi, notorium iuris, et notorium praesumptionis.
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dience.^
The fourth case is contumacy.

It is written

2

that he

who neglects to appear for his own hearing ought to be sen
tenced.

The individual who is called to court and fails to

appear is presumed to have confessed guilt by not appearing.
The argument is applied by analogy to Benedict,
certainly because he has neglected to be present
for his trial in the prosecution of the union of
the Church and contumaciously, so it seems, has
scorned to place his trust in the counsel of his
cardinals and notable princes, who most earnestly
exhorted and humbly asked that he pursue the cause
of the said union through the more fitting route,
namely the way of cession. Wherefore, the said
opinion concludes from these things that he is
contumacious and on this account that he must be
suspended from administration and not restored.-'
The fifth case is scandal.

It is shown in the canons

Ll

that the deposition of certain bishops "made in the face of
or beyond the cognizance of the Roman Pontiff the Church
tolerates to preserve peace among certain kings and to avoid
the scandalizing of the churches."^

As the text concludes;

*De materia, p. 291.
2C.3» q.9» c.10.
3
. . .Quia scilicet neglixit adesse causae suae in
prosecutione unionis Ecclesiae et contumaciter, ut videtur,
contempsit credere in consilio cardinalium suorum et principixam notabilium, qui causam dictae unionis prosequi per
viam convenientiorum, scilicet per viam cessionis, instantissime suadebant et humiliter requirebant. Quare dicta
opinio exam ex his conclusit contxamacem ac idea ab administratione suspendendum nec esse restituendxam." De materia.
p. 292.
C»3f q.6, c.10.

. . .Contra vel praeter ‘conscientiam Romani Pon-
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"Indeed, it is not necessary that the churches of the Lord
suffer through the discords of kings any of the damages of
division when they are eager to mutually and among them
selves preserve the peace (insofar as it comes from them)
which they proclaim."

Thus the second opinion holds that

the withdrawal from Benedict done to stop the scandal of
the Schism and to restore the peace of the Church must be
borne until unity is accomplished.

D*Ailly notes that the

exception concerning scandal mentioned in the third case
more aptly belongs here, because this opinion holds that the
people of the faithful (populus fidelium) under Benedict
suffer by his scandalous action, in that Benedict contuma
ciously rejects the way of cession, clasps in his hand the
crime of schism, as some say, and runs into suspicion of here
sy.
The sixth case is drawn from marriage law by analogy.
Normally an estrangement is settled by the restoring of the
woman to her lawful husband.

But if this would endanger her

because of his hatred for her, she must be entrusted to a
safe guardianship until the case is decided.

This is ap-

tificis factam' tolerat Ecclesia pro pace servanda inter
quosdam reges et ecclesiarum scandalo evitando." The phrase
quoted by d ’Ailly is from the text cited in n.4, p. 64, as
the following sentence. De materia, p. 292.
*"Non enim ecclesias Domini per discordias regum divisionis aliqua pati damna necesse est, cum (quantum ex se
est) pacem, quam praedicant, servare studeant invicem et in
omnes."
2
"Si autem capitali odio ita vir mulierem persequere-
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plied to Benedict, since it is asserted that he is a cruel
and vindictive man whose ferocity and mortal hatred are to
he feared by those who with good intentions brought on the
withdrawal.

Therefore, they say, until the decision of the

case, that is, the termination of the Schism, restoration
1
ought to be reserved.
2
The seventh case concerns an oath or pact made.
Bene
dict swore upon his election to work for unity by all routes
and rational means.

Because he has not done this, a with

drawal of obedience has been performed, and there must be
no relenting at least until he has effectively implemented
3
his oath.
Eighth and last, and more to the point than the seventh,
it is stated "that one despoiled of his possession is not
4
restored when he held it under a condition. . . ."
Accord
ing to the second opinion, Benedict received and held his
office under the condition expressed in his oath.

Since he

has not implemented the condition, he deserved spoliation

tur, quod merito de ipso diffidat, alicui probae et honestae mulieri, usque ad causae decisionem custodienda studiosius committatur in loco, ubi vir vel parentes eius muli
eri nullam possint violentiam inferre." X, 2, 13, c.8.
^De materia, p. 293.
2
X, 2, 13, c.3» is cited in support.
^De materia, p. 293*
4
" . . .Quod non restituitur a possessione sua spoliatus quando sub conditione possidet, ut Extra. De restitu
tions spoliatorum. Olim." The text cited is X, 2~, 13, c.16.
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and must not be restored.

1

The Third Opinion
The third opinion, states d'Ailly, is midway between
the two extreme and contrary opinions above, since it as
serts that in the present case, a restoration of obedience
should be made in some things but not in others.

It draws

a distinction between the essential and necessary powers
of the papacy and those which are accidental and adventi
tious- -.
For certain things were essential and by
necessity attached to the papal dignity, namely
those rights, those preferments, and those honors
which as much by reason of orders as by reason
of jurisdiction are owed by divine law to the
pope as supreme head of the Universal Church.
Other things were accidental and adventitious
and, as it seems in certain cases, usurped to
the prejudice of the prelates and lesser churches,
as the dispositions and collations of episcopacies,
to the prejudice of elections, reservations of ec
clesiastical benefices to the prejudice of the
collations of ordinaries, the reception of vacan
cies to the prejudice and often to the greatest
injury of the churches, retentions and reserva
tions of offices to the prejudice of visitations
and_corrections and the reformation of the ecclesi
astical state of life and to the grave scandal and
peril of souls, and also many other things of this
kind, which are called rights of the Apostolic
Chamber. And these all were not attached to the
papacy of old, and neither Peter nor the greater
number of the most holy successors of this most
perfect pope had the use of such things; but from
some other times they have been introduced, more
de facto than de jure, since these things seem
to be against the common law, indeed against the
i
De materia, pp. 293-9^*
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divine law.

1

This opinion posits two conclusions arising from this
distinction.

First, there ought to be a restoration of those

things which are comprehended by the first part of the dis
tinction.

This agrees with the first opinion and is founded

upon the same authorities.

Second, there ought to be no

restoration of those things comprehended by the second part
of the distinction.

This agrees with the second opinion,

but it is not founded on the allegations made in its behalf.

2

D'Ailly perceives that the most serious challenge to
partial withholding of obedience comes from the many author
ities cited in favor of the first opinions no bishop may be
1

"Nam quaedam erant essentialia et necessario annexa
dignitati Papatus, scilicet ilia iura, illae praeeminentiae et illi honores, qui tarn ratione ordinis quam ratione
iurisdictionis de iure divino debentur Papae tanquam supremo
capiti universalis Ecclesiae. Alia erant accidentalia et
adventitia et, ut quibusdam videtur, usurpata in praeiudicium praelatorum et ecclesiarum inferiorum, sicut dispositiones et collationes episcopatuum in praeiudicium electionum, reservationes beneficiorum ecclesiasticorum in praeiud
icium collationum ordinariorum, receptiones vacantium in
praeiudicium et saepe in maximam destructionem ecclesiarum,
retentiones et reservationes procurationum in praeiudicium
visitationum et correctionum ac reformationum status ecclesiastici et in grave scandalum et periculum animarum, ac etiam
multa alia huiusmodi, quae vocabantur iura Camerae Apostolicae. Et haec omnia antiquitus non erant annexa Papatui,
nec Petrus nec plures eius sanctissimi successores Papae
perfectissimi talibus utebantur; sed ab aliquibus temporibus introducta sunt, magis de facto quam de iure, cum ista
contra ius commune immo etiam contra ius divinum esse videantur." Ibid.. p. 29**-. D'Ailly's reference to ius commune
is to the canon law. See Oakley, D?Ailly, pp. 173-76, for
discussion. See also below p. 12f n. 2.
2
De materia, pp. 29^-95.
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accused and judged while he stands despoiled.

In this case

Benedict stands despoiled, and there must be a restoration
before further legal proceedings.

To this objection the

third opinion can make two responses.
First, as to those things which have been usurped by
the Roman Curia from the bishops and lesser churches, Bene
dict was not, properly speaking, despoiled by the withdraw
al.

According to Geoffrey de Trani* spoliation "is violent

and injurious ejection from the possession of an immobile
thing or the taking away of a mobile thing."1' Geoffrey then
explains that "injurious" (iniuriosa) is added
because notwithstanding how often someone is
ejected violently from a possession, he must be
understood to be ejected injuriously, as for
example when someone ejecting another is im
mediately and as though in a continued war
repulsed. For even if he is shut out by vio
lence, he is still not restored.
The bishops and lesser churches can argue that the popes,
against their rights, and in the face of their protests or
their silent, fearful unwillingness, have usurped such things,
and now through withdrawal, "as though in a continued war,"

" . . .Est a possessione rei immobilis violenta et
iniuriosa eiectio vel mobilis rei ablatio." On the rubric
De restitutione spoliatorum. For full reference see Oakley,
D ’Ailly, p. 295 n. 3.
2
" . . .Quia non quotienscunque quis de possessione
violenter eicitur, iniuriose eici intelligendus est, ut cum
quis alium eiciens incontinenti et quasi bello continuato
reicitur. Nam etsi per violentiam excludatur, non tamen
restituitur. . . . "
In support Geoffrey (and d ’Ailly) cited
X, 2, 13, c.16* C.3»
c.6, Patet ergot C., 8, ^,4.
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they repulse such a usurpation and return to the old pos
session of their rights, not in this bearing injury to the
pope.

They have not despoiled him, as it is said, ’"he who

makes use of his own right does injury to no one.*"

D'Ail-

ly concludes that the bishops-should not now be despoiled,
nor should they ever have been despoiled, of those things
which they now hold as they held them in antiquity, that is,
the pope*s accidental powers.
Second, even supposing, although improperly, that the
pope were actually despoiled of his possession in the with
drawal from him of his accidental powers, nevertheless, it
is not necessarily to be conceded from this that he ought
to be restored.

As has been pointed out above, there are

many cases in which the rule on restoration fails.
2
these are seen to pertain here.

Some of

First is the case in which immediately the despoiler
3
wishes to prove exception.
In the present case, the prel
ates immediately and promptly are able to prove exception
because all iura communia and most of all the ancient laws
Al
instituted by the holy fathers support their case.
i

.Qui iure suo utitur, nemini facit iniuriam..'"
•
•
De materia, p. 296.
2
De materia, p. 296. As above, d'Ailly bases his dis
cussion on C.3» 9*1* in v. quod restitutio.
-^As in X, 2, 13, c.13.
h,
De materia, p. 296. Here is another point at which
the later drift of d'Ailly's discussion intrudes. He fol
lows the above remarks by saying "Et si aliquae novae de-
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Second is the case in which possession has been gained
"by favor or entreaty."^

It is written in the canons that

beyond ancient custom bishops can exact nothing from their
flocks, even such exactions as have grown up by usage.

These

are to be denied to them "lest we seem in the Church of God
_
2
to be named exactors rather than High Priests of God."
And
the gloss comments that prolonged possession does not make
the law and that time does not induce obligation? other can3

ons testify to this.

Because a usurper remains long in pos

session without being proceeded against, it does not follow
that he may not at length be brought to an accounting.

And

Hostiensis, among twenty-four cases in which restitution is
to be denied, sets down three in which spoliation is charged
h.
against the one seeking restitution.
Notice, says d'Ailly,
that the bishops charge that they have been despoiled of
their rights.
Next, d'Ailly turns to face the objections raised by
the second opinion, that no restoration at all ought to be

cretales epistolae seu papales constitutiones in favorem dictae possessionis emerserint, illae per generale concilium
retractandae et corrigendae sunt vel saltern moderandae . .
fl
• »
^"Ex gratia vel precario." De materia, pp. 296-97.
D'Ailly cites in support X, 5» 31* c.7 and C.10, q.3» c.6.
From the latter the following material is drawn.
2
" . . .Ne videamur in Ecclesia Dei, exactores potius
quam Dei Pontifices nominari."
■^C.10, q.3» c.6, in v. praesumpta. Cited by d'Ailly
in support are D.93» c7?27 C.24, q.i, c.3^» X, 3» 39» c.5»
4For reference see Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 297 n. 5*
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made.
First, the Lord Benedict and his followers deny all
the crimes charged in the above-mentioned objections; con
sequently they deny that their crimes are notorious or ev
ident.

Furthermore, concerning these charges, Benedict has

made known his readiness for discussion, as is obvious from
his letters to the French prelates.
dience must not be denied to him.

On these things an au
"Indeed, it seems most

unjust that he be punished unheard and not despoiled by his
1
own judge."
Second, supposing that Benedict has in any way sinned
or erred in these affairs, in error he has not persevered.
As is obvious from the public records signed by him, what
ever has been sought in the affairs of the Church at the
instance of the French king, he has conceded.

Nor has he

been obstinate, as is obvious from the protestations often
made by him, in which he has submitted himself, his faith,
words, and deeds in the matter of union to the correction
and determination of the Church.
a heretic or schismatic.
but I am not a heretic."

Thus he cannot be called

As Augustine wrote* "I can err,
2

It is obvious, says d'Ailly, that

^"Immo iniustissimum videtur ipsum non auditum puniri
et a non iudice suo spoliari." De materia, p. 298.
2
"Errare potero, sed haereticus non ero." To quote
Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 298 n. 2* "The idea is St. Augustine's
cf. De Tnnitate, I, c.3» PL 42, 822-23; also De Haeresibus Tn the Preface; PL 42,“T0ff. The actual words, however,
are St. Bonaventure•s, Sent., 4, dist.13, dub.4."
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here the exception of heresy noted in the gloss

(that is,

the exception, in the case of heresy, to the rule on res
toration) has no place.
For truly this exception has a place in the
case of one who is stubbornly heretical or who
holds obstinately a manifest and already-con
demned heresy, as in D.19* c.9» where it is
read that clerics withdrew themselves from him.
But there the gloss says that they did this
because it was a case of heresy already-con
demned, and it is obvious in the text that he
was even blatantly communicating with a manifest
heretic, cherishing his error and contumaciously
persevering in it.
It cannot be said that Benedict has obstinately persisted
in manifest heresy already condemned.
Third, it is well known that withdrawal in France was
made in an attempt to force Benedict to agree to pursue the
via cessionis.

Since he has indicated his willingness to

do this, obedience ought to be restored to him, at least in

^D.8, c.l, in v. Nam iure divino. The gloss cites C.23,
•1 , 3, 35*
2
"Haec namque locum habent in eo qui pertinaciter est
haereticus, vel qui tenet obstinate haeresim manifestam et
alias damnatam, ut in cap. Anastasius. 19 dist., ubi legitur quod ab eo se subtraxerunt clerici. Sed dicit ibi glossa quod hoc ideo fecerunt, quia incidebat in haeresim iam
damnatam, et patet in textu quod etiam communicabat notorie
cum manifesto haeretico, eius errorem fovendo, et in eo contumaciter perseverando." De materia, p. 298. D'Ailly here
echoes certain opinions of the great Decretist Huguccio. See
Appendix. Cited here are D.19 j c.9 and the gloss upon it,
in v. Abegerunt. The text of D.19» c.9 discusses the case
of Pope Anastasius II (^96-^98), whose friendly reception
of the deacon Photinus, a partisan of the Acacian Schism,
prompted the Roman clergy to renounce communion with him.
According to medieval legend, he was then struck dead as
an apostate by God.
0.»5>

c c
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those things already advocated.

The cause having ceased,

let the effect likewise cease.
Fourth, experience has shown that despite good inten
tions to settle the scandalous Schism, the withdrawal has
not done so.

Rather, the Schism is strengthened, and with

in the Avignon obedience a further schism has arisen.

When

experience teaches that well-intentioned withdrawal makes no
progress but is prejudicial to it, it ought to be halted.

If

not, in one way after another scandal shall be given, against
the Gospel’s warning:
..1
comes."

f'Woe to that man through whom scandal

•

Fifth, it seems hardly just to impute to Benedict fe
rocity and mortal hatred against those who made the with
drawal after he has announced his readiness for reconcil
iation.

Nor does it' seem just for him to be detained a pris

oner on suspicion of such sentiments, because in other more
just and honorable ways the initiators can be protected.
Indeed, those who have invaded Benedict's dwelling and
have been detaining him there seem more open to such accusa
tions.

Their acts will in no way aid the solution of the

withdrawal problem.

Furthermore, the king, in his letters,

has expressed disapproval of the acts of Benedict's enemies
and has placed Benedict in royal safeguard.

D'Ailly appar

ently refers to the letter of safeguard delivered to Benedict

XMatt. 18:7.
2
De materia, p. 299.
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on April 10, 1399* and to the letter of August 1, 1401, disavowing the violence organized by the Sacred College.

D'Ail

ly warns that those who persist in this violence evidently
show that they are the king's enemies.
Sixth, the third opinion responds to the seventh and
eighth points of the second opinion.

From the oath of Bene

dict, taken before or after his election, it is not to be
inferred that his election to or reception of the papacy was
conditional or done under a condition, because the election
of a pope cannot be conditional.

Besides this, Benedict has

expressed his readiness to implement the conditions of the
oath, thus fulfilling it inasmuch as he personally can. D'Ail
ly seems determined to put a good construction on the often
questionable conduct of Benedict.
To the administration of the papacy Benedict ought to
be restored, argues d'Ailly, since even those who withdrew
are unable to deny that Benedict holds the right to the of
fice.

They named him to it, and after the withdrawal, they

sought the way of cession from him.

If he is not the pope,
2
then how can they ask him to cede the papacy?
Seventh, d'Ailly lays down a general response to the

second opinion.

In the eight cases touched upon therein,

in which restoration is not carried out, the laws advanced

■^Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 299 n. 9.
2
De materia, p. 300. He passes over legal citation here
"causa brevitatis."
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in support do not speak directly concerning bishops, but only
lesser persons, as is inductively obvious in all the texts
cited there, except C.3,

c.10.

Even there, he notes,

the exception is not introduced by the disposition of the
law, but by tolerance or permission.

The laws on spolia

tion and restoration, which support the first part of the
third opinion (that there should be a partial restoration)
always hold in the cases of bishops and popes.

The excep

tions to these rules cited by the second opinion do not hold
in their cases, unless they consent to them.

It is the law

that bishops deprived of their sees and honors must be re
stored before being called to the synod for judgment.

The

rule is to be closely observed here, because the pope is more
privileged than the lesser bishops, as laws human and divine
proclaim.^
It may be well at this point to review the arguments.
D'Ailly states that he agrees with the first opinion that
the necessary powers ought to be restored and that he shares
»

the same reasoning.

Moreover, he agrees with the second

opinion on not restoring the accidental powers, but he does
not share the reasons of the second opinion.
Then he turns to face the objections of the first opin
ion that the accidental powers as well as the necessary pow
ers ought to be restored.

His primary argument is that re

garding these accidental powers, there was not actually a

^De materia, p. 300.
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spoliation, since the pope never rightfully possessed them.
Therefore, there can be no restoration.

D*Ailly's secondary

argument is that, even conceding, improperly speaking, that
the pope was despoiled by the removal of his accidental pow
ers, it is not necessary to concede that there should be a
restoration, because, as has been pointed out in the second
opinion, there are exceptions to the rule on restoration,
applicable to this case, which deny the necessity of the
restoration.
Now he faces the objections of the second opinion that
the necessary powers should likewise be denied to the pope.
D'Ailly*s first six arguments are miscellaneous.

His final,

general rebuttal is that the exceptions in favor of the sec
ond opinion are inapplicable to the case of a bishop unless
he consents.
First, there is an understandable oversimplification
when he says that he agrees with the reasoning of the first
opinion on the restoration of necessary powers.

He agrees

with the argument of the first opinion that the pope was,
in this case, unjustly despoiled.

He does not agree with

the other argument that the pope is subject to no human
judge.

This would bar the lesser bishops from recapturing

the usurped powers and most of all would fly in the face of
part of the tract yet to come, in which d'Ailly argues that
the General Council can judge the pope.

Actually it is only

in the last part of the third opinion that he answers the
more extreme proponents of the first opinion.
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It is interesting to note that in advancing his pri
mary argument against the objections of the first opinion,
he is saying why he does not support the reasoning of the
second opinion.

He is agreeing with the second opinion, in

opposition to the first opinion, that the accidental powers
should not be restored.

But whereas his rationale is that

no actual spoliation occurred, since the pope did not right
fully possess them, the rationale of the second opinion is
that the exceptions to the laws on restoration allow the
spoliation of Benedict which occurred.

Involved here is

his distinction of necessary and accidental powers.

His

argument applies only to the accidental powers, while the
argument of the second opinion applies broadly to both.
It is when we arrive at his secondary argument against
the first opinion and compare it to his summary argument
against the second that there is potential trouble.

D'Ailly

attacks the first opinion by saying that there are excep
tions to the rule on restoration that allow such a spolia
tion, and that they apply here.

But then, in answering the

second opinion, he denies the applicability of such excep
tions to bishops or popes, unless they consent.

It seems

that in laying to rest the arguments of the second opinion
d'Ailly has negated part of his argument against the first.
A solution may be at hand for this.

First, it should

be noted that d'Ailly, in his secondary argument against
the first opinion, is not expressing his own opinion.

He

states that to admit the argument's assumption— that the pope
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has actually been despoiled in regard to the accidental pow
ers— is to speak improperly.

What he is actually doing is

employing the same types of arguments, drawn from the same
gloss detailing cases in which the rule fails, that the en
tire second opinion is founded upon.

He is using the argu

ments of the second position against the moderate position
represented under the first opinion, that spoliation in this
case was unjustly done.

He has agreed with the first opin

ion to the extent that the necessary powers ought to be re
stored.

He has given his own reason for not restoring the

accidental powers and has backed it up with someone else's
argument, for someone else's benefit.

But this latter argu

ment is one which, if clung to, would deny restoration of
the necessary powers as well.

So, his aim when he comes to

attacking the second opinion is to deny its arguments that
the necessary powers should not be restored.

He then does

this by undercutting the exceptions upon which the second
opinion is based.
D ’Ailly was a practical and flexible man, engaged here
in writing a publicist tract.

It seems that he was attempt

ing to offer as many arguments as possible to as many men
as possible, men who did not necessarily agree on all the
legal points but who did want desperately to find a solu
tion.

The men against whom the secondary argument is direct

ed were most likely not at all the vigorous opponents of
papal centralization to whom the primary argument would ap
peal.

D'Ailly was using his secondary argument against the
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point of view which regards withdrawal of accidental powers
as unlawful spoliation.

Perhaps d'Ailly felt free to use

such an argument against those holding such a point of view
because his later denial, in attacking the second opinion,
that such an argument is effective, would not have had an
effect on men who were supporting full restoration.

The ar

gument was not directed against them but against the point
of view that complete withdrawal of necessary and acciden
tal powers should be maintained.

It is likely that those

men would have joined d'Ailly in opposing this last point
of view, no matter what d'Ailly*s own reasoning might be.
It appears that d'Ailly is characteristically preoccupied
with the end of his arguments rather than the means employed
in getting there.
Also, it must be remembered that,d'Ailly, in arguing
against the second opinion, stated that Benedict had ex
pressed willingness to accept correction.

Perhaps he re

garded this willingness as tantamount to consenting to the
admission of the exceptions in the prosecution of Benedict's
case.

This may serve to answer another question.

For what

reason did d'Ailly bother to refute the second opinion by
denying charges brought under the argument which admitted
the application of the exceptions, when he also believed
that no such exceptions could be made for use against bish
ops and popes?

Aside from the possibility that here again

he is trying to appeal to as many points of view as pos
sible, there is the possibility that he wished to be safe
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and cover all contigencies.

So, if some determination were

made that Benedict, by his expression of willingness to be
corrected, had admitted the application of the exceptions
to his case, the argument would still hold up.

One could

still at least contest the truth of the allegations or the
efficacy of the withdrawal policy.
Finally, whether one is inclined to see here subtlety
or fuzziness, it seems that the complexity of this matter
is at least partly due to the fact that d'Ailly is distin
guishing two different types of papal power while he is
agreeing and disagreeing with the aspects of two different
arguments.
To sum up d'Ailly's position thus far, the pope's nec
essary powers were taken from him unlawfully and should be
restored, while his accidental powers have not really been
taken from him— they have, rather, been restored to their
rightful owners— and thus cannot be restored to him.
We return now to d'Ailly's argument.

He recalls that

the first opinion advanced a line of argument which went
beyond asserting that in this particular case, Benedict was
unlawfully despoiled, to assert that withdrawal can never
lawfully be made, especially a withdrawal of the necessary
powers attached to the papacy.

The laws cited in support

of this opinion state that the pope can have no human judge.
D'Ailly readily concedes that this is the regular situation.*

1Ibid.. p. 300.
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But, he says, some have gotten the wrong idea from the
text which states concerning the pope "and not by all the
clergy . . .shall the judge be judged."'*’ From this and oth
er texts, as well as from the glosses on them, some have
been led to say that the pope cannot be judged even by a
2
General Council.
This line of reasoning— that the pope
has no human judge— denies that the pope can under any cir
cumstances be deprived of his necessary powers.

D ’Ailly has

agreed with the first opinion inasmuch as he agrees that
Benedict, in this particular case, was despoiled of his nec
essary powers contrary to correct legal procedure.

He dis

sents when the first opinion adopts the view that the pope
can never be so removed.
The gloss says on the words ab omni clero that
a council cannot judge a Pope, as X, 1, 6,
c.4 has it. Whence if the whole world should
opine in some affair contrary to the Pope, it
would seem that the opinion of the Pope is to
stand, as in C.24, q.l, c.14. But there is an
argument against this, because the world is greater than the city, as D.93» c.24 has it.

■*■" . . .Neque ab omni clero . . .iudex iudicabitur."
C«9. q»3» c.13.
2
D ’Ailly cites here C.9f q*3» cc.14, 15. These, and
c.13» it will be remembered, figure in the first opinion,
when it is argued that the pope has no human judge.
3

. . .Concilium non potest Papam iudicare, ut Extra,
De electione, ’SignificaSti.’ Unde si totus mundus sententiaret in aliquo negotio contra Papam, videtur quod sententiae Papae standum esset, et 24, q.l, ’Haec est fides.' Sed
est argumentum contra, quia orbis maior est urbe, ut 93, dist.
’Legimus.*" C.9» q»3» c.13» in v. Ne^ue ab omni clero. Tier
ney, Foundations, p. 253. See Appendix beTow for some dis-
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Conceding that the gloss does not reconcile the contradic
tion here, d'Ailly notes that Teutonicus directs the read
er to his gloss on the much discussed D.40, c.6.

There the

text discusses the situation in which a pope neglects his
own welfare and that of his brother., and is found useless
and remiss in his duties.

It warns that "no mortal presumes

to confute faults of this kind, because he who is to judge
the rest must be judged by no one, unless he is observed
deviating from the faith . . . .”
D'Ailly then turns to the gloss on the words a fide de2
vius.
Teutonicus relied in turn upon Huguccio, who had
understood the a fide devius clause as applying when the
pope refuses correction for his alleged heresy.

For if he

is prepared to be corrected, he cannot be accused.

D'Ailly

points to the correspondence on this last point with the case
of Pope Marcellinus (296-304), who, because he openly re3
pented his apostasy, was not condemned for it.

cussion of the development in the glosses of the issue of
the deposition of the pope.
. . .Tamen huiusmodi culpas redarguere praesumit hie
nullus mortalium, quia cunctos ipse iudicaturus a nemine est
iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide devius . . . ," D.40,
c.6.
2D.40, c . 6 , in v. a fide devius. D'Ailly follows this
gloss almost verbatim. It also is printed in Tierney, Foun
dations, pp. 251-52, as is that of Huguccio (pp. 248-50) upon
whom Teutonicus relied.
3

^De materia, p.
cite C.24, q.l, c .36
cannot be accused if
pp. 72-73* 73 n. 2,

301. D.21, c .7.
in support of the
he is ready to be
d'Ailly*s similar

The gloss and d'Ailly
contention that he
corrected. See above,
treatment of the case
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But then the above-mentioned gloss asks whether the
pope can be accused of any crime other than heresy.

Sup

pose that his is a notorious crime, by confession or by evi
dence of the deed.

Must it be admitted that if he commits

simony or adultery, is admonished, and remains incorrigible,
so that the Church is scandalized by his case or his crime,
that he cannot be accused?

The gloss responds that certain

ly, if the crime is notorious and thus scandalizes the rest
of the Church, and he remains incorrigible, then he can be
accused.

For contumacy is called heresy, and the contuma-

cious one is an infidel.

The gloss seeks a reason why only

deviation from the faith is actually mentioned in the Decretum when other crimes may be charged against the pope.
"Here mention is specially made of heresy, because even if
the heresy is a secret one, he may be accused of it, where2
as of other secret crime he cannot."
But it is when Teutonicus asks himself whether the pope
can decide that he will not admit an accusation of heresy
against himself that a more important reason for the expan
sion of justiciable issues emerges.

He responds to his own

of Pope Anastasius II, which he draws from the glossa ordinaria. The texts cited in p. 84 n. 1 figure heavily in can
onist discussions of the deposition of a pope.
*In C.l, q.7» c.lj D.38, c.16.
2
"Hie tamen fit mentio specialiter de haeresi, ideo
quia et si occulta esset haeresis, de ilia posset accusari,
sed de alio occulto crimine non posset." D'Ailly is again
quoting verbatim from the glossa ordinaria, D.40, c.6, in
v. a fide devius, for all the material in this paragraph.
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query in the negative,
because by this the whole Church would be
endangered, which is not permitted, as C.25,
q.l, c.6 has it . . . .In this case the Pope
would cease to be head of the Church, and so
his constitution would not hold.3The third opinion, states d'Ailly, approves this gloss
and according to it understands the case of Pope Sixtus, who
2
voluntarily submitted to a synod's judgment.
According
to it this opinion also interprets the statement of the glos
sator on this case, when he gives it as an example that "the
Pope can be judged by no one, not even by a Universal Coun
cil, as D.17, c.6, Hinc etiam, has it."-^

This must be under

stood to apply to the case of secret crime, which does not
agitate and scandalize the whole Church, in line with the
prescription of the gloss above on a fide devius.

In like

manner we are to understand the other assertions in the can-

" . . .Quia ex hoc periclitaretur tota Ecclesia, quod
nonlicet, ut 25, q.l, 'Sunt quidam,' . . .in eo casu Papa
desineret esse caput Ecclesiae, et ita non teneret eius con
stitution The argument is again verbatim from the same
gloss. The gloss here voices an overriding concern common
to the Decretists: maintenance of the general welfare of the
whole Church. The argument is ready-made for the conciliarists. As is evident here, already among the Decretists
it was being used to expand the area of offenses for which
popes could be judged and to supersede the basic charge of
heresy. D'Ailly, later in this tract, develops the implica
tions of the canonistic concern for the general welfare. See
below, pp. 89 n. 2, 91 n. 3, 97-106.
2C.2, q.5, c.10.
3
. . .Papa a nullo potest iudicari nec etiam ab universali cor.cilio, ut 17 dist., 'Hinc etiam.'" De materia,
p. 302. The quotation is verbatim from C.2, q.5» c.10, in
v. potuissem.
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ons that the pope can be judged by no one.'1'
D'Ailly advances another argument to get around the
ab omni clero text.

One can say that the expression

is not to be taken collectively for the whole
of the universal clergy or the General Council,
but is to be taken distributively, so that its
sense would be that by no clergy, that is, by
no part or .by no particular college of clergy is
the Pope to be judged. Or "all the clergy" is
to be taken there for the College of Cardinals
or all the Roman clergy or all those of the Ro
man diocese, as it is assumed above in D.17,
c.6, Hinc etiam. . . ."2
Taken in this way the text is seen to be no threat to the
case for a General Council.

The third opinion holds that

in certain cases the pope can be judged by a General Coun
cil.
Against this some will object that a greater is not
n
judged by a lesser, nor a superior by an inferior.^ The
pope is said to be greater than and superior to the General
Council; therefore, it cannot judge him.

This line of attack

goes farther in saying that in the General Council, the pope
alone judges and defines.

The Council merely advises and

1C.9» q •3» cc.l3, 14, 15.
2
" . . .Non capitur collective pro toto clero univer
sal! seu concilio generali, sed capitur distributive, ut sit
sensus quod a nullo cler, id est, nulla parte seu a nullo
collegio cleri particulari Papa iudicandus est. Vel capitur
ibi omnis clerus pro Collegio Cardinalium seu toto clero Ro
mano vel Romanae dioecesis, sicut etiam supra sumitur in 'Hinc
etiam' . . . ." De materia, p. 303*
3
D. 22, Prima pars Gratiani, is cited in support. As
Oakley points out (D'Ailly, p. 303 n. 6), this was an argu
ment employed at the Council of Paris (1406) by William Fillastre.
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counsels.

Citations are made which show the pope, having

consulted the Council, himself then laying down the defini1
tive statement.
From such laws some doctors of the canons
contend that the pope is not bound to the deliberation or
recommendation of the Council.
judged by it.

Much less, then, can he be

Joannes Andreae writes, "Therefore it appears

that the opinions of the Pope stand, if he should contradict
2
the Church or the Council."
D ’Ailly discerns three parts to this argument and re
sponds to each in turn.

First, conceding that regularly a

greater one or superior cannot be judged by an inferior, he
points out that nevertheless the rule fails at times.

The

king of France, who is greater than and superior to anyone
in his kingdom, is in certain cases judged and has sentence
brought against him in his own Parlement.

D ’Ailly apparently

refers to the frequent condemnations of royal officials by
the Parlement or to its clashes with the king over alienations of the royal domain.^

Similarly, the pope is judged

1D'Ailly gives as examples X, 3» ^2, c.6; VI0, 2, 14,
c . 2.

2

"Ergo videtur standum sententiae Papae, si contradicat Ecclesia vel concilio." Ad X, 1, 6, c.4; see Oakley,
D ’Ailly. p. 304 n. 3 for fuller reference. In the section
emoted by d ’Ailly, Andreae cites in support D.4, c.3* D.15,
c.2; D.19* c.9? C.9, q»3» c.13; C.24, q.l, c.6.
^Oakley, D ’Ailly. pp. 123 n. 3^# 304, n. 2. Oakley has
pointed out the potentially misleading nature of this anal
ogy* in these cases the Parlement was actually working in
the real interest of the king.
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in the forum of his conscience by a simple priest.

Also,

in the exterior forum, he can be judged by an inferior if
he willingly submits himself.*
Second, it is not true that the pope is greater than
or superior to the council, although he is greater and su
perior in council when he is the head of all the members.
D'Ailly regards this as obvious to reason, because the whole
is greater than any part.

The pope is part of the council,

as the head is part of the body.

Therefore, the whole coun

cil is greater than the pope, and consequently the author
ity of the whole council is greater than the authority of
2
the pope.
D'Ailly quotes the words of Jerome often cited
in similar discussions by the canonists:

"If authority is

sought, the world is greater than the city."-'

According to

the gloss this supports the argument "that the statute of
4
a council is preferable to the statute of a Pope."
D'Ailly

^De materia, p. 304. In proof of this last point, he
cites C.2, q.7* c.4l.
2
D'Ailly's remarks here are reminiscent of Decretist
speculation on the relationship of pope and General Coun
cil: the pope surrounded by the fathers of the council is
seen as the most exalted authority in the Church. It was
in this sense alone that the average Decretist believed in
conciliar supremacy. In d'Ailly's remarks here there is a
hint of his intention to turn this supremacy against the
pope. Tierney, Foundations, pp. 54-55*
3
^"Si auctoritas quaeritur, orbis maior est urbe." D.
93, c.24.
4
pae."

" . . .Quod statutum concilii praeiudicat statuto PaD.93» c.24, in v. maior est.
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goes on to point out the case of Pope Anastasius II, often
adverted to in canonist discussions.^

Here it is said that

many clerics abandoned communion with the pope because, with
out a council, he had communicated with Photinus the heretic.
The gloss here comments "that the Pope is held to require a
council of bishops where matters of faith are concerned, and
then the synod is greater than the Pope, as in D.15, c.2 . .
. ."

On C.24, q.l, c.l, on the words qui cunque in haeresim

^D.19, c.9* See above p. 73» n. 2.
2
” . . .Quod Papa tenetur requirere concilium episcoporum, ubi de fide agitur, et tunc synodus maior est Papa,
ut 15 dist. . . ." D.19t c.9, in v. Consilio. The inerrancy
of the Universal Church was virtually unquestioned in med
ieval times. But for practical matters a more well-defined
locus of inerrancy was required. In this regard, the Decre
tists considered the question of which authority was to be
preferred in the event of a conflict, the pope or the General
Council. Gratian had ruled in favor of the pope (dictum Gratiani C.25, q.l, post c.16), but his successors insisted on
exceptions. They tended to favor conciliar superiority in
the definition of articles of faith. The Decretists also
commonly held, in line with their concern for the maintenance
of the status ecclesiae, that no pope could dispense from a
conciliar decree in any matter touching the Church's general
welfare. A pope might disregard conciliar decisions of mere
ly local or temporary significance, but a conciliar statute
of universal application (generale statutum ecclesiae) was
held to touch the generalis status ecclesiae and was thus
inviolable. Subsequently, in discussing the pope's author
ity to dispense from conciliar decrees, the terms generalis
status ecclesiae and generale statutum ecclesiae were often
used indifferently, as m the text quoted by d'Ailly, p. 88
n. 4.
D'Ailly above quotes Decretist discussions supporting
both kinds of limitations on papal power. But an important
distinction must be made between the Decretist and the conciliarist positions. When the Decretists held that a pope
was bound by the laws of a council or that a council was su
perior in matters of faith, the meaning behind their often
ambiguous language seems to have most commonly been that a
pope surrounded by the fathers in council possessed a great
er authority than a pope acting alone. Tierney, Foundations.
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semel damnatum labitur, the gloss notes:
Here is a case . . . in which a Pope falls
tinder a canon of broad condemnation. The rule
that an equal cannot bind or loose an equal does
not prevent this, because if the Pope is hereti
cal, in this he is less than any Catholic: C.12,
q.l, c •9 . . * *
Much more then, comments d'Ailly, is he less than the Gen
eral Council.
Third, from this it follows that it is false to assume
that in a General Council only the pope judges and defines,
because the whole General Council can do so authoritatively
and by the consensus of the council.

D'Ailly attacks the

opinion of "those doctors" who argue that the council merely
counsels and deliberates, but does not define and judge.
contrary is found many times in the canons.

The

We find expres

sions such as "It pleases the sacred council . . . ," or "the
council defines . . . ," or "the holy council determines . .
. ."

Or we find the pope announcing that by the authority

of the sacred council and by the consensus of the faithful

pp. 4-7-55* 251, 253* There had to be some development from
the idea that the superiority of the General Council con
sisted in the union of all the churches with the Roman Church
to the idea that that superiority could be expressed in the
association of other churches acting against Rome. D'Ailly's
argument illustrates the conciliarist development: the au
thority of the council is tending to be seen as the authority
of the council fathers acting against the pope, rather than
with him.
*"Hic est casus . . .in quo Papa in canonem latae sententiae incidit. Nec obviat regula ilia, quia par parem sol
vere aut ligare non potest: quia si Papa haereticus est, in
hoc minor est quolibet catholico, 12, q.l, 'Scimus' . . . ."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
and by the counsel of other advisors, a matter is defined.*
D'Ailly quotes the words of Gregory the Great often cited
in canonist and conciliarist discussion: "Just as I acknow
ledge my acceptance and veneration of four books of the Holy
Gospel, so I acknowledge my acceptance and veneration of four
councils."

Gregory states the reason for this reverence:
3
"because they were established by universal c o n s e n t . H e

says, notes d'Ailly, fiot "by papal consent" but "by universal

From the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals (Hinschius, pp.
-------------------------254-62).
2
"Sicut Sancti Evangelii quatuor libros, sic quatuor
concilia suscipere et venerari me fateor." D.15, c.2.
3
. . .Quia universali consensu constituta sunt." The
Decretists made no theoretical analysis of the concept of
representation in trying to define the relationship between
General Council and inerrant Universal Church. Apparently
they saw no need to distinguish their powers. For them the
reliability of the council was established by the statement
of Gregory the Great that the decisions of the first four
councils were inviolable because established by universal
consent. That decisions of the General Council were estab
lished by universal consent apparently gave such decrees
overriding authority. The Decretists in general came to
closely associate the generalis status ecclesiae with the
generale statutum ecclesiae formulated by the General Coun
cil. It seems that until the mid-thirteenth century, when
the doctrine that a pope was bound by a general statute had
died, the indentification of General Council with Universal
Church was so complete that a conciliar canon relating to
the whole Church was assumed to be beneficial to the Church,
or at least it was supposed that normally the interest of
the whole Church would be better guarded in the conciliar
statutes than in papal decrees. Among Decretists then there
were at least two institutions through which the authority
of the Universal Church could be expressed, the papacy and
the General Council, and on questions of faith and the gen
eral welfare, there was a definite presumption in favor of
the council. See Tierney, Foundations. pp. 48-49, 50-53*
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consent.”

D'Ailly goes on to cite other texts which show

the council authoritatively defining and judging.1

These

sources, he admonishes, "are to be observed and followed
more than the opinion of any fledgling doctor who is maintami ng the contrary."

2

Fourth, the third opinion states that those who down
-grade the definitive authority of councils by exalting and
magnifying the pope's authority not only teach contrary to
•2

the human laws mentioned,

but also contrary to divine law.

In the first council, celebrated at Jerusalem, James, the
bishop of the city, produced the decision, even though Peter
was present.

It was as "Apostles and presbyters" that they

addressed the Christians of Antioch.

Collected as one, they

elected men and regarded their judgment as united to that of
4
the Holy Spirit.
From this evidence, states d'Ailly, it
is obvious that authority of defining and determining in
council is not attributed there to Peter, but to the whole
council of apostles and elders, whose sentence is carried
and promulgated by consensus.
D'Ailly's fifth point is that the authority and deter
mination of the council must be attributed to the Holy Spirit,

1Hinschius, pp. 658, 677, 684.
2
" . . .Magis sunt notanda et sequenda quam cuiuscunqur. novelli, doctoris opinio contrarium asserentis." De ma
teria. p. 306.
3

-That is, the canon laws* see below p. 121 n. 2.
\ c t s 15:23, 25, 28.
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according to that passage in Acts:
the Holy Spirit and to us . . .
words of Pope Leo:

"It hath seemed good to
1
and according to the

"the canons of the holy fathers, estab

lished by the Spirit of God and consecrated by the reverence
2
of the whole world."
From the texts which indicate the
guidance of the Holy Spirit over the General Council, some
have argued, says d'Ailly, that the General Council cannot
3
err in matters of faith.
His sixth point is that the power
and authority of the Church are received directly from Christ,
her principal head, and not through the pope.

Seventh, he

holds that the Church is to obey Peter in the things which
pertain to its edification, but not in the things which per
il,
tain to its destruction.
It seems best to deal with these
points together because d'Ailly's arguments tend to run to
gether.

Put briefly, he wishes to show that the whole Church

holds power directly £rom Christ; this includes the power of
inerrancy, which it may exercise over the pope if he exer
cises his delegated authority for the destruction of the
Church.
An important part of d'Ailly's argument is developed

^Acts 15*28.
2
"Sanctorum patrum canones, spiritu Dei conditos et
totius mundi reverentia consecratos." C.25, q*2, c.5*
3

-Tor more on d'Ailly's opinion concerning the inerrancy
of the General Council see below p. 100 n. 1.
^De materia, pp. 306-308.
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from canonist discussion of Matt. 16*18-19:
And I say to thee, thou art Peter, and upon
this rock I will build my Church, and the gates
of hell shall not prevail against it. And I
will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven;
and whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be
bound in heaven, and whatever thou shalt loose
on earth shall be loosed in heaven.
The text was a source of ambiguity concerning the nature
of the Church: it was to Peter that Christ gave the keys but
to the Church that he promised unfailing protection.

Exe

gesis could stress the unique position of Peter among the
apostles or the indefectibility of the whole Church.

While

the text was cited repeatedly in the Decretum as a basis of
papal authority,^- the Decretists pursued the other possibil
ity as well, albeit without intention to question papal pri
macy.

While the one emphasis led to claims, heavily supported

by the Decretum. of supreme legislative and judicial author
ity for the pope over the Church, the other, with the aid of
2
a few texts, suggested that the delegation of the keys was
to all the apostles, not just to Peter.^

^For example, D.12, c.2; D.19, c.9; D.21, cc.2, 3 .
2
For example, dictum Gratiani ad C.24, q.l, post c.l;
C.24, q.l, c.6.
3

^In the thirteenth century, the power of the keys— that
of binding and loosing (potestas ligandi et solvendi)— was
commonly identified with the sacerdotalpower conferred on
all the apostles and not limited to the pope (Jn. 20:22-23).
Gratian used the term potestas ligandi et solvendi in two
senses, one being the sacramental power to remit sin confer
red on all the apostles (dictum Gratiani a_d C.24, q.l, post.
c.4), the other being the power of jurisdiction inherent in
the papacy. Gratian argued that in the settlement of legal
disputes papal decrees were preferable even to the opinions
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Gratian and the Decretists came upon a unifying con
cept which allowed a consistent understanding of the whole
Gospel text.

They followed Augustine’s explanation (C.2if,

q.l, c.6) of the relationship of pope and Church found in
the text: in receiving the keys Peter signified the Church.
He stood in figura ecclesiae.

This interpretation was also

commonly applied to Luke 22:32-33t and again below d ’Ailly
echoes the Decretist treatment.

In discussions of this text

of Luke, the faith which Peter declared and Christ's prayer
far that faith are seen respectively as symbolic of the faith
of the whole Church and Christ’s care for it.

Peter symbol

izes the Church in the faith he holds and in the power of
the keys he has received.

This symbolic position of the

pope is constitutionally ambiguous.

On the one hand, it

could and did support a doctrine of the papacy as the unique
and illimitable epitomization of all ecclesiastical author
ity.

On tne other hand, it might mean that the pope had the

limited exercise of a power originally and fully inherent in

of revered theologians because of this latter aspect of the
delegation (dictum Gratiani ad D.20, ante c.l). This led
to the recognition of two types of authority comprised in
the sacerdotal power of the keys. It made possible the can
onists* acceptance of Gratian’s double use of potestas li
gandi et solvendi as applied to the pope and the satisfac
tory exposition of Decretum texts which claimed equal powers
of binding and loosing for all the apostles, while accepting
Gratian*s dictum that the power was uniquely papal. The sa
cramental power was equal in all the apostles and their suc
cessors. But in Peter and his heirs the power of government—
iurisdictio. administratio, dispensatio— was superior. For
more details, see Tierney, .pbuhaatlbhs, pp. 30-33•
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the whole Church, to which he was perhaps accountable for
the exercise of the said authority.*
It is likely that in points five, six, and seven d ’Ail
ly relies directly upon John of Paris and thus indirectly
2
upon the canonists.
The inerrancy of the Universal Church
and the superiority in matters of faith of the General Coun
cil were unquestioned among medieval canonists.

But from

John comes the consistent assumption that the whole Church
is subject to the same rules that the canonists had evolved
in considering the affairs of lesser ecclesiastical corpor1
The canonists and later conciliarists were aided in
their symbolic interpretation by their willingness to see
the rock of Matthew's account as other than a synonym for
Peter. For more on the canonist discussion of Christ’s dele
gation, see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 25-47, 133» 192.
2
John of P a n s was able to combine Decretist ideas on
the underlying authority of the whole Church with elements
of later- canonist corporative theory, all deployed in such
a fashion as to reach conclusions more radical than the can
onists foresaw. Especially important for John was Hostiensis, who organized the doctrines relating to the constitu
tional structure of lesser ecclesiastical corporations and
showed how they might be applied to the Roman Church and the
Church as a whole. Hostiensis saw the implications for papal
headship of the whole Church viewed as a corporation and ex
plored them in the hypothetical case of the extinction of
the College of Cardinals during a papal vacancy. The right
of the people in this case to authorize a council to elect
a pope he derived from D.65, c.9? which permitted the people
of a diocese to summon bishops from the neighboring dioceses
in cases of necessity, if their own bishop neglected to do
so. This argument implies that the doctrines of corporate
law apply not just to governing prelates but to all levels
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. John of Paris took the
principles of Hostiensis and other canonists and extended
them systematically to the corporate structure of the whole
Church and the position of the pope. For more on Hostiensis
and the Roman Church, see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 149-53.
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ations.

John's guiding principles were the proctorial na

ture of any prelacy and the constitutional analogy of the
Universal Church to lesser ecclesiastical corporations.

To

John the pope's relationship to the Universal Church was the
same as that of any prelate to his ecclesiastical corpora
tion.

In the disposition of ecclesiastical goods and in the

determination of articles of faith the highest authority was
not the pope but th'e whole corporate Universal Church, rep
resented by the General Council.

This implied that the in

herent and inerrant authority of the Church was not concen
trated in the pope.

There existed in the Church centers of

authority whose powers could be used to supplement or oppose
his authority. These independent powers, both of orders and
X
jurisdiction, came not from the pope but directly from Christ,
the principal head of the Church, who delegated them to all
the apostles and their successors.

It was John also who in

troduced the texts and terms of II Corinthians to this dis
cussion? all ecclesiastical authority is given for the edifi2
cation, not for the destruction of the Church.
D'Ailly develops his case with similar arguments.

That

the General Council has an authority which does not originate
in the pope is already implicit in his fourth point.

He goes

1See p. 9^ n. 3*
2
For more information on John of Paris and references
to his work, see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 152-78? see also
below p.. 108 n. 1...
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on to argue that Christ, the Church’s principal head, has
given directly to the Universal Church powers of orders and
jurisdiction and has maintained these through the Spirit’s
guidance.

He, like many other conciliarists, employs argu

ments derived from John's use of II Corinthians, arguments
which imply that the whole corporate Church retains certain
rights over her sovereign.
Those who see in the Gospel text "And I say to thee, thou
1
art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church," proof
that the power and authority of the Church are immediately
from the pope are open to three charges, according to d'Ailly.

First, sacerdotal authority is not always derived imme

diately from the pope, since a pope who is not a priest can
not properly confer priestly orders.

Second, even without

a pope existing, the Church has abundant powers of both or
ders and jurisdiction; such powers then are not derived from
the pope.

Third, the Universal Church has the authority that

in faith it cannot err, and this neither mediately nor imme2
diately depends upon the pope, because he does not have it.
When Christ said, "I have prayed for thee, Simon, that
thy faith fail not,"-' he was not speaking of Peter's person-

1Matt. 16:18.
2
As has been pointed out, only the Universal Church was
generally recognized as inerrant in medieval times. The can
onists conceded to the pope the supreme exercise of govern
mental powers.
3Luke 22:32.
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al faith, because Peter did in fact err.

This is shown by

Paul, who said that he withstood Peter to his face because
he was incorrect and not walking the straight path of the
Gospel.'*’ Rather, he was speaking of the faith of the Uni
versal Church.

Notice, says d'Ailly, that Christ, in making

the delegation to Peter, said "I will build," not "you will
build," and "my Church," not "your Church."

Augustine sev

eral times wrote that the keys of the kingdom were given to
the Church when they were given to Peter, that not Peter alone but the Universal Church received and exercises power
from Christ to bind and loose.

The Universal Church was al

so referred to by Christ when he said "and the gates of hell
2
shall not prevail against it."
Christ did not say "against
you," that is, Peter.^
The pope is conceded to be the head of the Church, but
it must be understood that the Church is under the principal
and essential headship of Christ.

The subordination of the

body of Christ to the pope is accidental; to Christ it is
essential.

From Christ immediately and directly, and not

from Peter, the Church has authority and power and the priv
ilege of speaking without error in matters of faith.

This

privilege the Church does not receive from the pope, and the
authority of the pope when he does speak without error is

^Gal. 2 *11-14.
2Matt. 16*18.
^De materia, pp. 306-308.
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also directly from God, according to Matt. 16:18.
Apparently, for d ’Ailly, the inerrancy of the Univer
sal Church is best preserved in the General Council which
represents it.

He holds that the authority and determina

tion of the General Council must be attributed to the Holy
Spirit sent by Christ and regards it as obvious that the
judgment of the General Council must be preferred to that
of the pope, who is capable of error in matters of faith.*

The uncertainty here may be evident. The general op
inion of scholars seems to be that d'Ailly ascribed certain
inerrancy only to the Universal Church, on this point, at
least, going no farther than Ockham or the canonists. And
here, when he first airs the opinion that the General Coun
cil is inerrant, he is careful to avoid personal endorse
ment: "Et hinc trahitur secundum aliquos quod concilium generale non potest errare in his quae sunt fidei." But he
follows immediately with "Quod etiam probatur ex illo verbo
Christi: 'Petre, rogavi pro te ut non deficiat fides tua,'
quia hoc non est dictum de fide personali Petri, cum ipse
erraverit, sed de fide universalis Ecclesiae, quae repraesentatur in concilio generale, de qua etiam ibidem dictum
est: 'et portae inferi non praevalebunt adversus earn,' sci
licet Ecclesiam. Non enim dictum est 'adversus te,' scili
cet Petrum. Ex quibus patet, quod iudicium concilii praeferendum est iudicio Papae, exam ipse in his quae fidei sunt
possit errare . . . ." (pp. 306-30?). Here he fails to dis
tinguish clearly whether he regards Christ's prayer as ap
plying to the General Council or just to the Church Univer
sal. But his final argument seems to imply the General Coun
cil's inerrancy, because the reason why its judgment is pre
ferred to that of the pope is that the pope is capable of
error. Possibly I am wrong to attribute this reasoning to
him; d'Ailly may be continuing to give the opinion of those
who did believe in conciliar inerrancy. This, the insistence
of scholars on d'Ailly's rejection of conciliar inerrancy
(see Ray C. Petry, "Unitive Reform Principles of the Late
Medieval Conciliarists," Church History, XXXI ^l962j 1?1),
and my lack of access to certain other works have 3ictated
my cautious treatment.
D'Ailly nowhere spells out in what way the General Coun
cil can be said to be representative of the Universal Church
here, though according to Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 1^9 and n. 35,
he does say elsewhere that it derives its authority from the
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D'Ailly then follows John of Paris in concluding that
the Church ought to obey Peter just as its own head in those
things which pertain to the edification of the Church, but
not in those things which pertain to its destruction.

This

is approved by Paul where he says "For if also I should boast
somewhat more of our power, which the Lord hath given us un
to edification and not for your destruction . . . ."

He al

so wrotet " . . .that, being present, I may not deal more
severely, according to the power which the lord hath given
1
me unto edification and not unto destruction . . .
It
is only for the edification of the Church that the pope is
given power from the Church, and it is only for the edifica
tion of the Church that he can legitimately wield that power.
When the pope uses his delegated powers for the edification
of the Church he has many special privileges, residing in
2
him alone.
But these privileges the pope does not have when

consent of the faithful as well as from the authority of
Christ. In Oakley's words (pp. 147-^8), "His criterion of
the adequacy of representation would seem to be the proxim
ity of the representative body to the whole community. Thus,
although the Pope and the Roman Church can claim to represent
the Universal Church, in that they act in its place and name,
it is nevertheless the General Council which has the strong
est claim to be representative." Perhaps the idea that the
council is the body most representative of the whole Church
causes d'Ailly to see it as, if not strictly inerrant, at
least as close to inerrancy as any body outside of the assem
bling of the whole Church could be. It seems that d'Ailly
shares with the Decretists a failure to precisely define the
relationship between the General Council and the Universal
Church or to analyse thoroughly the theory of representation.
1II Cor. 10*8, 13*10.
2
D'Ailly refers to the pope's powers as final arbiter
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he works the destruction of the Church.
Bound up in the arguments of d'Ailly is the canonistic
conception of the maintenance of the status ecclesiae.

The

Decretists, like civilian lawyers from the thirteenth cen
tury on, made the maintenance of the common welfare an over
riding concern.

But unlike the civilians and some later can

onists and papal publicists, their view of the principle was
restrictive.2
In the Decretist writings (as in the Conciliarist works of two centuries later) the necessity
to preserve the status ecclesiae was always pre
sented as imposing a limit on papal authority
rather than as a ground for extending it. The
question of the status ecclesiae was most common
ly considered in discussions o n th e limitation of
papal authority by a General Council, and it is
this that gives to the Decretists' claims their
special significance. For them the "state of the

and caller of the General Council. He cites the following
which illustrate the pope's powers: X, 1, 7, c.l, in v. Pertinet; X, 5» 31, c.8, in v. Pertinere; X, 1, 30, c.47 Tn v.
Reservata; Geoffrey de Trani, on the rubric De officio~Tegati (see Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 309 n. 2 for fuller reference);
C.2, q.6, c.l?; C .3» o.6, cc.7, 9; C.16, q.l, cc.48, 52, 53*
D.17, cc.l, 2, 3; C.24, q.l, c.13; C.7, q.l, cc.34, 44; C.9,
q.3, cc.17, 18.
^He cites C.25, q.2, c.4 ("Statuta Apostolicorum decessorum Apostolicus destruere non debet.").
2
Civilian lawyers commonly contended that the preser
vation of the status regni justified governmental resort to
extraordinary measures m cases of emergency or necessity,
even if counter to law and private rights. See Gaines Post,
"The Theory of Public Law and the State in the Thirteenth
Century," Seminar. VI (1948), 42-59. For a discussion of
writers who gave the same broad license to the pope over the
Church, see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 140-42; Ullmann, Me
dieval Papalism t The Political Theories of the Medieval Can
onists (London: Methuen and Co., 1949), pp. 1-37.
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Church" was not a vague indefineable concept
which might be used to justify any extraordin
ary action of the Church*s ruler, but was rather
a living reality, closely identified with the
rules of ecclesiastical life laid down in the
laws of General Councils and confirmed "by uni
versal consent."*
Traditionally the canonists envisaged no distinction
between the acts of the General Council and those of the
whole Church, and the conciliarists were to cling to this.
The Decretists commonly held that a pope could not dispense
against the decrees of a General Council in any matters af
fecting the Church's general welfare (generalis status ec
clesiae).

Apparently, among the Decretists, the identity

between General Council and Universal Church was so complete
that a canon of a council relating to the whole Church (ge
neral e statutum ecclesiae) was assumed to be beneficial to
the whole Church, or at least to be normally more effective
in guarding the Church's interest than a papal decree.

Hence

papal action against a general statute of a General Council
was seen as prejudicial to the "state of the Church."

The

principle that papal authority could not be used to injure
the Church was familiar to thirteenth-century canonists and
was upheld by later Decretalists as well as the Decretists.

p

But while the Decretists built up a theory that the pope
could be deposed for conduct prejudicial to the welfare of
the whole Church, they did not explicitly formulate any doc

^Tierney, Foundations, pp. 5*-52.
2
Ibid.. pp. 50-53* See also p. 89 n. 2. above.
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trine of judicial supremacy for the General Council over
the pope,

and they did not argue that because the congre-

gatio fidelium was inerrant that it possessed an active gov
erning power superior to the pope's.

While the conciliarists

would treat indefectibility as a positive authority inherent
in the Universal Church, which could be used against the pope,
the Decretists saw it "rather as a kind of negative capacity
in the Church, an inability to err simultaneously in all its
2
parts."
The promise of an unfailing Church was not associ
ated with an institutional safeguard.

Yet, the Decretists

assumed that when a General Council was needed to provide a
head for the Church, it could be summoned somehow.

And their

suggestions that the pope could be judged by the whole Church
and that in matters of faith the General Council was superior
could aid in the development of a conciliarist posture.-^
Again, it was the fermentation of such thought with cor
poration law which led to the institutionalization of safe-

Alanus excepted, Ibid.. p. 6? n. 1. As has been point
ed out, when the Decretists wrote that the pope was bound by
the laws of the General Council or that in matters of faith
it was superior, they generally seem to have meant that the
pope surrounded by the fathers in council possessed greater
authority than when alone, Ibid., p. 54. See also Tierney,
"Pope and Council» Some New Decretist Texts," Mediaeval Stud
ies, XIX, (1957)t 203-205, for a discussion of a small group
of Decretist works which adequately handled the problem of
a disagreement between council and pope, at least in the par
ticular case of the heretical pope, without resort to Alanus'
position.
Tierney, Foundations, p. 46.
•^Ibid., pp. 45-46, 54, 67.
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guards for the general welfare.

Later canonists, notably

Hostiensis, gradually applied the principles of the inherent
authority of the chapter and the proctorial power of the
head to all levels of the hierarchy, at least implying that
the pope's governmental power (potestas iurisdictionis) could
devolve to the cardinals and that that authority could in
turn devolve to the Roman clergy and people, and even to a
General Council representing the Universal Church.

The under

lying authority of the congregatio fidelium was emerging as
a positive power to act in the interest of the whole Church,
able to be invoked at least in emergencies.

In the canonist

application of the idea that in grave default or vacancy

the

authority of the head devolved to the corporation, which
could then effect a remedy, lay a ready-made suppletive prin
ciple for the conciliarists, who would hold that the Univer
sal Church could remedy the failure of its governing organs
and preserve the status.*
Here again John of Paris played his role of developing
for the later conciliarists the "constitutional" implications
of many canonist doctrines.

It has already been pointed out

that John consistently applied to the whole Church the doc
trines of corporative thought, assuming that certain powers
always inhere in the corporation and that the head's powers
are representative, delegated, derivative, ordained to the
ends of the community.

This allowed John to give the canon-

1Ibid., pp. 50-51. 57-58, 130, 142, 149-53, 224.
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ists* diffused indefectibility an institutional enforcer
for the status ecclesiae t the General Council representing
1
the Universal Church.
John’s assertion that a pope could
be held responsible to a General Council for abuse of spirit
ual powers and dissipation of church goods rested upon the
assumption that the Church’s inherent authority was not con
centrated in the pope; there existed in the Church centers
of authority whose powers were not derived from the pope,
powers which could be used to oppose his authority.

While

the papacy was of divine origin, it was not the only such
power in the Church; there existed in the College of Cardi
nals or in the whole Church an authority at least equal to
the pope's.

John's use of the Pauline texts on edification

and destruction were an apt addition to the issue of preserv
ing the status.
In establishing a theoretical basis for the deposition
of a pope whose acts injured the Church's general welfare,
1
Through writers such as John, d'Ailly and other con
ciliarists came to see in the idea of representation more
than mere personification. It was commonly held by high papalists that the pope represented the Church, in the sense
that he personified it and embodied the whole of its author
ity. But to the conciliarists representation implied an ac
tual bestowal of authority upon the representative by the
community, with the corollary that the authority could be
withdrawn if abused. For more on the issue of the shift from
personification to delegation in conceiving of representation,
see Tierney, Foundations, pp. b-5t 35-36, 55-56, 125-57; Oak
ley, D'Ailly. pp. 136-38; Ullmann, Medieval Papalism. p. I 65.
That representation could be conceived of as either irrevo
cable personification or limited delegation shows the ambigu
ity of such "constitutional” developments.
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John applied an established juristic distinction between the
office and the person who for a time occupies that office,
a distinction we find implicit in d'Ailly'§ arguments.

The

intrinsic authority of the papacy was conferred directly by
God and thus was immutable, but the decision as to which in
dividual should exercise that authority was made— and in
John's view unmade— by men.

The divine origin of papal au-

thority did not confer immunity from deposition.

John also

made use of the canonistic distinction between the power
of orders and the power of jurisdiction.

It was commonly

held by the canonists that in orders all the apostles were
equal? Peter's primacy consisted in superiority of jurisdic
tion.

Furthermore, while the canonists regarded orders as

a supernatural and indelible gift, they felt that jurisdic
tion (potestas iurisdictionis) was conferred on a prelate sole
ly hy the human election and consent of the community.

John

of Paris accepted and extended this principle, applying it
to the papacy: the pope's potestas iurisdictionis was con
ferred by the election of the whole Church, with the cardi
nals acting in her behalf, and was subject to removal by loss

It should be noted that neither John nor Pierre intend
ed to deny the divine origin or permanent nature of papal
primacy or to encroach upon the daily working of papal gov
ernment. The recognition of papal headship was an indispen
sable base for the application of corporative theories to
the Church. Both John and Pierre upheld the jurisdictional
primacy of the pope in normal circumstances and the divine
origin of this primacy. For references to primary material,
see Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 121, 165-66.
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of that approval, again through the agency of the cardinals,
though more properly a General Council should be summoned.
Since jurisdictional primacy was the distinguishing element
of papal authority, a pontiff deprived of it ceased to be
pope, though he remained priest and bishop due to the indel
ibility of orders.^
Also in the fourteenth century, William Durantis, bish
op of Mende, gave the General Council a regular constitu
tional role in all matters affecting the general welfare.
In such matters, he held, the General Council was superior
2
to the pope.
During the fourteenth century the ideas of
men such as John and William tended to slip into Decretal3

ist glosses.

By the fifteenth century, the idea that the

*0n the canonist sources of John of Paris and his de
velopment of them: Tierney, Foundations, pp. 3-5, ^5-^9, 15253» 157-78. See Oakley, D'Ailly. p p . 45. ^7, ^9, 53, 101,
109-H0, 118, 121-22, 128, 127, 199, 205-209, for further
information on d'Ailly's borrowings from John of Paris. John
exercised a much greater influence over the conciliarists
than Ockham, who drew back from asserting any conciliar su
premacy. See also Tierney, "Ockham," 60-62.
2
Tierney, Foundations, pp. 19^-96, 235.
3

■^These fourteenth-century Decretalists, generally re
garded as high papalists, did not lose sight of the idea that
there was diffused throughout the Church or in the College of
Cardinals an authority for its preservation, normally dormant,
but capable of being invoked in emergencies. Mainly such
emergencies were limited in their thinking to cases of here
tical popes. Yet some Decretalists preserved a broader span
of justiciable offenses against the status ecclesiae. For
example, Joannes Andreae quoted approvingly the solution of
Hostiensis to the extinction of pope and cardinals and con
sidered the solution applicable to the case of schism, in
which grave doubt existed as to which man was validly elect
ed. He seemed to admit that not only an heretical or crim
inal pope but even a true pope could be held subject to
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whole community was the source of political authority was
a commonplace among canonists and civil lawyers.

This is

indicated by the ease with which conciliarists were able to
apply it to the Church.
The eighth point in d ’Ailly's attack is a summary ar
gument in which he wishes to show that his conciliarism is
supported by reason, even beyond his seven points above. That
the pope can in many cases be judged and condemned by the
Universal Church or by a General Council representing it,
and that appeal can be made beyond him to a General Council
in many cases, clearly in those touching the destruction of
the Church, he regards as evident to reason as well as man
dated by laws human and divine.

Briefly stated, his course

is to apply to the Church the idea that every civil body nat
urally resists its own destruction.

The bridge to these ar

guments on the basis of reason from those above based mainly
on the canonists is the restrictive principle of the main
tenance of the status ecclesiae.

Every rightly ordained pol

ity naturally resists a threat to its status, if need be by
setting aside the letter of the law in the interest of equity.^-

a General Council summoned by an authority other than the
pope's. He was led to the explicit conclusion that there
could be in the whole Church or in the General Council an
authority at least equal to the pope's. It seems true, as
Tierney has pointed out, that the great Decretalist edifice
of papal monarchy found an inadequate base in the theory and
practice of corporate life. Tierney, Foundations, p p . 54.
148, 212-18, 235, 237 n. 1.
"^The arguments of the seventh and eighth points of the
tract are somewhat elliptical. D'Ailly has omitted direct
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That d’Ailly has not left John of Paris and the canonists
behind becomes evident when he reaches the question of the
extinction of the pope and cardinals at once.
D'Ailly*s use below of the term politia to refer to the
Church presents no large difficulty.

A perusal of the texts

shows that most often he uses universalis Ecclesiae or congregatio fidelium to refer to the whole Church.

But he does

not avoid this other term indicating the similarity of the
Church to a secular kingdom.
Although his opinions have not remained unchallenged,
J. N. Figgis years ago discussed the connection between the

mention of the location of the plenitudo potestatis and has
abbreviated his thoughts on the resistance of a body to its
own perdition. One must turn to his Propositiones utiles
(1409) or his Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate (l4i6)
for fuller arguments. Probably drawing upon John of Paris,
d'Ailly held that by natural law any natural body resists
its own division, and in a like manner any rightly ordained
civil body resists its own destruction. In this tract, he
jumps right into speaking of the civil community, omitting
the broader, more basic model of the natural body. Also,
in his 1416 tract, he held that while the pope's authority
derives directly from God, it depends ministerially upon hu
man agency. The flock is not deprived after the election
of the natural right of all over whom authority is exercised:
the right to preserve itself. Though the plenitude of power
resides in the pope because he has the general exercise of
it, it belongs to him in a ministerial way and is ordained
to the ends of the Universal Church. Thus, if he uses the
power against those ends he is subject to judgment by the
General Council, which represents the Universal Church. Oth
erwise, the Church is not a rightly ordained body, natural
ly resisting its own division. For discussion and references,
see Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 62-63, 119-20. For Propositiones
utiles, see Martene and Durand, VII, 909-911* or 39&-403.
D'Ailly covers some of the same ground in his "Conclusiones
in civitate Tarraconensi," Martene and Durand, VII, 916-18.
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constitutional examples of the secular states and the ten
dency of the conciliarists to treat the Church, analogous
in many ways to the secular state, as a political society.*
Oakley and others have pointed out the extent to which the
long struggle of popes and monarchs had brought about a sec2
ularization of man*s conception of the Church.
As an in
ternational organization, the Church shared with the state
many constitutional issues and problems? both learned from
the experience of corporate organization and the reception
of Roman law.

Tierney has stressed that it was long the prac

tice of canon lawyers to apply terms and concepts applicable
3

to all corporations to the Church.

While scholars may not

agree on the source of the attitude, there is little dissent
from the view that the Church at this time was being con
sidered as, in some ways, a political society, and there is
general agreement that the conciliarists were not the source
of the attitude.

Finally, it must be remembered that d'Ail

ly and his conciliarist colleagues were not concerned with
the •potestas ordinis but the potestas iurisdictionis.

As

Oakley writes, this "enables him to set aside that aspect
of ecclesiastical power which could hardly be confined with
in the profane categories of corporational and political ar

*Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 36, 42, 44-45.
20akley, D'Ailly, p. 53 •
3
^Tierney, Foundations, pp. 108-153* passim.
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gumentation . . . ."

1

His preoccupation is with the con

stitution of the Church, with the governmental power some
how conferred on Peter.
The attitude which conceived of the Church as in cer
tain ways analogous to a secular state is implicit above,
where d'Ailly refutes the claim that because a greater can
not be judged by a lesser, the pope cannot be judged by a
General Council, through arguing by analogy to the French
king and Parlement.

And below, when he finds it necessary

to qualify the application of the dictum princeps legibus
solutus. he does so not in terms of the irrelevance of the
secular maxim to the Church, but in terms of the superior2
ity of divine to human law.
That d'Ailly disagreed with
some of the arguments based upon the application of the prin
ciple is evident; yet, in Oakley's words, "his failure to
question its very application reveals his own commitment to
the conception of the Church which made it relevant.."^ In
a sense, d'Ailly says that if the arguments concerning the
source and purpose of political authority cannot be applied
to the Church, then Christ did not ordain and establish it
sufficiently.

Since to affirm this last is unthinkable, the

arguments based upon the maintenance of the status and the
nature of the rightly ordained polity are seen to apply to

1Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 61.
2
De materia* pp. 30^-* 313*
-^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 5^.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PLEASE NOTE:
Page 113 is lacking in number
only. No text is missing.
Filmed as received.
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
any organized body, secular or ecclesiastical.
D ’Ailly argues then that no communitas is sufficiently
ordained which cannot resist its own perdition and public
demolition.

Yet, this judgment would have to be made of

the Ecclesiastical Polity if a pope, through manifest heresy,
open tyranny, or another notorious crime tried to subvert
it, and no one were able to question him and resist him by
way of the law* appealing from him, accusing him, and by
means of a General Council judging him.

It would follow that

Christ himself, "the true and supreme head of the Church and
her most wise founder,"^ has not perfectly and sufficiently
ordained the Church.

This position is heretical and contra

ry to that passage from Deuteronomy* "The works of God are
2
perfect."
It would be to concede power to the pope not for
edification but for destruction, contrary to the word and
example of Paul.
On the basis of Paul's reproof of Peter^ d'Ailly as
serts that the pope need not necessarily be heretical to mer
it conciliar reproof.

It is seen that Paul justly reproved

Peter by rational means, because he was not walking strictly
according to the Gospel's truth.

Nevertheless, we receive

no inkling from the text or from any gloss that Peter had

1"Ver\un et supremum caput Ecclesiae et institutorem eius
sapientissimum"* De materia, pp. 309-310*
2Deut. 32*4.
3Gal. 2*11-14.
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strayed into heresy.

A pope may in many cases other than

heresy stray from the correct faith, as when he scandalously
agitates and manifestly destroys the Church.

Consequently,

in such cases, the pope, even though not a heretic, can be
corrected, accused, and judged.^What is to be done in the sort of cases mentioned here,
if the pope refuses to convoke a council, even after it is
sought of him?

D*Ailly argues that a council must be called

"just as if a similar necessity arose while the see was vacant."

In these two cases (that is, in the event of a pa

pal vacancy or in the event of a pope*s refusing to convoke
a council), when the welfare of the Church demands the con
voking of a General Council, a council is able to be cele
brated without a pope or his authority, by the authority of
Christ and the Universal Church.

It shall be convoked by

D'Ailly dismisses as unconvincing arguments against
this opinion gleaned from those popular texts, C.2, q.7, c.13,
and D.40, c .6. He uses these very texts to support his point
of view. Apparently, the difference hinges on the interpre
tation of the clauses nisi a recte fide exorbitaverit and nisi
deprehendatur a fide devius, withd'Ailly adopting the broad
position that straying from the faith is not always heresy.
The first of these texts does not refer specifically to the
pope, but to pastores in general. The Pauline texts under
question are, as above, Gal. 2*11-1^, II Cor. 10:8, 13*10.
2
" . . .Sicut si sede vacante similis occurreret necessitas." De materia, p.
3
^"Nam m his duobus casibus, . . .poterit concilium sine
Papa vel sine eius auctoritate celebrari, scilicent auctoritate Christi et universalis Ecclesiae." De materia, p. 311.
Here is a good example (but not the only one) of the appli
cation by d'Ailly of corporative principles to the entire
Church* in such an emergency power devolves to the entire
corporation. It is interesting that d'Ailly's argument para-
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the greater prelates, or in support of the law and at their
instigation by the secular princes, as it has more often been
done in the past.

The reason for these arrangements is ob

vious, says d ’Ailly, because in the event of a vacancy or
of a pope's refusing to convoke a council, unless a remedy
can be applied in the above manner, it follows that the Church
has not sufficient strength and resources to preserve and
continue itself. In this way, again, it would be possible
for the Christian Polity to fail completely,- contrary to the
words of Christ: "I am with you . . . .even to the consummai

tion of the world.”

What happens when there is no pope and the cardinals
resolve not to elect a successor, and attempt to produce se
dition and to agitate the Church in a hostile manner?

Or

what happens if some tyrannical princes prevent their convo
cation or imprison them?

Or suppose that they also are all

dead or join the pope in manifest heresy.

Again, if in these

and similar cases, "the remnant of Christianity, which would
then be the Church, could not form a council and elect a new
pope through the other clergy and beneficially provide against
these and similar occurrences, it would be necessary for the

llels some of the thirteenth-century canonist discussions of
the workings of ecclesiastical corporations. The jurisdic
tional powers were held to be capable of devolution not only
when the prelate was dead but when virtually so— for instance,
when heretical, imprisoned by infidels, or grossly negligent.
See Tierney, Foundations, pp. 127-31*
Hiatt. 28:20.
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Ecclesiastical Polity to perish and fail."

1

To obviate such

crises, the Universal Church can, by the authority of Christ,
gather a General Council.

Christ said, "Where there are two

or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the
2
midst of them."
He said, "in my name," not "in Peter's
name," or "in the name and authority of the pope."

We must

consider this message in conjunction with what he said elsewhere* "whatsoever you shall ask the Father in my name,"-'
for his name is the name of salvation.

He thus promises us

whatever we seek pertaining to salvation.

We must understand

that the salvation of the Church becomes the duty of the congregatio fidelium if those to whom the duty regularly per
tains cannot or will not carry it out.

And if the Scriptur

al evidence here is commonly understood to refer to the au
thority of the congregatio fidelium to pray, it ought also
by reason be understood to refer tp its authority to demand,
for the Church's salvation, a correct solution to such dif
ficulties as are discussed above.^
The appeals to Scripture, the immediate authority of
Christ, and the inherent power of the congregatio fidelium

. . .Residuum Christianitas, quod
sia, non posset concilium facere et novum
clerum eligere et contra casus praedictos
briter providere, necesse esset perire et
asticam Politiam." De materia, p. Jll.

tunc esset EcclePapam per alium
aut similes saludeficere Ecclesi-

2Matt. 18*20.
3John 14*13, 16*23.
Ll

De materia, pp. Jll-12.
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show that d'Ailly has not left behind Scripture or the can
onists.

But his arguments from reason on the nature of the

rightly ordained polity have a life and cogency of their own.
As Oakley points out, to simply assert that d'Ailly has prov
en on the basis of Scripture that in some

crucial ways the

Church must be regarded as a political society is to over
look the initial assumption of the eighth point, an assump
tion essential to the validity of his Scriptural argument:
no community is sufficiently ordained if it cannot resist
its own ruin and open destruction.^
D'Ailly draws his arguments to a close with a return
to emphasizing that the integrity of the Church is guaranteed
by divine law and the immediate direction of Christ.

He deals

with two potentially troublesome texts and the gloss on one
2
of them.
Some, he says, will raise objections to the above
opinions by arguing on the basis of certain canons that the
principal see (prima sedes), that is, the Roman Church (Romana ecclesia), confirms every synod by its own authority
and that all councils are produced and receive their strength
by its authority.

D'Ailly*fe reply parallels a common approach

of the canonists when faced with the problem of the locus of
inerrant authority: the examination of different connotations
of Romana ecclesia.

^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 6k.
2

C.25* Q.l, c.l; C.25, q.l, c.l, in v. Oportet; X, 1.
6, c.k.
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The Decretists had followed Gratian in upholding the
power of the pope to settle doctrinal disputes but also in
treating this power solely as an outgrowth of his judicial
supremacy.

"His decisions commanded the assent of the Church

as the sentences of a supreme judge, not as the teachings of
an infallible d o c t o r . T h e y ascribed inerrancy in faith
only to the Universal Church, and no claim that the pope was
necessarily inerrant in his doctrinal decisions was ever
made by them.

There were texts explicitly declaring that

the Romana ecclesia never erred in faith (C.24, q.l, cc.918), but the Decretists did not employ them to tout papal
infallibility, apparently because they were deterred by some
texts implying and demonstrating that popes could be and had
2
on occasion been heretical.
Thus the Decretists were pre
sented with a Universal Church incapable of error in mat
ters of faith, an immaculate Roman Church, and a judicially
supreme pope who might be a heretic.

They sought a solution

by examining the different connotations of Romana ecclesia.
Gratian made no attempt to distinguish among the powers
of pope, Apostolic See, and Roman Church, and used the terms
interchangeably.

Most often in the Decretum the term Romana

1
Tierney, Foundations, p. 37? dictum Gratiani ad D.20,
ante c.l; see also D.17» c.5? C.2, q.6, cc.4-10; C.5¥, q.l,
cc.9-1^.
^ e have become familiar with some of these texts in
following d'Ailly's arguments* D.21, c.7? dictum Gratiani
ad C.2, q.7, post c.39? D.l9t c.9»
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ecclesia described the local church of Rome.

But a different

meaning was suggested by certain passages emphasizing the
unity of faith between the local Roman Church and the Uni
versal Church.

In this sense the Roman Church could be iden

tified with the Universal Church.*
Huguccio was an important figure in this discussion.
He was apparently the first to see that the paradox surround
ing the papal authority might be rooted in some confusion
concerning the nature of the Roman Church.

He made it clear

that in matters of faith any theory of ecclesiastical author
ity consistent with the Decretum would have to be based on
a distinction between the inherent powers of the whole Church
and the authority that could be exercised by the local Roman
Church.
Besides the two senses of Romana ecclesia, Huguccio found
another distinction apt, for the term Romana ecclesia, was
doubly ambiguous.

Not only did Romana have two senses, but

ecclesia had many more.

It might refer to the head of the

corporation in question, all of its members, or some inter
mediate group.

Thus, Romana ecclesia might refer to the pope,

the pope and cardinals (or some other intermediate group rep
resenting the local church), or the whole congregatio fidelium.

Huguccio did not deny the acceptability of the other
2
understandings of Romana ecclesia.
But when the term was

*See, for instance, C.24, q.l, c.25.
2
He believed that the local Roman Church enjoyed a posi-
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used to describe the bearer of Christ*s promised unerring
authority, it seemed evident to him (as to any later con-ciliarists) that the Roman Church understood as pope or pope
and curia could not be the Romana ecclesia that was to be
forever sinless and inerrant; this could only be the Univer
sal Church.
Huguccio's interpretation was widely accepted among la
ter Decretists and was incorporated into the glossa ordinaria to the Decretum.

This gloss, the work of Joannes Teuton

icus, was the most available of Decretists texts to the conciliarists and a work with which d'Ailly displays familiar
ity.

In the fourteenth century, the most common understand

ing of Romana ecclesia seems to have been congregatio fidel1
lum.
It should come as no surprise that we find d'Ailly be
low appealing above human law to divine law and the immedi2
ate direction of Christ.
It was a natural corollary of the

tion of authority among the local churches, who were required
to obey the Roman Church in matters of ecclesiastical disci
pline and judicial decisions.
1
Tierney, Foundations, pp. 36-45, 71, 202-203j see also
"Ockham," 47, 49, 63-67* For the glossa ordinaria's discus
sion on this matter, see glossa ad C.24. q.l, c.9» in v. Novitatibus. printed in Foundations, pp. 253-54. The DecretTst
distinction between the authority of the Roman Church and the
whole Church in matters of faith Tierney calls "the essence
of later conciliar thought." (Foundations, pp^ 45-46). Of
course, the Decretists never took the step of formulating for
the congregatio fidelium an active governing power over the
pope. But the distinction between the local and universal
Romana ecclesia was no invention of fourteenth-century publicists.
2
The human law to which d'Ailly refers is the canon law,
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restrictive concept of the status ecclesiae that the letter
of the law must be set aside when it actually threatens the
interest it has been ordained to serve.

The appeal to nec

essity and emergency is implicit in the canonist and publi
cist arguments above.

The Decretists never troubled to dis

cuss a question heatedly argued in the conciliar era— whether
the cardinals really had any right to summon a General Coun
cil.

The principle that only a pope could summon a General

Council was explicit in the Decretum.

Yet all assumed that

when a General Council was urgently needed to provide a head

which, following contemporary usage, he sometimes refers to
as ius commune or iura communia (De materia, pp. 29^, 296;
for discussion, Oakley, D*Ailly. pp. 173-78). When d'Ailly
discusses the accidental powers of the pope, he observes that
these "usurpations" of local rights violate not only ius com
mune but ius divinum (p. 29*0. Or below, he regards the con
centration of definitive authority in the Apostolic See set
down in the canons as human law, capable of being set aside,
since by divine law the whole Church holds power and author
ity immediately from Christ (pp. 312-13). His assumption
that canon law is not divine law is contrary to the opinion
of a good number of the canonists but 5n line with Ockham's.
D'Ailly nowhere defines ius commune, but remarks made in Parts
One and Three of this tract (pp. 253» 266, 320) lead one to
think that an important part of his definition would be its
promulgation by the legislative authority. He apparently
regarded the will of the proper law-making authority and the
common consent of those affected as essential elements of
human law. I have not treated d'Ailly's discussion of nat
ural law and its relation to divine law at all, since he does
not mention natural law in this tract. For our purpose, the
essential point is that d'Ailly places canon law among human
laws and that in his philosophy of law the basic dichotomy
is between human and divine law. This is borne out at points
by the phrases of the tract 1 "tam de iure divino quam humano,"
"iura tam divina quam humana," "non solum . . .iura humana .
. . , sed etiam . . .ius divinum," "tam de iure humano quam
divino." (pp. 295, 300, 306, 309) • D'Ailly seems to have
used ius and lex interchangeably without discrimination.
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for the Church, it could be summoned, if necessary, by an
alternative method.

Hostiensis, in support of his point of

view that power could devolve to the cardinals and even to
the Universal Church, could make use of appeals from the let
ter of the law to legislative intent and equity found in the
glossa ordinaria to the Decretum.

Ockham*s appeals to neces

sity were no more new than were those of the conciliarists.
Like the other conciliarists, d'Ailly saw a large role for
J
/
Aristotleian e m e u m * in solving the Schism. Below he tries
to show that positive law must in some cases be interpreted
or set aside in the light of equity, necessity, or the spirit
of the law.'*’
D'Ailly then has pointed out that some will take excep
tion to his arguments by citing sources which designate the
Romana ecclesia as the source of every council's authority.
If, replies d'Ailly, Romana ecclesia is understood as the Ec
clesia universalis, as it is often necessary to understand it
in the canons, then we have here an argument for, not against,

I have not discussed d'Ailly's conception of gttc
£.<.<*
at length because in this particular tract he does not deal
with it directly. For treatment and reference to sources,
see Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 160-61, 164, and n.4. As was sta
ted before, d'Ailly was upset by the legalistic spirit of
his age. He felt that it encouraged men to forget the role
of equity in interpreting positive law and to prefer the let
ter to the spirit. Tierney writes: "The fourteenth-century
Conciliarists were not original in relying on a doctrine of
epikeia and 'necessity' to justify extra-legal actions, but
only m thinking that the explicit formulation of such a doc
trine was indispensable to their case. The Decretists seem
to have taken their epikeia for granted." Foundations, p.
77.
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the third opinion.

If Romana ecclesia is taken to mean the

College of Cardinals and the clergy of the Roman diocese,
such a Romana ecclesia is conceded to have no authority over
a General Council.

More than that, the College of Cardinals

receives from the General Council authority to elect a pope
and to exercise its other privileges? as it happens, it has
usurped from the councils many things.1

If, however, in the

above canons, Romana ecclesia is taken for the pope, as is
often assumed in the law, it is conceded that by him, reg
ularly, councils are confirmed, produced, and receive their
strength.

By his authority they are and ought to be congre

gated, as the laws which preface the eight consideration a2
bove prove.
But the point which d'Ailly wishes to stress
is that these powers regularly wielded by the pope exist by
the disposition of human law.

"The Church has reasonably

established this and for good reasons has bound herself in
this authority . . . .

D'Ailly points out that in apostol-

1

"Immo tale particulare Collegium, quantum ad electionem Papae vel alia eius privilegia, a generalibus conciliis auctoritatem accepit, et forte contra ea plurima usurpavit." De materia, p. 312. Here is an example of d'Ailly*s
application of the laws of ecclesiastical corporations to
every level of the hierarchy. He emphasizes the derivative
nature of the power of the local Roman Church as, in a sense,
the head of the Universal Church.
2
De materia, pp. 308-309, where d'Ailly has conceded the
pope's prerogatives when used for the Church's edification.
•'"Hoc rationabiliter statuit Ecclesia, et ex iustis causis suam in hoc auctoritatem restrinxit . . . ." Ibid., pp.
312-13.
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ic times no such limitation of the original divine gift to
the whole Church had yet been made, as is witnessed by the
1
proceedings of the Council of Jerusalem.
Thus, in the pre
sent situation we are dealing with limitations of purely hu
man origin, and in spite of all these human laws, it is still
true "that by divine law and from Christ directly the Church
has had and shall always have special power and authority
to assemble a council and there to define and determine, es2
pecially in the above-mentioned cases."
D'Ailly accords this treatment specifically to one of
the troublesome texts above and to some words of the glos
sator on it.

Pope Gelasius wrote, "It behoves no see more

than the first to execute before the rest the constitution
of any synod which the assent of the Universal Church has
approved."^

The gloss comments that this refers to consid

eration or propriety and not necessity.

This is true "be-

cause 'the prince is unfettered by laws.'"

XActs 151^-30.
2
" . . .Quod iure divino et a Christo immediate Eccle
sia sua habuit et semper habebit specialem potestatem et auc
toritatem concilium congregandi et ibi definiendi et determinandi, maxime in casibus supradictis." De materia, p. 313.
3

^"Uniuscuiusque synodi constitutum, quod universalis
Ecclesiae probavit assensus, nullam magis exsequi sedem prae
ceteris oportere, quam primam . . . ." C.25, q.l, c.l.
if

It is extremely difficult to render this argument in
English. It centers around the interpretation of a Latin
verb and a Latin maxim. "Generaliter tamen in docto cap.
Confidimus dicit Gelasius Papa: *Uniuseuiusque synodi con
stitution, quod universalis Ecclesiae probavit assensus, nul-
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Bui; this maxim (princeps

legibus solutus). d'Ailly ar

gues, applies to the pope only in the case of the humanlaws
which he issues.
On the other hand, concerning divine laws or
those instituted with divine authority by the
Universal Church, this is not conceded to be
true generally and in all cases, and especially
in those which touch the whole body and status
of the Universal Church. But concerning-particu
lar persons and in certain cases the Roman Church
can by her own authority ordain and dispense with
respect to those conciliar statutes and those of
her own laws which pertain only to human mores,
and once conceded by her, necessity with respect
to piety or reason and the consideration of equity
are adequate grounds to change them either in
whole or in part, as Gratian shows, C.25, q.2,
c.21, His ita.1

lam magis exsequi sedem prae ceteris oportere, quam primam,'
scilicet Romanam Ecclesiam. Ubi super verbo 'oportere* dicit glossa quod 'hoc verbum "oportet" est hie verbum honestatis' et non necessitatis. Et hoc ideo dicit 'quia princeps legibus solutus est,' ut in dicto cap. Significasti.
'Tamen honestum est ut secundum legem vivat,' ut testatur
Imperator." De materia, p. 313* The quoted passages are
from C.25, q.l, c.l} C.25, q.l, c.l, in v. Oportet; X, 1,
6, c.4-, the three texts with which d'Ailly has wrestled in
this final section, which grant special privileges to the
prima sedes or Romana ecclesia. The difficulty of this pas
sage is enhanced by the apparent lack of a solid connection
between the thought expressed by the matter from C.25, q.l,
c.l, and that from X, 1, 6, c.^. The connection apparently
is between the meaning of oportere and the meaning of the
maxim princeps legibus solutus: when one speaks of what a
ruler ought to do, what it behoves him to do, one must re
member that this refers only to what it is proper or honor
able for the ruler to do. Strictly speaking, according to
the maxim princeps legibus solutus. the ruler is above the
law. In introducing the maxim in this way d'Ailly is per
haps only following the lead of the glossa ordinaria in its
treatment of C.25, q»l, c.l, but without access to anything
but a fragment of this gloss, I have been unable to deter
mine this. The whole passage seems to be merely d'Ailly*s
way of introducing this maxim; he now proceeds to rob it of
force in this case.
lwDe legibus autem divinis aut divina auctoritate ab
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This distinction in applying the maxim princeps legibus so
lutus must be kept in mind, warns d*Ailly, for a correct interpretation of many canonist texts.
Thus, in the emergency situation, the underlying author
ity of the whole Church, which no human law can eradicate,
may be asserted to save the Church.

D'Ailly finds his point

firmly based in Scripture, canon law, reason, and divine law.
Part Two of De materia is closed with a prayer:

universali Ecclesia institutis generaliter et in omnibus verum esse non concedit, et maxime in his quae totum corpus
et universalis Ecclesiae statum tangunt. De particularibus
autem personis et in certis potest Romana Ecclesia circa statuta conciliorum et leges suas, quae mores humanos respiciunt, sua auctoritate ordinare et dispensare, et pietatis vel
necessitas intuitu rationis aequitate considerata, semel a
se concessa valet vel in totum vel in partem commutare: ut
ostendit Gratianus 25, q.2, His ita respondetur." De materia,
pp. JlJ-lk. The concession which d'Ailly grants to papal
power with respect to human regulations is reminiscent of the
Decretist claim that the pope might disregard decisions of
the General Council which were of merely local and temporary
import, but that conciliar statutes which were of universal
application, touching the status ecclesiae. were inviolable.
For more see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 52-53*
^D'Ailly cites as an example Joannes A’
ndreae's gloss
on X, 1, 6, c.^, where, according to d'Ailly, Joannes wrote
that "videtur quod solus Papa sine concilio vel eius parte
possit interpretari statuta concilii." For more complete ref
erence see Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 31^ n* 7. Also cited are D.17,
c.4; VI , 5, 11, cc.9» i3? Clem. 1, 3, c.2, Sane; VI , 1, 3,
c.ll; Clem.l. 3, c.^; Jher is also a general reference to the
glossa ordinaria on VI , 1, 3» c.ll. Joannes Andreae pro
duced this gloss. Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 111-12, writes that
"D'Ailly . . .is echoing a well-established Decretist posi
tion when he argues that the dictum, princeps legibus solu
tus. is true of the Pope only in the case of those laws of
his own promulgation, but not in the case of 'divine laws
or of those laws promulgated with divine authority by the
Universal Church . . .above all -in those matters which af
fect the whole body and status of the Universal Church.*"
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In this . . .diversity and adversity of opin
ions may the Lord Jesus Christ grant us to choose
the one which he knows to be more beneficial and
suitable for the honor of his name and the salva
tion of his holy Church. Amen.1

1

"In hac . . .opinionura diversitate et adversitate det
nobis Dominus Jesus Christus id eligere, quod scit utilius
esseet convenientius ad honorem sui nominis et salutem Ec
clesiae suae sanctae. Amen." De materia, p. 31^-.
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CONCLUSION
This conclusion is designed to give some account of
the way in which the Second Part of De materia relates to
d’Ailly's conciliarism as a whole, events of the following
years, and any later changes of point of view.

Then there

will follow some words on the subsequent course of such ideas
as are found in the Second Part,
It will be recalled that d'Ailly had opposed the with
drawal of obedience from Avignon in 1398 in the first place.
The message of De materia joined a chorus cf voices demand
ing restoration.

The March 11, 1^03, escape of Benedict XIII

from Avignon spelled the end of effective resistance to res
toration.

By March 29, Benedict's cardinals had all returned

to him, and he was calling for a council to unite the French
Church.

At the Paris Council of 1^03, on May 28, though the

dukes of Berry and Burgundy and Simon of Cramaud still op
posed restoration, France joined the other nations of the
Avignon obedience, who had already resubmitted, in resubmit
ting to Benedict, on the sole condition that he promise to
explore the possibility of cession.A

D'Ailly announced the

^Secondary sources present conflicting accounts of the
French restoration, and most standard church histories give
it quick and simplified treatment. Crucial primary sources
have not been available to me. There seems to be some gen
eral agreement on the nature of the restoration of 1^06 dis
cussed below; it seems that it was the position of d'Ailly
which was adopted then. But, for instance, Dubray (p. 236)
129
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decision of the synod in a sermon in Notre Dame of Paris.
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i

By the time of the election of Gregory XII to the Ro
man See, November 30, 1*4-06, Benedict's favor in France was
again on the decline.

Thus, when Gregory announced .his de

termination to seek a possible cession, Benedict was more
inclined than ever to make terms, especially after the fail
ure of his mission to Italy that year.

The University of

Paris was becoming impatient again, and discussions about
withdrawal of obedience were again current.

By November of

1406, definite proposals for such a withdrawal had been drawn
up, and on November 18, when the University, the king, and

represents the 1403 restoration in the same way and makes
no mention of 1406. Oakley's words are ambiguous (D'Ailly.
pp. 12, 252, 294 n. 6 ), but he seems to say that in both ca
ses the restoration was along the lines recommended by d'Ail
ly. Mansi, XXVI, 1001-1031, is not entirely conclusive on
this point. Therein we find that upon the 1403 restoration
Benedict promised to abdicate if his rival ceded or died and
that in l407 the French Church reclaimed certain enumerated
liberties. There is no clear indication, in these documents
of what precise relationship between the pope and the French
Church was established by the Paris Council of 1406. I have
adopted the reconstruction of J. H. Smith, The Great Schism,
1378 (New York: Weybright and Talley, I97O), pp. 162-63; John
Moral!, Gerson and the Great Schism (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, i960), pp. 63-64; 69; and Bishop Creighton,
A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack
of Rome (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 6 vols., 1897),
I, 179-80, 195-96, 201-202. It seems most in keeping with
the course of events. This interpretation is strengthened
by the treatment by Ch. V. Langlois, "Political and Social
Conditions from 1337 to 1494," in Medieval France: A Com
panion to French Studies (ed. Arthur Tilley; New York: Hafner Publishing, 1964), pp. 145-46. He points out a factor
which may be a source of confusion: properly speaking, in
1406 France was not restoring essential powers to the pope,
but withdrawing nonessential ones, since a full restoration
had been made m 1403.
1Creighton, I, 179-80.
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the French clergy met in council at Paris, Simon of Cramaud
and Jean Petit

proposed that the king make himself sovereign

in his land and obey neither pope.

However, d'Ailly spoke

strongly in support of papal authority and Benedict's right
to wield it.

He cited from the canons to prove that a pope

could be condemned only for recognized heresy and that to
withdraw obedience would be to transfer the Church's author
ity from the heart to the outlying members.

An even more

pro-papal stand was taken by William Fillastre, whom Bene
dict would soon elevate to the cardinalate.

It is interest

ing that d'Ailly's arguments may not be exactly the same as
those of De materia, in which he had admitted that a pope
could be condemned even for secret heresy, default, or neg
ligence, and that the congregatio fidelium held potentially
greater power than the pope.

But "flexibility" in debate
2
was not uncharacteristic of d'Ailly.
Most importantly, the
end to which he argued at Paris was the end to which he ar-

Simon of Cramaud was titular patriarch of Alexandria
and had presided over the 1398 assembly which had initially
withdrawn obedience. Petit was a Dominican scholar most fa
mous for his vindication of tyrannicide.
2
There must be a word of caution here. This assessment
of d'Ailly's statements at the synod is derived from secon
dary sources (Smith, p. 166), due to the inaccessibility of
the primary sources. It is possible that Smith oversimpli
fies in condensation. I am uncertain about how to interpret
his "recognized heresy." Does this mean "open," or "alreadycondemned?" And on the question of the relative strength of
the powers in the Church, the difference between 1402-1403
and 1406 may be simply one of emphasis, because d'Ailly was
not one inclined to strip Rome completely of prerogatives.
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gued in De materia*

And it was the policy accepted by the

French: the "necessary” spiritual powers of the pope were
to remain unimpaired, but the "ancient liberties" of the
French Church were to be denied him.
It is impossible on the basis of the evidence to say
exactly what part De materia played in the events described
above.

It can only be said that it was part of the chorus

that brought on the restoration, that the specific sort of
restoration which it advocated was the one accepted, and that
d’Ailly defended just such a restoration orally as well dur
ing the first decade of the fifteenth century.

But the par

tial restoration was the short-range motive for which the
tract had been composed.

We must also consider the arguments

which he aired concerning the authority of the Universal
Church and General Council over the pope.

The further course

of events is instructive.
In the short run, the pressure for cession generated
by the withholding of nonessential powers seemed to pay off.
The Paris Council decrees were published January 7, 14-07, and
within a week Benedict had agreed to meet Gregory XII.

But

there followed the farcical episodes in northern Italy, 14-0714-08.^

In January 14-08, d ’Ailly finally broke with Benedict.

Exasperated by his years of involvement in fruitless negoti2
ations, he returned to his own diocese.
In September of 14-09,

^Sraith, pp. 166-70.
2Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 12.
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France again withdrew obedience.

That same year, d'Ailly
2
was back to calling for a General Council.
What might be called the long-range motive for writing
the tract— the vindication of the conciliarist point of view—
must be considered against the background of these events.
The arguments for the authority of the General Council do
not form part of the central thrust of the tract, which was
to bring about a partial restoration.

But they ward off pos

sible misunderstanding of d'Ailly's motives in favoring res
toration.

They show that he was not a member of the extreme

papal party.

They form the more enduring and consistent cur

rent in his thought, for both before and after his flirta
tion with Avignon, he was a defender of the conciliar solu
tion.

Moreover, they point in the direction to which all

of the reformers were beginning to turn* the convoking of a
3
General Council of the Universal Church.
Evidence that De materia, in its expression of the in
herent authority of the Universal Church and its represent
ative, the General Council, represents the mature opinion of

^Smith, p. 171.
2
Dubray, p. 236.
3

On the other hand, the tract shows that d'Ailly was not
a member of the radical wing of the conciliarists. He admits
the papal prerogatives when used for the Church's edification,
and he actually ends the Second Part on a discussion of the
cases in which the pope is solutus legibus. Our discussion
of the extent to which d'Ailly*s conciliarism leans heavily
upon curial and even papal prerogatives has been limited, since
d'Ailly.does not deal directly with these aspects in the Sec
ond Part of De materia. See Oakley in Gerrish. no. < 5 Oak
ley, D'Ailly. pfT." 127-28; Tierney, Foundations, pp. 238-39.
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d'Ailly may be found in his Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate (1416).

This tract is, in many ways, a verbatim re

production of the conciliarist arguments of De materia; in
fact, at the end of this later tract, d'Ailly referred back
to De materia as the source of his arguments.1

Later writ

ings of d'Ailly reveal changes of opinion on some issues in
2
Parts One and Three of De materia.

10akley, D'Ailly, pp. 246-47.
2
So, in his Disputatio de iure sufragii quibus competat
(1415), he tries to explain away a position he took m the
First Part (pp. 268ff.) of De materia. There he had held
that the definitive authority of the council rests with the
bishops alone. By 1415, he was convinced that other elements
had to be admitted, on the general principle that representa
tion belongs to those who are preeminent in wisdom and in
fluence. See Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 151-54, 246-47.
Changes were also made in the substance of Part Three.
Oakley disagrees with Matthew Spinka's opinion, in Advocates
of Reform from Wyclif to Erasmus (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1953)* P» 103» that d'Ailly's reform tract of the Coun
cil of Constance, Tractatus super reformatione ecclesiae, was
dependent upon a tract of Henry of Langenstein. Oakley finds
no borrowing of words or, necessarily, of ideas. Nor does
he accept the idea of Paul Tschackert and J. P. McGowan that
it is a redaction of the Tractatus agendorum in concilio generali de ecclesiae reformatione, a work of disputed author
ship. Rather, Oakley regards it as a redaction of the Third
Part of De materia. D'Ailly abbreviated it to eliminate an
achronisms and superfluities. Also, he deleted a passage in
which he had attacked the College of Cardinals and substituted
for another passage— in which he had merely expressed disap
proval of the supression of the College— a flat condemnation
of such ideas. D'Ailly was by then himself a cardinal. Oak
ley, wishing apparently to vindicate him, sees these changes
as "probably less indicative of his own self-interest than of
the strengthening of the conservative and moderate elements
of his character, for it is clear from the original text that
he was never an extremist." Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 251. For
further information on the above, see Ibid., pp. 201 n. 13,
246-47 and n. 11; see Oakley's Appendix V, pp. 346-47, for
some pertinent excerpts from the 1416 tract. In De materia.
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It is difficult to say with certainty just how much or
in what way De materia influenced men and events at the time
of the Schism.

But it is more difficult to trace any influ

ence it had over the larger span of the following centuries.1
The whole subject of later borrowings from the conciliarists
has been only sketchily examined.

Research does not seem to

have reached the stage at which scholars would be prepared
to search for borrowings from a specific tract such as De
materia.

But some more broadly-based remarks on the possible

influence of d'Ailly's conciliarism, and conciliarism in gen2
eral, may be valuable.
The immediate practical importance of conciliar theory
was that it opened the way for an appeal beyond the stubborn
rivals to a decision of the faithful expressed in a General

see pp. 322ff.t 328ff. The reform tract was to have a long
history. The Third Part of De materia, in its sweeping re
form program, anticipated in many ways the measures of the
Catholic Reformation, a fact, as Oakley points out, which is
not as much a mark of d'Ailly's vision as it is a sign of the
persistent nature of the problems. In its revised form of
1416, the tract was published many times in the next two cen
turies and translated into German as late as 1600. It seems
to have been used by Protestants and other dissenters, as
might be guessed from the title under which it appeared in
Basle, 1551* De squaloribus Ecclesiae Romanae. See Oakley,
D'Ailly, pp. 250, 252, and n. 33*
1Except for that of the Third Part and its revised ver
sion of 1416, which are discussed above in p. 134 n. 2.
2
As has been indicated before, the subject of d'Ailly's
influence in topics ranging from the route to the Indies to
impanation is simply too large to make reference to here. A
good introduction to his influence on a broad philosophicotheological plane is William Courtenay, "Covenant and Causal
ity in Pierre d'Ailly," Speculum, XLVI (1971), 94-II9.
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Council.

The long-range significance of conciliarism ought

then to be sought among the constitutional implications of
such stances as the conciliarists developed tc\ accomplish

\
their aim.

Conciliarism called i m o question the evolution

of papal monarchy and stressed the communitarian and colleg
ial facets of ecclesiastical authority.

It looked toward

the creation of constitutional machinery set up to prevent
abuse of papal power.1
Oakley has been primarily interested in d'Ailly's conciliarist ideas to the extent that they are "political," that
is, bearing on the problems of the exercise of the Church's
potestas iurisdictionis and thus potentially upon the prob
lems of any rightly ordained polity.

Insofar as he has been

able to investigate the future of these political ideas, Oak
ley discerns a twofold influence, one ecclesiastical, one
secular.^

Oakley in Gerrish, p. 53* points out that the nature
of these constitutional implications has often been misun
derstood because historians have not always been aware of
the distinction between the powers of orders and of juris
diction, a commonplace of canonistic and conciliarist think
ing, and because they have been distracted by the efforts
of the later conciliarists of the Basle era, who attempted
to impose a parliamentary regime on even the daily affairs
of the Church.
2
Oakley writes that "the central problem of political
philosophy is the necessity of finding rational grounds for
political obligation. This is th£ r.rcblem that lay at the
heart of ancient political speculation. This is the problem
that has served as the conscious focus of its modern counter
part. It can hardly be said; howev^^, to have exercised the
majority of medieval political thinkers . . . .The bulk at
least of the early medieval literature was dominated . . .
not by questions relating directly to political obligation,
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First, while pure conciliarism suffered a great drop
in support after the practical solution of the most urgent
issues of unity and reform had passed, there was still some
support of the theory among canonists and jurists of the fif
teenth century.

These theories apparently enjoyed some cur

rency in England, where no strong university tradition of
conciliarism had developed, contrary to the general contin
ental situation.

Pamphleteers of the early English Reforma

tion cited the superiority of the General Council in spirit
ual affairs, over Icing and pope, appealed to ancient prac
tice and to Constance and Basle, and invoked writers such as
Gerson and d'Ailly.

A strong Scottish conciliarist tradi

tion also developed over the course of the fifteenth century.*
But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Gallican
France, especially the University of Paris, was the real bastion of conciliar theory.

D'Ailly's name figures in the pol-

but rather by problems concerning the relationis which should
exist between regnum and sacerdotium." Oakley regards the
Great Schism as one of the factors which served to reinstate
the question of political obligation as the focus of politi
cal philosophy; hence arises his interest in the conciliar
ists' speculation on the nature and location of authority.
The question of the subsequent career of these ideas has add
ed interest in that it helps to elucidate the enduring im
pact of the whole Romano-canonical contribution to the ques
tion of political obligation. D'Ailly, pp. 1-2 (quoted ma
terial-), 211.
*Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent (trans.
Ernest Graf; St. Louis: B. Herder, 2 vols., 1957, 1961), I,
27-61; see Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 213 nn. 6, 7 for references
to information on the English and Scottish conciliarists.
2Jedin, I, 32-3^.
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emical battles in support of the independence of the French
Church from close papal control; he was cited or echoed, along
with other conciliarists, by Gallican spokesmen down into
the early eighteenth century.

In a sense, he was the found

er and inspiration of a series of conciliarists and Gallicans at the College of Navarre:

Gerson, John Major, Jean

Courtecuisse, Jacques Almain, Bishop Bossuet.

D'Ailly and

his ideas were by no means forgotten, and over the two cen
turies after his death many of his works, even ones of no
immediate value to the polemicists, continued to be read and
printed.1
Thus, in the first area of the twofold influence of
d'Ailly's "political" writings, "that full formation of his
thought about the government of the ecclesiastical polity
which is found in his Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate
remained, along with the teaching of his pupil Gerson and
\
For fuller discussion, see Oakley, D'Ailly. pp. 211-1?.
This would be the appropriate place to discuss d'Ailly's in
fluence on curialist thought subsequent to its divorce from
its short marriage with conciliarism. But again, the issue
must be passed over since the curialist aspects of d'Ailly's
conciliarism do not emerge in De materia. But see Oakley,
D'Ailly, pp. 216-17, for a discussion and for reference to
source material concerning d'Ailly's influence on Torquemada
in this respect. There is a dearth of information on d'Ail
ly's immediate influence on his fellow conciliarist contem
poraries. See Oakley, "Gerson and D'Ailly: An Admonition,"
Speculum, XL (1965), 7^-83, for discussion of his influence
on his illustrious pupil Jean Gerson. Paul Sigmund, Nicho
las of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge: Har
vard University Press, 1963), p. 107, has noted that of the
earlier conciliarists d'Ailly is probably the one closest
in tone and argumentation to Nicholas of Cusa.
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of -their disciples Major and Almain, the abiding inspiration
of theological Gallicans . . . .
In the light of the general trend of the most recent
scholarship, it is no longer the fashion to view conciliar
theory as proceeding in any simple or direct way to the Prot
estant Reformation.

The theological orthodoxy of a man like

d'Ailly— demonstrated by his opposition to the Hussite and
Wyclyfite movements— may help us to see more of the ortho
doxy of his ecclesiology and reform measures, in which he
never attacked the divine origin of the papacy nor its right
to carry on the Church's daily government.

Oakley prefers

to see d'Ailly’s footprints not only in the tradition of the
Gallicans, but in the disciplinary legislation which emerged
at Trent and in the ecclesiology emerging from the Second
2
Vatican Council.
"There can be little doubt . . .about the
real influence of d'Ailly's political ideas upon later theo
ries concerning the nature of the ecclesiastical polity.”-^
The second facet of influence is the more difficult one
to pursue.

This is the question of the alleged influence of

conciliar thought on later secular political thought* "in par
ticular can d'Ailly's political thought be assigned any in
dividual part in this development?"^

Many have written, in

^"Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 229.
2
Oakley in Gerrish, p. 48.
-^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 21?.
W

,

p. 218.
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support of this influence of the conciliarists.

For in

stance, Harold Laski views conciliarism as a political the
ory in its own right, "the one universal expression to which
medieval constitutionalism attained."

The conciliarists re

garded the community as the sovereign and the headship as
a trust; the road from Constance to 1688 was "a direct one."'*'
Otto von Gierke thinks that the conciliar movement formed
"an important chapter in the historical development of 'Na
ture-Right* theories of the State," and contributed immense
ly to the success of the political doctrine of papal sover2
eignty."
J. N. Figgis has followed Gierke’s lead and sug
gests that the conciliar arguments were important because
they were "more purely political than those of the earlier
Middle Ages," concerned not with conflicts between rival au
thorities "but with the depositary, the function and the lim
its, of sovereign power in a perfect society."

Figgis has

suggested that it was precisely the lack of concern for the
medieval preoccupation with the relationship between regnum
and sacerdotium that gives the conciliarists' speculations
their peculiar value.

Their theorizing on the General Coun

cil as the depositary of sovereignty within the Church "drove

"^Harold Laski, "Political Theory in the Later Middle
Ages," in Cambridge Medieval History, VIII, The Close of the
Middle Ages led. C. W. Previte-Orton, Z. N. Brooke, et al;
2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan Company, 8 vols., 1936), p. 640.
2
Otto von Gierke, The Development of Political Theory
(trans. Bernard Freyd; TTiw York: W. W. Norton and Company.
1939), pp. 147-48.
*’
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the thinkers to treat the Church definitely as one of a class,
political societies."1

Walter Ullmann writes that "Monarchy

versus oligarchy was the real issue of the Schism, or seen
from a different angle, absolute versus constitutional mon2
archy."
Finally, G. H. Sabine comments;
The controversy in the Church first drew the
lines upon which the issue between absolute and
constitutional government was drawn, and it spread
the type of political philosophy by which in the
main absolutism was to be contested . . . .From
the Conciliar theory of the fifteenth century there
is a directly developing line of thought to the
liberal and constitutional movement" of the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries. 3
The a priori case for such influence is good.

As has

been pointed out, the constitutional movement in the Church
paralleled certain secular developments.

Also, the medieval

canonists had not regarded their juristic principles as ex4
clusively ecclesiastical.
By late medieval times, the Church
was being conceived of as a political community similar to

J. N. Figgis, Gerson to Grotius,
terial, in order, pp. 49, 42. Oakley,
pointed out that the apparent error of
source of conciliarism in the examples
not damage his observations here; even
that the Church was being conceived of
munity.
2
Ullmann, Origins, p. 6.

pp. 44-45; quoted ma
D ^ i l l y . p. 52, has
Figgis in locating the
of secular states does
his opponents agree
as a political com

•^G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (2nd ed.;
New York; H. Holt and Company, 1950)» PP« 326-27.
4
For example, Huguccio had applied canonistic doctrine
on the deposition of an heretical pope to justify, in cer
tain cases, the deposition of a tyrannical king by his bar
ons* Brian Tierney, "The Canonists and the Medieval State,"
Review of Politics. XV (1953). 381.
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others.

In d'Ailly's case, we have seen that he regarded

his "political" concepts as true for any rightly ordained
polity and that he justified their application to the Church
on that very basis.

Oakley has emphasized the significance

of d'Ailly's conception of the inherent authority of the gov
erned.

D'Ailly not only asserted the existence of an actual

institutional machinery for retraining monarchical abuse
of power; he went on to envisage

continuously operating in

stitutional restraints, in the form of regular assemblings
of the General Council.

A basic problem with medieval the

ories on resistance to princely abuse of power was that ef
fective remedies were essentially dependent on "the verdict
2
of the individual outraged conscience."
In this as in other
areas, d'Ailly and his conciliarist colleagues brought into
relatively explicit statement what had been vague suggestion.
"It is, accordingly, in its faltering moves toward the in
stitutionalization of what had been essentially personal rights
to enforce the limitation of government to its proper goals
that the interest and value of d'Ailly's position concerning
forms of government is to be found."

E. F. Jacob, who is ap

parently skeptical of the claim that the conciliarists are
among the organizers of the Western constitutional tradition—
for he suggests that the conciliarists held a theological ra1
In Part Three of De materia.
2
Oakley, D'Ailly. p. 116; for the following quotation.
Ibid., p. 117.
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ther than a political and constitutional conception of the
Church— writes that "The passages where the constitutional
analogy is pressed are not always the most essential part
of Conciliar doctrine, save perhaps, in the writings of Pii
erre d'Ailly."
Finally, as Hubert Jedin has pointed out,
"it is a commonplace with the writers of the period of restor
ation that the democratic ideas of the epoch of the Councils
2
were a danger to monarchy as an institution."
Such considerations, coupled with obvious similarities
between conciliarist views on the nature of the political
community and the ideas of seventeenth=century constitution
alists, make the generalizations of historians sound true.
But with the exception of some scant research by Figgis the
case has remained largely a priori.

Some writers have re

garded conciliarism as irrelevant to the history of political
1
E. F. Jacob, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch (South Bend:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1963)* P« 4. Jacob's posi
tion is not clear. He seems to have reacted against the as
sertion of Figgis that the conciliarists borrowed from the
examples of secular states by denying not only this asser
tion but its reverse as well. He seems to slide unconscious
ly from saying that the conciliarists did not borrow from
the earlier examples of secular states to saying that the
conciliarists are not among the ancestors of Western consti
tutionalism in secular politics. It seems like an error op
posite to that of Figgis, who was aware of the influence of
the conciliarists on later political theory and then linked
conciliarism to earlier developments in the secular states.
At the close of his book (pp. 241-42), Jacob emends his as
sessment of the conciliarist conception of the Church to admit
that it is juristic as well as theological, while he still
maintains that it is not political or constitutional. But
how is a conception of the institutional Church, especially
a juristic conception, not also a constitutional one?
2Jedin, I, 137 n. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
theory.

1

Oakley suggests that there is good reason for this

situation— the lack of exhaustive analysis and elucidation
of the political thought of leading conciliarists except
Nicholas of Cusa.

He suggests that no general evaluation of

the place of conciliarism in the history of European politi
cal thought be made until a great deal more is known about
2
the political thought of individual conciliarists.
Much less then, at this time, can we expect much in
formation on possible influences of the Tractatus de materia
itself.

Yet some facts have emerged, and Oakley suggests

that we have allowed the Protestant Reformation to obscure
"more distant prospects" in the landscape of late medieval
and early modern political thought, that men living closer
to the events have recognized the enduring influence of con
ciliar ideas, and even of d'Ailly's in particular, in a number of ways beyond somehow being Protestant precursors.
For example, such writers as John of Paris, Marsilius
of Padua, William of Ockham, d'Ailly, Zabarella, Gerson, John
Major, and Jacques Almain were repeatedly cited in the seven
teenth century as having supported the right of the people
to resist tyranny.

English sources are the most fertile, but

1

Notably, R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, A History of
Medieval Political Theory in the West, VI, Political Theory
from 1300 to l600 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 6 vols., 1953),
T5>6?, 24-7.
2
Oakley, D'Ailly, pp. 6-7. It was Oakley's hope in writ
ing this volume to perform this task ir, d'Ailly's case.
3Ibid.. p. 219.
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the French also yield some material.

Allusion has been made

to the continued publication of conciliarist works, and there
is evidence that the early seventeenth-century editions were
read and cited from not only by Gallican and Anglican pro
ponents but by the advocates of constitutional government,
especially in England.

While some of the seventeenth-cen

tury writers seem to have drawn directly upon the conciliarists for principles which they regarded as applicable to the
political order, nearly all of them drew heavily upon their
more immediate predecessors, the Protestant and Catholic monarchomachs of the sixteenth century.

Thus, in order to es

tablish a solid link of conscious continuity from the conciliarists down into the seventeenth century, one must es
tablish the fact that these sixteenth-century writers were
conscious inheritors of the tradition.

A good deal of trouble

is experienced here with many of the sixteenth-century writ
ers, but it can be shown that four very important works of
that century, at least three of which were very influential
in seventeenth-century English political thought, display this
conscious dependence.

These are John Ponet's Shorte Treatise

on Politicke Power, George Buchanan’s De iure regni apud Scotos, Theodore Beza's Du droit des magistrats. and the anony
mous Vindiciae contra tyrannos.

The relationship of concil-

iar doctrine to issues of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen
turies and the uses to which it was put during those times
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are topics too involved to be discussed here.

i

Oakley concludes that the "Conciliar tradition was a
living tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
and as such it helped to mould secular as well as ecclesias2
tical political thinking."
Grounded on principles more uni
versal than Scripture or natural

constitutional precedent,

conciliar theory proved of value in several countries.

Con

ciliar theories are among the direct sources at least of Pon^t, Buchanan, Beza, and the Vindiciae, and they were con
sulted and quoted by many including some of the English con
's
stitutionalists of the seventeenth century.
"If these facts are kept in mind, it may not seem un
reasonable to suggest that the history of early modern pol
itical theory should be viewed a little less in terms of the
upheaval occasioned by the Protestant Reformation and a lit
tle more in terms of late medieval antecedents."^

The ideas

of the popular origin of political authority and of common
interest as the criterion of legitimacy of governmental acts
locate d'Ailly and most of his conciliarist colleagues with-

For a full discussion of the influence of d'Ailly and
other conciliarists on secular political theory, along with
copious references to source material and further reading,
see Ibid., pp. 219-32.
2Ibid., p. 229.
-^Of course, the survival of such a tradition on an in
ternational scale raises the question of why constitutional
ism only survived the era of absolutism in England, a ques
tion, needless to say, outside the purview of this survey.
^Oakley, D'Ailly, p. 230.
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in the tradition of European constitutionalism, which matured
in the seventeenth century, but which originated in the daily
life, civil and ecclesiastical, of the Middle Ages.

Oakley

does not doubt the important political consequences of the
Reformation but would place them on the practical rather than
the theoretical level.

It was reluctantly, in spite of them

selves, and by necessity, that religious groups were led to
employ doctrines which are now recognized as a common Western
heritage.

It was the failure of any of the religious groups

to command universal allegiance, rather than any necessary
theoretical deductions from their religious doctrines, which
insured the survival of constitutional ideas.

In England,

it may be doubted whether the quasitheocratic
principles of those Puritans were as important a
factor in providing an initial theoretical . . .
justification for the opposition to monarchical
absolutism as that "Whig" tradition of th- ;ht
which was so well expressed in the Vindic ~ 2 anc*
in the works of Ponet and Buchanan. This tradi
tion was not the offspring of the Reformation but
rather the legacy of the Middle Ages, and it had
received its clearest and most universal theoreti
cal formulation in the thought of the fourteenthand fifteenth-century conciliarists, not least
in that of Pierre d'Ailly.

1Ibid.. pp. 231-32.
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APPENDIXi SOME NOTES ON THE GENESIS OF THE
GLOSSES ON D.4-0, C.6, A FIDE DEVIUS
The glossa ordinaria to the Decretum was the best known
of the early Decretist glosses in the fourteenth century
and the most influential in forming fourteenth-century opin
ion.

Tierney has remarked concerning its author, Joannes

Teutonicus, that
precision of terminology was not one of his
virtues. What is at any rate certain is that the
Glossa Ordinaria to the Decretum provided a useful
source of arguments for later thinkers whose views
were more radical than those of Joannes Teutonicus
himself.1
The availability as well as the character of this work made
it popular among the conciliarists, including d'Ailly.

In

the evolution of Decretist literature, D.4-0, c.6, a text
which hints at the liability of the pope to judgment for
heresy, became the object of glosses which expanded upon
the theme of the pope's liability to judgment.

This appen

dix is presented to show something of how the gloss of Jo
annes Teutonicus came to say what it did, to shed more light
on d'Ailly's use of the text, the gloss, and related Decre
tist literature.

Perhaps the illustration of this one is

sue will give some idea of the chinks in the armor of pa-

^■Tierney, Foundations, p. 66. See the appendices to
this work, where Tierney presents the glosses of Huguccio
(pp. 24-8-50) and Joannes Teutonicus (pp. 251-52) on D.4-0,
c.6, in v. a fide devius, which are discussed below.
1*8
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pal monarchy which proved useful to the conciliarists.
The earlier Decretists had struggled with the trouble
some ambiguity of the Decretum on the relationship between
the authority of the pope and that of the whole Church.

The

Decretum contained several explicit assertions that the pope
stood above all human judgment.*

Gratian cited five cases

of popes who had submitted to judgment, but he maintained
that their submissions were made voluntarily.

He never ad

mitted that any man or group had the right to condemn an
2
erring pope.
But one text left the pope open to the charge
of heresy: D.40, c.6, with its admonition that the pope was
to be judged by no man, unless he was found to be deviating
from the faith.^

This text became the basis of "a formidah.
ble edifice of canonistic speculation," as the Decretists
sought to reconcile these texts and explain why heresy was
mentioned as the one case in which a pope apparently had a
judicial superior.

Quite early, schism was coupled to here

sy, since its prolongation was seen as always productive of
heresy.

Also current was a tendency to extend justiciable

*C.9» q.3» cc.10-18; D.17, post c.6; D.21, cc.4, 7;
D.79» Post c.10; c.17, q.^» c.30.
2
The five cases were D.21, c.7 (Marcellinus); D.17,
c.6 and C.2. q.7» post c.4l (Symmachus); C.2, q.5, c.10
(Sixtus III); C.2, q.7» Post c.^1 (Damasus); C.2, q.7,
post kl (Leo IV).
3
■Jn . . .A nemine est iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur
a fide devius."
it

Tierney, Foundations, p. 57«
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offenses to all cases touching the welfare of the entire
Church (status ecclesiae).
Huguccio presented in one comprehensive gloss the
first detailed discussion of the issue.

In answer to the

question why heresy should be mentioned as the one crime
that could be charged against the pope, he quoted the ac
cepted opinion that heresy in the pope was peculiarly in
jurious to the Church as a whole.
heresy the only crime so injurious.

But he did not consider
Huguccio conceived of

other offenses (for example, notorious fornication, rob
bery, sacrilege) injurious to the whole Church which could
not be tolerated.

To scandalize the Church by contumacious

persistence in such notorious crime was tantamount to heresy and punishable as such.

Finally, he stated that those

statutes declaring papal immunity from all human judgment
could not have been intended to apply to such crimes* his
reason for this, explicitly stated, was that no statute was
to be interpreted in a sense that endangered the welfare of
the whole Church.

Papal immunity from judgment could not

extend to a crime in which the whole Church’s welfare was
2
at stake.

^Contumacy was likened to heresy in the Decretum* C.l,
q. 7 , c.l* D.38, c.16. Huguccio suggested that heresy was
mentioned alone by way of example or perhaps because a pope
could be accused of it even when it was not notorious.

2

This aspect of the problem, clearly and decisively
set out by Huguccio, aroused little comment in later Decre
tist glosses. His view won general acceptance among the D.e-
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But Huguccio went on to tackle the problems of legal
procedure involved in bringing a pope to court.

Although

D.40i c.6, might withhold immunity from an heretical pope,
other texts stated that the pope had no judicial superior
and that an inferior could not even accuse a superior.*
Why Huguccio was unsatisfied with simply establishing that
a pope could be tried for heresy or crimes tantamount to it
is evident.

He saw the difficulty facing the canonists in

framing a consistent theory and stated it in considering
the problem of why the normal procedure— which allowed for
denunciation for secret crimes— could not be applied in a
pope’s cases the pope lacked a competent judge.
decide whether the pope was a heretic?

Who was to

Once elected by two-

thirds of the cardinals (even if simoniacally) he was le
gally true pope, and no exception could be brought against
him.

He remained pope until a charge of heresy could be le

gally established.

If a pope denied a charge of heresy, it

did not seem as if any court was competent to judge the is
sue.
passe.

The principle of papal immunity could lead to an im
"A Pope could only be brought to trial if he were

a heretic* but the fact of his heresy could normally only be

cretists of the thirteenth century, but by Ockham’s day,
the prevailing canonist opinion limited papal liability to
heresy.
*0n the pope’s judicial superiority, see p. 1^9 n. 1.
On the ban on inferiors accusing superiors, see D.22, Prima
pars Gratiani* C.2, q.7»
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established in the course of a trial.
As Tierney writes, "The juristic problem was to define
the circumstances in which a Pope could be presumed guilty
of heresy, and so no longer a true Pope, without any trial
2
being held."
Huguccio*s solution defined the circumstances
in which a charge of heresy could be brought against the
pope and recognized limitations to the exercise of this pow
er.

A pope could only be accused of heresy when he public

ly announced his willful adherence to a known heresy and
refused to abandon his position after due admonition.
accusation could be made against him

No

if he propounded a new

idea suspected of heresy or if he held in secret a heresy
already condemned but denied the fact.

To be liable to ac

cusation his heresy had to be public or his crime notorious.
He could never be accused of a secret crime.
These reservations, the heart of Huguccio*s argument,
sought to meet the difficulty that no court was competent
to try a pope by eliminating the necessity for the trial of
a pope as such, and to achieve this, Huguccio was applying
to, the pope a series of arguments Gratian had applied to
the position of lesser prelates.

Although Gratian felt that

no inferior could condemn a superior, he also held that no
formal condemnation was necessary in the case of a man who
£
Tierney, Foundations, p. 61.
2Ibid., p. 62.
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embraced a heresy already condemned.

Such an individual’s

blatancy was regarded as a willful self-inclusion in the
standing condemnation.

This explains Huguccio*s distinc

tion between novel and known heresy and his insistence that
a charge brought against the pope must be one of adherence
to the latter.

Gratian also conceded that accusations by

inferiors against superiors might be admitted in the case
of heresy, since in matters of faith the heretic was lower
2
than the worst Catholic.
He added that this applied only
in cases of acknowledged heresy; a prelate of good repute
who did not admit being a heretic was not subject to such
3

accusations.

Hence came Huguccio*s reservation that the

pope could only be accused of publicly preached heresy, and
not secret heresy.

And the deposition of any prelate thus

self-convicted would not involve a breach of the principle
that a superior could not be condemned by an inferior, since
/l

such a man was inferior to any true Catholic.

Thus, if a

pope announced his adherence to known heresy and held to
it despite due admonition, or, what amounted to the same,

C .2^,

q

.1, ante c.l.

2

C.2, Q.7i j^osjfc c.26; C.6, q .1, c.20«
3
C.6, q .1, j^osjt c .21.
ij.
There is no evidence that Huguccio*s argument rested
on any alleged conciliar supremacy. He did not consider a
General Council necessary to condemn a pope for heresy. He
held that the cardinals could deal adequately with one who
was "minor quolibet catholico." Tierney, "Ockham,"
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contumaciously persisted in notorious crime, he was ipso
facto condemned, lower than the worst Catholic, and so no
longer pope.

The problem of finding a competent judge was

neatly circumvented by regarding the heretic as automatical
ly degraded and condemned.
The effect of Huguccio*s analysis was to augment the
number of charges admissible against a pope, since all no
torious c r i m ^ w e r e regarded as tantamount to heresy, but
also to severely limit the circumstances in which the charge
could be brought.

Tierney points out that Huguccio*s reser

vations concerning this latter point were essential to his
position and that if the canonists wished to adhere strict
ly to the principle that a legal pope stood above all human
judgment, they could only hold him liable to deposition for
heresy in the circumstances described by Huguccio.1
But though the Decretists of the next generation fully
accepted Huguccio*s view that the pope could be deposed for
any notorious crime, they came to reject or ignore his care
ful reservations concerning the legal procedure, to the com
promise of the principle of papal immunity which Huguccio
had defended.

No distinction was made between secret and

open heresy or new and known heresy.
without his self-incrimination.

A pope could be accused

No suggestion was made that

the man brought to trial had ceased to be pope before he
was found guilty.

1Tierney, Foundations, p. 63.
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As has been pointed out, the glossa ordinaria to the
Decretum stands out among the Decretist works because of
its especially fertile ambiguity and its availability dur
ing the conciliar era.

In it Joannes Teutonicus held that

a pope could be deposed for any notorious crime, but even
for secret heresy.

He made no distinction between old and

new heresy, nor did he restate Huguccio*s solution to the
difficulty of an inferior accusing a superior.

Teutonicus

closely associated the judicial immunity normally conceded
to the pope with the doctrine that normally his decisions
could stand against the whole world.1

But he was more out

spoken than other Decretists in emphasizing that in cases
in which articles of faith were involved, the General Council was superior to the pope.

Tierney speculates that Jo

annes may have believed that a General Council had superior
jurisdiction in matters of faith, enabling it to judge a
pope on charges of heresy.

Such an interpretation would ex

plain why Joannes felt that a pope could be accused even of
secret heresy but not of other secret crimes.

If this glos

sator felt that a pope's liability to judgment for heresy
rested on a superior authority of the General Council in
matters of faith, not on any idea of self-condemnation and

1See C.9t 9*3* c .13 » in v. Neque ab omni clero, print
ed in Tierney, Foundations, p. 253*
2
D.15, c.2, in v. Praesumitt D.19» c.9» in v. Concilio;
Ibid., pp. 250-51.
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automatic degradation, there would be no need for him to
reproduce Huguccio*s cautious reservations.

But Tierney al

so sees sufficient reason to suspect that Joannes had con
fused the authority of the General Council understood as
the pope starrounded by the fathers in council with the au
thority of those fathers acting against the pope.1

Without

a doubt, the ambiguities of the glossa ordinaria to the De2
cretum were to prove fruitful for later radicals.

In 195^ ("Ockham, 56-57) * Tierney argues that Joannes
Teutonicus did support the idea of the judicial superiority
of the General Council in matters of faith.
By 1955 (Foun
dations , pp. 65-66), he seems more hesitant to choose be
tween the alternatives.
2
For a fuller discussion on the subject matter of this
appendix, see Tierney, Foundations, pp. 57-67, and '’Ockham,”
50-53* My discussion is drawn largely from these. This ap
pendix does not trace subsequent Decretalist treatment of
the topic, since d*Ailly seems to have drawn from and ex
panded upon Joannes. But the issue of papal liability to
judgment received renewed interest in the fourteenth-century
glosses, after a slump in the thirteenth, because of the
crises of those years. Guido de Baysio, for example, held
a doctrine which had been common in the thirteenth century:
resistance to an heretical pope could not take the form of
an exceptio (an allegation that he had never been true pope
or had ceased to be one because of his heresy), but must be
expressed in an accusatio, which necessitated a trial. He
also held that a pope could be accused even of secret her
esy and that the competent tribunal was a General Council.
Joannes Andreae and Henricus Bohic expressed approval of
this. While none of these three claimed that a General Coun
cil was superior in cases involving articles of faith— they
expressly denied it— their ignoring of Huguccio's arguments,
which had shown how a pope could be brought to trial with
out the need of such a doctrine, carried the readily-exploit
ed implication of conciliar supremacy. Meanwhile, some of
the anti-papal publicists reaffirmed Huguccio*s point on
automatic degradation* For more on these fourteenth-century
developments, see Tierney, "Ockham,” 57-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Friedberg, Aemilius, ed. Corpus Iuris Canonici. 2 vols.
Graz: Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959.
preprint of Leipzig, 1879-81 edition/
Oakley, Francis. The Political Thought of Pierre d/Ailly:
The Voluntarist Tradition. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1964.
Appendix III: Tractatus de materia concilii generalis.
________. "The 'Propositiones Utiles' of Pierre d'Ailly:
An Epitome of Conciliar Theory." Church History.
xxix (i960), 398-403.
A translation with notes and commentary.
Raymond, Irving W. "D'Ailly*s 'Epistola Diaboli Leviathon.’
Church History. XXII (1953), 181-91.
A translation with notes and commentary.
Tierney, Brian. Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The
Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian
to the Great Schism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968.

15?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

